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ABSTRACT 
What are we?  
The Ontology of Subjects of Experience 
by 
HUNG Jenny 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
What am I? There are a number of possible answers: I am a person, a mind, a human 
animal, a soul, part of a human being (e.g., a brain), I do not exist, and even more. 
Philosophers have been asking this for thousands of years and were not satisfied.  
 
In the contemporary analytic tradition, philosophers are attracted to a naturalistic, 
scientific ontology hence a materialistic personal ontology that matches the huge 
success in scientific discoveries. They think that we are material objects. However, 
their views do not match our intuition about some cases regarding our survival. Also, 
the possibility of an afterlife is eliminated. In my thesis, I explain the shortcomings of 
current philosophical theories, and develop a better account. 
 
I propose the Conscious Subject View, according to which (1) I am a subject of 
experience, a mental entity whose essential property is to be conscious, and (2) 
Subjects have haecceities, a property that makes an object a different object from other 
objects even if they are qualitatively identical with it. I provide two arguments for the 
claim that we are essentially subjects. The first is the Essentiality Argument. I first 
define an egoistic concern as one such that necessarily, my concern about X can be 
egoistic if and only if I exist and persist as X. Furthermore, I argue that necessarily, I 
can be egoistically concerned with an entity E if and only if E is numerically identical 
with my subject of experience. I then conclude that we are essentially subjects of 
experience. My second argument, which I call the Argument of Persistence, is that we 
have the intuition that we persist only when there is the gradual replacement of the 
brain. I argue that the best candidate to explain this intuition is that we persist as 
subjects of experience. I further offer a conceivability argument for the claim that 
haecceity of the subject determines its persistence. 
 
I defend a mentally-oriented proposal regarding our nature by examining the 
essential properties of our existence. It solves most of the problems with the 
 
 
materialistic personal ontology and shows the theoretical advantages of a long-
neglected approach. 
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0   Introduction 
0.1   Personal Ontology 
This thesis is on our essential properties and our persistence conditions. The question 
of the nature of the self is often expressed in the form “what I am.” Although there 
have been plenty of discussions throughout the intellectual history, philosophers are 
not satisfied. The problem of personal ontology is one concerning the metaphysics of 
ourselves. There are three questions of personal ontology: 
 
Personal Ontology 
1. What are we?  
2. What are our synchronic identity conditions?  
3. What are our diachronic identity conditions? 
 
There are a number of possible answers to the first question (1) in the contemporary 
literature: I am a person, a mind, a human animal, a soul, part of a human being (e.g., 
a brain), a subject of experience, and even more. 
Usually, when philosophers try to answer question 1, they aim to provide the 
nature but not the accidental statuses of what we are. When philosophers make such 
an inquiry about our nature, they usually aim to provide the essential properties of our 
existence. I take the first question of personal ontology as the question of what our 
essential properties are. Also, I understand the question of our nature as the question 
of our essential properties. I understand the notion of essential property to be a modal 
notion. The definition of essential property I adopt is such that an entity x has an 
essential property F if and only if necessarily, when x exists, x has F.1 For instance, I 
am a philosopher, but I am not essentially a philosopher because I may exist without 
                                                     
1 Kit Fine (1994) argues that such a modal definition of essential property is unsustainable. He also 
proposes that this approach and the idea of metaphysics as a branch of modal logic should be 
abandoned. In this thesis, I do not aim at arguing for a novel definition of essential property. What I 
adopt is the classical, modal definition of essential property. 
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being a philosopher. In other words, “being a philosopher” is not my essential property. 
I treat one’s nature as one’s essential properties. In asking for the nature of x, we ask 
for the essential properties of x. I define also that if “being an X” is my essential 
property, then I am essentially an X. In this thesis, I assume essentialism in general, 
namely, the thesis that there are at least some objects with essential properties. I also 
assume subject essentialism, the claim that subjects have essential properties. I define 
the first question of personal ontology as what fills in F in this sentence: necessarily, 
for any x, if x is among us, then necessarily, when x exists, x is an F (x has the essential 
properties of F). 
The question of “what we are” has been prevalent for more than two thousand 
years. The famous ancient Greek philosophers, Socrates and Plato, proposed that we 
are immaterial souls separable from the physical body. There is also the notorious 
Cartesian dualism defended by René Descartes, according to which the thinking thing 
is a mental substance distinct from the physical. In the contemporary analytic tradition, 
philosophers are fond of the view that we are material objects. They are attracted to a 
naturalistic, scientific ontology of the world hence also to a materialistic personal 
ontology that matches the huge success in scientific discoveries. 
The second question (2) of personal ontology concerns our synchronic identity 
conditions. Many philosophers think that there are two kinds of identity relation – the 
numerical identity relation and the qualitative identity relation. The former is a relation 
that holds only between an object and itself as numerically the same thing. For instance, 
Peter is numerically identical with himself but not to his twin brother. The latter 
relation is one that holds between things of the same type, or of the same qualitative 
properties. Peter and his twin brother can be said to be qualitatively identical in terms 
of their genes; the many packs of cookies in the supermarket can also be regarded as 
qualitatively identical in some other sense since there is no reason for us to pick one 
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pack of cookies but not the other, given that they look very much the same to us. Most 
of the time, the questions of personal ontology concern our numerical identity, not 
qualitative identity, at a time and over time.  
There are two senses in which we can understand individuation. For the first sense 
of individuation, the recognition that there is only one object but not two or more in 
front of us is for us to identify an object from an epistemological or cognitive point of 
view. For instance, when we perceive a monkey mother carrying her two babies, we 
immediately perceive three entities there instead of one; but we perceive that there is 
a fence but not separated pieces of wood. How are perceptions of these individuals 
possible? This is the famous problem of perception of objective particulars. This 
question is categorized as a historical debate in philosophy of perception, which is 
itself a big question not directly related to the problem of personal ontology in the 
metaphysical sense. I am not going to deal with it in this thesis. 
There is also a metaphysical sense of individuation of objects. The facts about the 
criteria of individuation of an object in a metaphysical sense would be facts 
independent of our perception of the object, given that realism is true – physical objects 
exist independent of our existence, and their individuation is also independent of our 
psychological structure. Under this picture, necessarily, an entity E is a single thing if 
and only if it fulfills certain requirements for being a single thing. The requirements 
vary among different kinds of thing. Since discussions of personal ontology aim to be 
metaphysical, the individuality of ourselves should be studied via the metaphysical 
sense of individuation. That said, the second question of personal ontology is not just 
a question regarding how we perceive our own individuality, but how we are 
individuated ontologically. 
 The third question of personal ontology concerns with the persistence conditions 
of ourselves. The answer to this question is what fills in the dots in this sentence: 
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necessarily, for any x and y and for any times t1 and t2 (t1?t2), if x and y are among us, 
then x at t1 = y at t2 if and only if …. People usually ask questions such as “When did 
I begin?” “What will happen to me when I die?” In fact, these questions can be reduced 
to a more fundamental inquiry about the necessary and sufficient conditions for our 
persistence: “in virtue of what we persist over time?” There are many answers to such 
a question. For instance, some philosophers think that we persist if there is continuity 
of memories, psychological traits, future goals, and aims. However, there is the famous 
reduplication problem saying that these psychological properties are multiply 
instantiable, thus should not be factors that determine personal identity, and there can 
be two or more individuals that are psychologically continuous with you. Some 
thinkers claim that the continuity of the same physical body or the brain determines 
our persistence. There are still other philosophers who propose that all these are merely 
evidence for, but not what determines, our persistence. Some would even claim that 
the sameness of souls is what our persistence consists of. 
As we will see, one’s idea of what we are will directly influence one’s choice 
about theories of our persistence conditions, and vice versa. In other words, the 
metaphysical fact regarding “what we essentially are” is directly related to the 
metaphysical fact concerning “in virtue of what we persist.” For instance, one easy 
observation is that if we are essentially X, then we cannot persist without being X. 
Moreover, if necessarily, I persist if and only if I persist as X, then I am essentially X. 
So long as we persist, the properties of X that ground X’s persistence and existence 
will be present. In this case, the essential properties of X are also present when we 
persist. In other words, necessarily, so long as we persist, we are X. That is tantamount 
to saying that we are essentially X. 
 
0.2   Personhood and Selfhood 
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When philosophers make an inquiry about our essential properties, they sometimes 
interpret the question as asking for the essential properties of a person. This is correct 
only if we are essentially persons. Indeed, some philosophers, such as the 
Constitutionalists, think that we are essentially persons constituted by human animals. 
However, it is noted that some thinkers, such as some versions of Animalism, think 
that we are not essentially persons but human animals. 
The idea of what makes an individual a person may vary among philosophers. 
Derek Parfit (1984) adopts a Lockean definition of a person, according to which 
necessarily, x is a person if and only if x is an entity that thinks, has the ability to think 
of itself and itself, and can extend its consciousness to the past. Lynne Rudder Baker 
(2013), on the other hand, proposes that necessarily, x is a person if and only if x has a 
rudimentary first-person perspective and is capable of developing a robust first-person 
perspective. Briefly speaking, the rudimentary first-person perspective is the ability to 
perceive the world from a spatiotemporal perspective, and the robust first-person 
perspective is the ability to think of oneself as oneself (and to use first-person 
pronouns). Despite these variations, the term “person” generally refers to an entity that 
can think and has certain psychological properties. In the current literature, the term 
“person” usually refers to a being that has certain psychological properties such as 
memories, dispositions, psychological traits, and cognitive capacities such as thinking 
of itself as itself. Moreover, a person bears a certain moral and social responsibility. In 
this thesis, I adopt the following definition of person: necessarily, for any x, x is a 
person if and only if x has memories, psychological traits, certain personality, and the 
capacity to think of itself as itself. 
There are two different sets of questions for us:  
 
Set A 
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1. What properties do we have?  
2. What essential properties do we have?  
3. What are the persistence conditions of ourselves? 
 
Set B 
4. What properties does a person have? 
5. What are the essential properties of being a person?  
6. What are the persistence conditions of a person? 
 
The main project in this thesis is to answer question 2 (but not 5). I will touch on 
question 1 (but not question 4) about the relation between the subject of experience 
and its physical body and answer whether we are human animals. Moreover, I will also 
answer the question of our persistence (question 3, but not question 6). We can see that 
the two sets of questions become equivalent if we are essentially persons. On the other 
hand, if we are not sure whether we are essentially persons, then we could not just 
define the problem of our persistence as one of the persistence of persons, and vice 
versa. Such an assumption would heavily undermine the original intention of asking 
the questions of personal ontology. 
There may not be fruitful practical guidance for our daily lives personal ontology 
claims could provide. For instance, it is widely accepted that persons bear a moral 
status and have moral and social responsibilities. In contrast, some human animals, 
brains, or subjects of experience may not have moral status or social responsibilities 
as high as that of persons. For instance, the subject of experience of a jellyfish has no 
social responsibilities. A person is a being of a certain dignity, and “person” a term 
with certain practical (such as legal) implications; a subject of experience may not. We 
should distinguish the difference between the moral and social status of a person, a 
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human animal, and a subject of experience. 
Take the subject of experience as an example. It is a sentient conscious being 
capable of feeling pain and joy. If we admit that pain is undesirable, and joy is desirable, 
then it is preferable to minimize pain for a subject and to maximize joy for it. In light 
of this, the owner of these simple sensory and emotional experiences may carry certain, 
yet limited, moral status. I hold the view that it is possible for there to be a subject of 
experience of pure pain without being able to have moral thoughts or moral actions. 
Patients in the late stage of Alzheimer’s disease are some examples. Also, there may 
be a totally passive subject of experience that only feels without having volitions. For 
instance, there are patients with lock-in syndrome who suffer from the inability to act 
and interact with others. Since their ability to interact with the society is very limited, 
they thus should not have as many social responsibilities as we do. I do not aim at 
investigating the social and moral responsibilities of ourselves as subjects of 
experience in this thesis, although it would certainly be an important concern for many 
people in the stream of ethics. 
 
0.2.1   Human Beings (Human Animals) 
There is also the conception of human being or human animal, sometimes confused 
with the idea of person in the contemporary literature. I take the term “human animal” 
or “human being” to be referring to the kind of physical organism, or primate species, 
Homo sapiens which we belong to, and which the Biologists study. I also define the 
term “human body” as the physical body of the primate species Homo Sapiens that 
persists after the human animal dies, so long as it retains a human shape. By the same 
token, corpses are regarded as human bodies until it does not have a human shape 
anymore. “Having a human shape” is vague. Sometimes it is indeterminate whether 
one should treat an entity as a human body or not. For instance, if 70% of a human 
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body is eaten up by a lion, and the rest has severely deteriorated such that nobody 
recognizes it as once being part of a human body, then one may doubt whether the 
remaining 30% hunk of matter is a human body. 
Some thinkers would believe that one is a person only if one is a human animal 
since only human beings can be persons in the actual world. However, the claim 
indicates that it is impossible that there is a person who is not a human being. I would 
regard this understanding of personhood as too narrow. I would rather adopt a broader 
conception of person such that if there is an entity, such as a chimp, a Martian, an angel, 
or a spirit, that thinks and has psychological properties similar to that of a human 
person, then this entity should be regarded as a non-human person. 
 
0.2.2   The Self 
There is yet another puzzling question regarding what the self is. Sydney Shoemaker 
(2011) thinks that there is no difference between selves and persons, and he uses the 
two terms interchangeably. Some philosophers such as Shaun Gallagher (2000), 
however, choose to regard the self as the minimal subject of our experience and a 
person as the subject of experience with certain psychological complexities such as 
personality, long-term goals, and memories. Gallagher thinks that a minimal subject 
of experience is a mental thing that has an immediate and non-reflective (non-
conceptual) self-consciousness. This approach is taken by other thinkers such as Galen 
Strawson (2011) who claims that the self is a minimal conscious mental entity which 
does not necessarily have any personality, sense of agency, sense of persistence, or 
memory of the past. 
I do not presuppose any of these claims. I would rather take the position that 
selves are what we genuinely refer to when we utter the term “I,” and our selves are 
essentially of the most specific kind of thing that we belong to. For instance, suppose 
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I am essentially a concrete object, and also, I am essentially a subject of experience. 
Since a subject of experience is a concrete object (the set of subjects is the subset of 
the set of concrete objects), our selves are essentially of the most specific kind of thing 
that we belong to, namely, the subjects of experience. 
Some philosophers would like to differentiate between the nature of selves we 
have and the essential properties of ourselves. For me, this is a confusion of terms – 
there is no such thing as a self apart from myself, yourself, or himself. Our “selves” 
just means ourselves. The question of “what we are” is one of our essential properties, 
and also, the essential properties of ourselves, and thus the essential properties of our 
“selves.” In other words, I presuppose that the term “I” refers to a certain self, and the 
question of what we are is to provide an answer to what the essential properties of 
selves are. More specifically, I regard the question of “what we are” as a question of 
what the most specific kind of thing to which we (ourselves) belong. 
I take the question of “what the essential properties of my ‘self’ are” as equivalent 
to the one of “what I essentially am.” As my project aims to answer this question, I am 
not going to define the essential properties of selves from the very beginning. For 
instance, I do not assume that selves are essentially mental, or essentially mental 
entities. I leave it open what the self is at the first place and go on to defend the view 
that selves are subjects of experience, which are essentially conscious. This claim is 
not an assumption I make – it is rather a conclusion at which I wish to arrive. To be 
precise, I take it that the claim that “we are essentially subjects of experience” and the 
claim that “our selves are essentially subjects of experience” as equivalent. 
 
0.3   My Basic Claims 
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In this thesis, I argue that we are subjects of experience, whose essential property is to 
be conscious, and subjects of experience have haecceities. I call my view the 
Conscious Subject View. These are the basic claims of the Conscious Subject View: 
 
The Conscious Subject View 
1. I am a subject of experience - I have the essential property of having conscious 
experience. (Chapter 4) 
2. Necessarily, for any entity x, if x is a subject of experience, then x has haecceity. 
(Chapter 5) 
3. Necessarily, for any subject of experience x, for any haecceity h, if h is x's haecceity, 
then necessarily, x exists if and only if x has h. (Chapter 5) 
 
I argue for my main claims in chapters 4 and 5. Chapters 1, 2, and 3 are discussions of 
dominant views in the current literature. 
I adopt the definition of subject of experience proposed by Galen Strawson (2011), 
according to which necessarily, for any entity x, x is a subject of experience if and only 
if x is a mental thing that has conscious experience. He uses SESMET to denote a 
subject of experience, which is the abbreviation of “a subject of experience that is a 
single mental thing.” A mental thing, for Strawson, is a thing that can undergo mental 
processes and be in certain mental states. A thing, in general, is an owner of properties. 
Sometimes, I would also state that the self is a thin subject of experience to indicate 
that a subject of experience does not necessarily have personality, agency, 
psychological traits, or memories.  
I adopt the physical theory of human animal, according to which human animals 
are physical (biological) organisms. I am inclined to substance dualism though I aim 
not to discuss the mind-body problem in detail in this thesis. Under this construal, I 
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am inclined to the view that we are purely mental entities and are not human animals.2 
I am also inclined to the claim that the human animal does not think; what thinks is the 
subject of experience that has intimate causal relation with the human animal. I will 
discuss the relation between substance dualism and personal ontology in chapters one 
and four. 
I argue in the final chapter that subjects of experience have haecceities. I define 
haecceities as follows: necessarily, an object O has haecceity H if and only if H is what 
makes O a different object from other objects even if they are qualitatively identical 
with it. We are subjects, and subjects have haecceities; our persistence is determined 
by the sameness of haecceity. There should not be any observable or verifiable 
criterion for our persistence. 
My views on personal ontology are most similar to that of Richard Swinburne 
(2012). He proposes that we are essentially souls and that our persistence is the 
persistence of souls, which is in principle unverifiable for us. Nevertheless, there is 
one point that I disagree with Swinburne. I take a soul as what Swinburne defines it as 
according to which a soul is a mental entity that is capable of being conscious but not 
essentially conscious. One obvious difference between a subject and a soul is that the 
Strawsonian subject of experience (which I adopt) is essentially conscious, but the 
Swinburnean soul is not essentially conscious. Swinburne thinks that we are entities 
that are capable of being conscious, and he thinks that we are not entities that are 
essentially conscious. I disagree. I believe that we are entities that are essentially 
conscious. 
                                                     
2 E. J. Lowe (2006) proposes a novel version of substance dualism. He thinks that we are psychological 
substances, and we have physical properties. He writes: “ Accordingly, I am perfectly ready to allow 
that psychological substances should possess material characteristics (that is, include physical states 
amongst their modes).” (Lowe 2006, p. 33) In my thesis, I adopt a traditional (Cartesian) definition of 
substance dualism, according to which a mental substance only has mental properties and a physical 
substance only has physical properties. 
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0.4   Methodology 
The methodology I have adopted in this thesis is to examine various approaches to 
personal ontology and then provide my own approach. I first target Animalism, a 
popular and controversial view in the contemporary analytic literature, that we are 
numerically identical with the human animals. There are clear and straightforward 
arguments for Animalism - one can understand the main debates of personal ontology 
in a systematic way upon investigating them. I then go on to discuss the 
Constitutionalist proposal, according to which we are persons constituted by the 
human animals. Constitutionalists are fascinated by specific terminologies and 
complicated metaphysical structures. In my opinion, these complications create new 
problems. I further discuss the view that we are essentially physical and mental parts 
of the human animals and raise several objections to the claims. I then argue that we 
are subjects of experience, a purely mental entity that has the essential property of 
being conscious. 
 
0.4.1   Conceivability and Metaphysical Possibility 
Some of my main arguments rely on thought experiments and on the idea that if X is 
ideally positively conceivable, then X is metaphysically possible. Before I lay out my 
arguments, I would like to talk a bit about the relationship between conceivability and 
metaphysical possibility. 
I assume, in this thesis, David Chalmers’s (2002) claim that situations that are 
ideally positively conceivable are metaphysically possible. According to Chalmers, 
there are different classifications of conceivability. He considers conceivability as a 
property of propositions. There is prima facie and ideal conceivability and positive and 
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negative conceivability. Necessarily, the proposition P is prima facie conceivable for 
a subject S if and only if P is conceivable for S on first appearances. Necessarily, P is 
ideally conceivable for an ideal reasoner subject S if and only if careful reflection is 
carried by S, and S detects no contradiction involved. Also, necessarily, x is an ideal 
reasoner if and only if x does not have contingent cognitive limitations. Under this 
construal, some prima facie conceivable situations are not ideally conceivable. They 
can be undermined by further reflection. 
There is also negative conceivability. According to Chalmers, P is negatively 
conceivable only if P is not ruled out a priori. As mentioned, there are two scenarios 
in which one finds a proposition P negatively conceivable. When a subject S cannot 
rule out P at first glance, P is prima facie conceivable for S. However, if an ideal 
reasoner S has reflected on P and still cannot discover any contradiction, then P is 
ideally negatively conceivable for S. In contrast, to positively conceive of a situation 
is to perceptually imagine an event with certain configuration of objects with their 
corresponding properties. In other words, P is positively conceivable for a subject S if 
S can perceptually imagine a situation in which P is true. For instance, we can 
positively conceive of a dog playing the piano by perceptually imagining the visual 
image of a dog playing the piano. 
In philosophical discussions, it is positive conceivability that is adopted as the 
ground for supporting theories such as mind-body dualism. As there is always 
perceptual imagination when there is positive conceivability, sometimes philosophers 
just use perceptual imagination to replace positive conceivability. In this thesis, I will 
take the assumption that if one can perceptually imagine X, then one can positively 
conceive of X. 
Prima facie negative conceivability arguments have the weakest strength for 
being evidence for metaphysical possibility because these arguments lack the concrete 
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imagination of the scenario. Prima facie positive conceivability is stronger in terms of 
its being evidence for metaphysical possibility, but there is no guarantee. Some 
philosophers may think that we can prima facie perceptually imagine impossible 
objects such as round square, but yet, the existence of such an object is metaphysically 
impossible.  
The strongest form of conceivability should be ideal positive conceivability. By 
his definition, necessarily, P is ideally positively conceivable by an ideal reasoner S if 
and only if (1) careful reflection is carried by S, and (2) S detects no contradiction 
involved, and (3) S can imagine a situation in which P is true. For Chalmers, situations 
that are ideally positively conceivable are metaphysically possible. Ideal positive 
conceivability has this power mainly due to the perceptual imagination of the 
corresponding scenario. For him, if an ideal reasoner has an imaginative scenario in 
her mind, it is very unlikely that there are contradictions involved in such a scenario.  
Conceivability arguments for haecceitism are arguments that aim to defend 
haecceitism by assuming that if X is conceivable, then X is metaphysically possible. 
Haecceitism is the view that the world could differ non-qualitatively without differing 
qualitatively. In this thesis, I assume that situations that are ideally positively 
conceivable are metaphysically possible. My argument for the claim that subjects of 
experience have haecceities in chapter 5 can be classified as a version of the 
conceivability argument for haecceitism. 
 
0.5   Outline of the Thesis 
0.5.1   Chapter One 
This thesis has five chapters. In chapter one, I discuss Animalism, the view that I am 
numerically identical with the animal. I investigate views such as Classical Animalism 
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and weak Animalism. I further argue that if one is a substance dualist, the one will 
reject either premise one or premise two of the Thinking Animal Argument. 
Furthermore, I argue that we can adopt a phenomenal principle of unity of 
consciousness which I modify from Tim Bayne’s (2012) theory, according to which a 
subject of experience always has mental states that are phenomenally unified. This is 
a useful principle for the individuation of ourselves without relying on Animalism. 
 
0.5.2   Chapter Two 
I examine Lynne Rudder Baker’s refined definition of Constitution, Derek Parfit’s 
Embedded Person View, and Sydney Shoemaker’s Individuation of Persons. I argue 
that all these views have drawbacks. Baker’s theory is problematic in the sense that it 
denies that we can exist without having a first-person perspective. Moreover, I propose 
that the rudimentary and robust first-person perspectives are distinct properties instead 
of two stages of one single property, and none of them are essential properties of our 
existence. In addition, I raise an objection to Parfit’s Embedded Person View. I argue 
that the idea that the brain directly thinks is problematic because we find it hard to 
clearly define what it means by saying that a physical part directly thinks. I also argue 
that Shoemaker’s individuation of personhood is undesirable because his theory has 
difficulties in explaining the individuation of persons during moments in which there 
is representational disunity of mental states, such as the waterfall illusion. Second, the 
claim that we are psychological functions has an undesirable consequence that I can 
be multiply instantiated at the same time. 
 
0.5.3   Chapter Three 
I introduce in this chapter Jeff McMahan’s Embedded Mind View and Galen 
Strawson’s Conscious Subject View. According to McMahan, we are minds embedded 
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in physical bodies, and there is the same mind over time only if there is broad 
psychological continuity. I object to his view by saying that if there is already the same 
mind supported by sufficient amount of brain over time, as McMahan explicitly 
endorses, then the broad psychological continuity criterion would be redundant. I also 
discuss Strawson’s view, according to which we are essentially subjects of experience. 
Moreover, the subject of experience is identical with its experience, and the content of 
the experience, and the experiential processes it undergoes. I object to this view by 
saying that there are real distinctions between a subject, its properties, its content, and 
its process. I first provide a counterexample to the claim that if two things necessarily 
coexist in every possible world, then they are identical. Second, I show that if a mental 
thing as a process, some information such as essential properties of that object in 
question would be lost. 
 
0.5.4   Chapter Four 
In chapter four, I argue for a Conscious Subject View, according to which we are 
subjects of experience with the essential property of being conscious. This view is 
different from both McMahan’s and Strawson’s views. First, I propose that any kind 
of psychological continuity is not necessary for the persistence of the subject of 
experience. Second, I argue that the subject of experience is not a process but a mental 
entity that has persistence conditions and essential properties. I argue for the Conscious 
Subject View via two arguments: the Essentiality Argument and the Argument of 
Persistence. The Essentiality Argument is basically as follows. First, I define egoistic 
concern such that necessarily, my concern about X can be egoistic if and only if I exist 
and persist as X. Furthermore, I argue that necessarily, I can be egoistically concerned 
with an entity E if and only if E is numerically identical with my subject of experience. 
If we follow the common definition of essential properties according to which s is the 
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essential property of entity e if and only if e has s so long as e exists, then we are 
essentially subjects of experience. I provide another argument, which I call the 
Argument of Persistence, that we have the intuition that we persist only when there is 
gradual replacement of the brain. The best candidate to explain this intuition is that we 
persist as subjects of experience. 
I also argue that there is a fundamental and unbridgeable difference between (1) 
an egoistic concern that involves concern about one’s future experience from a first-
person perspective and (2) an egoistically oriented concern that does not involve the 
fear of future pain or anticipation of future joy. I go on to show that one can only have 
an egoistic concern that includes the fear of future pain from a first-person perspective 
if one is numerically identical to the future entity.  
 
0.5.5   Chapter Five 
I investigate in chapter five various approaches to the haecceitism of persons. I argue 
against Richard Swinburne’s haecceitism of souls by showing that “I” should not be 
an informative designator if it refers to a soul. I also argue that Lynne Rudder Baker’s 
haecceitism of the first-person perspective is flawed in the sense that a subject does 
not necessarily have a unique spatiotemporal viewpoint. I propose that if it is possible 
for (1) one single spatiotemporal location to be possessed by two or more perceivers 
at the same time, and for (2) one perceiver to have two or more spatiotemporal 
locations at the same time, it follows that the haecceitistic implications of a first-person 
perspective are questionable. I then provide a thought experiment to argue that subjects 
have haecceities. Suppose a great physicist suddenly announces that our actual world 
is a symmetrical universe. There is another side of our world with exactly the same 
number of mirror-persons living there enjoying exactly the same qualitative lives as 
us. We can positively conceive of these situations: (1) I am at side A in this symmetrical 
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universe, and (2) I am at side B in this symmetrical universe. Given that there are no 
differences in qualitative, psychological, and physical properties between the two 
individuals, and yet these are genuine possibilities directing to different facts regarding 
my existence, the answer to the question “who am I?” is a non-qualitative further fact 
over and above the qualitative properties and state of affairs in the world. Haecceities 
of subjects of experience thus comes along. 
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1   Animalism 
 
Animalism is a prominent metaphysical view nowadays concerning our nature. It is 
the view that I am numerically identical to a human animal, and am not a proper spatial 
part of a human animal (such as the claim that I am a brain) or a proper temporal part 
of the human animal (such as the claim that I am a thing that lasts temporally shorter 
than an animal), nor am I constituted by a human animal (such as the claim that I am 
numerically identical with a person that is constituted by a human animal). The term 
“human animal” refers to a kind of biological (physical) organism which are members 
of the primate species Homo sapiens.  
One might think that it is obvious that we are numerically identical with the 
human animals, or what else can we be? Some might even think that the question of 
whether we are animals is as clear as that of whether our pets are animals. On the face 
value, we are obviously human animals, and we are not pillows, cats, or ghosts. 
However, ontologically speaking, things are not that easy. Many philosophers think 
that we are not animals but are part of the animals, or that we are constituted by, but 
not numerically identical with, the human animals due to various reasons. We will 
come across these in the following chapters. 
The discussions of Animalism have been evolving over time. There have been 
three generations of contemporary analytic philosophers who propose various versions 
of Animalism. The first generation of philosophers includes David Wiggins (1980), 
Richard Wollheim (1984), and W. R. Carter (1984). There is the second generation of 
animalists, with representational philosophers such as Peter van Inwagen (1990), Paul 
Snowdon (1990, 2016), Michael Ayers (1991), and Eric Olson (1997, 2003, 2007, 
2015). In recent years, younger philosophers such as Stephan Blatti (2006, 2007, 2012), 
Andrew M. Bailey (2014, 2015), Eric Yang (2015), Joshua Watson (2016), and Andrea 
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Sauchelli (2017) have been discussing how Animalism can be revised to solve existing 
problems. I will discuss in detail the arguments of some of these philosophers.  
I first introduce Eric Olson’s (1997, 2003, 2007) Animalism, which I call 
Classical Animalism and discuss Mark Johnston’s (2007) and Derek Parfit’s (2012) 
major objections to it. I then introduce weak Animalism, a recent theory proposed by 
Olson (2015), and explain my dissatisfaction with this claim. 
 
1.1   Classical Animalism and Weak Animalism 
I define Classical Animalism as the view that you are numerically identical with and 
are essentially an animal. Also, your persistence conditions are the persistence 
conditions of that animal. Third, you are identical to your embryo and the living animal 
in different stages, such as the animal in the vegetative stage and the late stage of 
Alzheimer’s disease. This view is proposed by Paul Snowdon (1990) and Eric Olson 
(2007).3 Olson believes that these implications align well with our common sense. For 
instance, when someone enters a permanent vegetative state condition, his relatives 
and friends would concede that he has a deprived life. However, they do not presume 
that he no longer exists, or that the living being lying on the hospital bed is a new entity, 
numerically distinct with him. 
Classical Animalism is incompatible with the psychological continuity criterion 
of personal identity. According to Classical Animalism, the persistence conditions of 
a human animal is independent of psychological continuity. Classical Animalism is the 
view that our persistence conditions are the persistence conditions of the human 
animals, and the persistence of human animals are determined by the sameness of life. 
                                                     
3 For instance, according to Olson: “ My own view, and that of most philosophers, animalists or not, is 
that animals are animals essentially.” (Olson 2007, p. 27) However, arguments for the claim that we 
are essentially animals are very few. 
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Olson’s Classical Animalism denies that we persist as corpses. Death is the ending 
point of an organism; only a lump of stuff remains after an animal dies. For him, we 
were once embryos and fetuses, and we persist when we fall into the vegetative stage. 
However, none of us is psychologically continuous with a twelve-week-old fetus or a 
person in the vegetative stage because they may not have any psychological features 
at all. 
For Classical Animalists, the concepts animal and person have different 
extensions. Being an animal is compatible with being a person, but not all persons are 
animals. Angels and Gods, if they exist at all, would be persons but not animals. 
Similarly, not all human animals are persons. Examples are human embryos and 
human beings in a vegetative state. They are not regarded as persons because they do 
not have enough psychological complexity to be regarded as persons.4 
In this chapter, I focus on Eric Olson’s (2003) version of Classical Animalism, 
who is one of the representative animalists in the heated debate of Animalism. My 
objections to his Classical Animalism can hopefully be applied to other versions of 
Animalism in the vicinity. 
 
The Thinking Animal Argument 
The main argument for Classical Animalism is as follows: 
 
1. There is a human animal sitting in your chair, and it is thinking. 
2. There is one and only one thinking being sitting in your chair. 
3. You are thinking in that chair. 
_______  
C. You are numerically identical with the thinking human animal in your chair.5 
 
                                                     
4 For the definition of person, see section 0.3 of introduction, “Personhood and Selfhood.” 
5 The argument is adopted from (Joshua 2016, p. 324 - 325) 
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This famous argument is sometimes called the “Thinking Animal Argument.” It 
concludes that you are numerically identical with a human animal. Classical 
Animalism presupposes that the numerical identity relation implies identity in all 
possible worlds. Also, they believe that animals are physical entities. If you are 
numerically identical with a physical entity, then it is metaphysically impossible that 
you are not that physical entity. 
Olson points out that one might attempt to deny premise two and admit that the 
case involves two or more thinking individuals. Assume that you are not the thinking 
animal sitting in the chair. When you are thinking, there is at the same time a thinking 
human animal having the same phenomenal qualities you experience and the same 
thought you have. Philosophers who deny premise two, such as the Constitutionalists 
and Embedded Part Theorists, would say that the thoughts the animal has are exactly 
the same as the thoughts you have. For instance, the Constitutionalists maintain that 
the person non-derivatively thinks, and its animal derivatively thinks; the Embedded 
Part Theorists commonly believe that we are directly thinking parts of the animals, and 
the animals indirectly think in virtue of having those directly thinking parts. Both agree 
that your animal thinks the same thoughts as you do because the animal thinks in virtue 
of your thinking. 
Olson thinks that this option is unsatisfactory in several ways. First, there is an 
overcrowding of entities. When you see your friend, there are actually at least two 
things in front of her – you and your animal. More significantly, if we assume that 
there are two or more beings, namely, you and the thinking animal, who are thinking 
your thoughts, you do not know which one you actually are. The human animal also 
thinks that it is the only thinking thing on the chair. As it thinks exactly the same 
thoughts as you, you can be either of them. It is impossible for you to know which one 
you are. 
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Olson is aware that mereological nihilists would reject premise one, the claim that 
there is an animal sitting in your chair, and it is thinking. According to mereological 
nihilism (or compositional nihilism) in general, there are no composite material objects 
at all. There are only mereological simples, such as fundamental particles, and these 
simples do not compose any complex material objects. According to this view, no 
human animals are sitting in your chair; for there are no human animals in the first 
place. Peter Unger (1979), for instance, defends mereological nihilism, according to 
which there are no objects with proper parts in a metaphysical viewpoint. 
Ontologically speaking, there are only indivisible simple substances such as basic 
atoms described in contemporary physics. This view denies the existence of all 
physical organisms including human beings and all other macroscopic material objects. 
According to the nihilists, our belief that persons and human animals exist is illusory. 
Under this picture, premise one is incorrect. 
Olson holds that nihilism is advantageous in the sense that it dissolves many 
metaphysical problems such as personal ontology by saying that there is no material 
entity at all. The situation is similar to that of atheism, which dissolves many problems 
in philosophy of religion such as the nature of God by asserting that there is no God at 
all. However, for Olson, this solution is not without problems. He insists that pain 
without a subject who owns the pain is difficult to understand. He claims that it is 
impossible for things to cooperate and to produce thought without there being a subject 
of that thought. Therefore, we should acknowledge our existence as thinking things. 
 
1.1.1   Objections to Classical Animalism 
In what follows, I introduce Mark Johnston’s (2007) and Fred Feldman’s (1992, 2000) 
objections to Olson’s Classical Animalism. 
Mark Johnston (2007) thinks that Olson’s Thinking Animal Argument is valid 
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and sound, and he agrees with Olson that we are animals. However, he thinks that we 
are not essentially animals. We can exist and persist without being animals. According 
to Johnston, the two claims below are independent of each other: 
 
1. We are animals, members of the species Homo sapiens. 
2. We are essentially animals, such that we are animals in every possible situation in 
which we survive. 
 
Johnston accepts the first claim but not the second. He thinks that the Thinking Animal 
Argument only supports the first claim. To show this, he offers the famous Remnant 
Person Problem: suppose your brain is removed and is kept in a vat with nutrients such 
that the brain retains its normal functions. Meanwhile, your physical body without the 
brain is provided with nutrients to keep functioning. This operation results in an 
individual that thinks with the severed brain and nothing else (call it the brain-
individual), and a physical organism with its brain removed but is kept functioning. In 
this situation, Classical Animalism denies that the brain-individual in the vat is you. 
According to Classical Animalism, you exist and persist as the human animal that is 
left alive after the operation. For the animalists, such an operation does not move a 
physical organism from one head to another but only moves an organ from one animal 
to another. The situation is analogous to that of a lung transplant or heart transplant. If 
one agrees with the animalists’s construal, the brain-individual would be a new person 
(or a remnant person) who comes into existence after the operation. The question is, 
where does this brain-individual in a vat, or this remnant person, come from? 
Johnston thinks one should not want to admit that this remnant person exists 
before the operation, for there would be two individuals that exist simultaneously 
before the operation – the remnant person and the human being. An alternative is that 
the operation brings the remnant person into existence, and this person is not you. It is 
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another individual that is numerically distinct from you, who is newly produced by the 
operation. Still, it is implausible because the surgeon merely moves an organ from one 
physical body to a vat with fluid nutrients. How could removing an organ creates a 
new individual? 
Johnston follows his intuition and claim that our identity goes along with the brain 
instead - we become the brain-individual after the operation. He believes that it is also 
the intuition of many others. For him, this remnant person is not a human animal. That 
said, you persist as the remnant person, which is not an animal. Mark Johnston thus 
concludes that the property “being an animal” is not essential for our existence - we 
are not essentially human beings. The argument can be formulated as follows: 
 
1. If you are essentially an animal, then it is impossible for you to exist without 
being a human animal. (Assumption) 
2. After the brain transplant operation, you persist as a remnant person, which is 
not a human animal. 
3. It is possible for you to exist without being a human animal. (2) 
_______________ 
C. You are not essentially a human animal. (1, 3) 
  
Johnston re-introduces concepts such as phase-sortal and substance-sortal first 
discussed by David Wiggins (1967, 2001) to explain his view that you are not 
essentially an animal. He thinks that “animal” is a phase-sortal. For Wiggins, a sortal 
is a concept that delivers principles of individuation and identity. For example, to 
answer the question “how many?” we need to specify how many of what; and to 
examine whether a thing remains the same over time, we need to specify “the same 
what.” A phase-sortal is a kind which applies temporarily to things that they classify. 
For instance, “student” is a phase sortal because this term temporarily applies to human 
animals. A human animal can be a student in a certain period of time, and the human 
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animal can persist without being a student. In contrast, a substance-sortal classifies and 
individuate things by their essential properties. If A is X, and X is a substance-sortal, 
then A has the essential property of “being an X,” and A is categorized as the kind X 
in virtue of having X’s essential properties as its own essential properties. It is 
impossible for A to exist without being an X. 
According to Johnston, the animalists wrongly assume that “human animal” is a 
substance-sortal. Recall the case of brain transplant. Before the transplant, the original 
person P was a human animal, but during and after the transplant, P is not. If it is the 
case that P was a human animal and P now exists without being an animal, then this 
entails that “animal” is not a substance-sortal; it is temporally applied to certain entities. 
There could be entities that are contingently animals. Johnston concludes that human 
animal is not a substance-sortal but a crypto-phase-sortal, which he defines as a sortal 
that is not an obvious phase-sortal like “student” or “bachelor,” but can be shown to 
be a phase-sortal via careful philosophical reflections. 
Another problem mentioned by the anti-animalists is the problem of the Corpse 
proposed by Fred Feldman (1992, 2000). Animalism fails to provide an explanation 
for where a corpse comes from. Given that I am essentially a living organism, I do not 
survive as a corpse. The corpse is something that does not exist before I die, and it 
comes into existence at the moment when I die. If we regard the corpse as an existing, 
physical entity, we should explain how it comes into existence. One might be inclined 
to think that an animal’s death causes the corpse to come into existence. However, we 
have a strong intuition that the death of an animal does not generate a new entity out 
of its body.6 
 
1.1.2   Weak Animalism 
                                                     
6 For more variations of the argument of the corpse, see David Hershenov (2005). 
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In reply to the Remnant Person Problem, Eric Olson (2015) modifies Classical 
Animalism. He proposes “Weak Animalism,” a doctrine which is neutral to the 
question of whether we are essentially animals. Weak Animalism does not state (1) our 
essential properties, or (2) whether it is necessarily that for any human animal x, x is 
essentially a human animal, or (3) what the identity and persistence conditions of 
human animals are. I now introduce weak Animalism – a new version of Animalism 
proposed by Olson. 
Olson first describes several varieties of Animalism. They are classified 
according to their degree of acceptance of these further claims: 
 
1. Necessarily, for any entity x that is among us, x is a human animal. (or “We are 
human animals.”) 
2. Necessarily, for any human animal x, x is essentially a human animal. 
3. Our persistence conditions are the persistence conditions of the human animals. 
4. It is not the case that “Necessarily, for any human animal x and any future entity y, 
x persists as y if and only if y is psychologically continuous with x.” 
5. Necessarily, for any human animal x and any future human animal y, x persists as 
y if and only if y is physically continuous with x. 
6. Necessarily, for any human animal x, it is possible that x is not a person (in the 
Lockean sense).7  
 
According to Olson, weak Animalism is the view that accepts only the first claim (1) 
that we are animals. It is neutral to other claims. Strong Animalism, on the other hand, 
accepts the conjunction of (1) with all the other claims (2) to (6). There are of course 
intermediate versions incorporating some but not all of the further claims. 
The claim that (2) necessarily, for any human animal x, x is essentially a human 
animal, together with the claim that (1) we are human animals, indicates that we could 
not exist without being human animals. Olson is neutral to claim (2). For Olson, I am 
                                                     
7 This formulation is modified from (Olson 2015, p. 12). For the definition of a Lockean person, see 
page 6 of the thesis. 
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a human animal in exactly the same sense that I am a philosopher, a student, and a 
bachelor. I am a human animal contingently if I can possibly exist in other ways 
without being a human animal. Let me elaborate more. The opposite concept of 
essential properties is contingent properties. An object O has a contingent property C 
if and only if (1) O has C as a property, and (2) it is metaphysically possible that O 
exists without instantiating property C. For instance, suppose you are now sitting on 
the chair, but you could have existed without sitting on this chair. Since being an F is 
logically equivalent to being numerically identical with an F, one must admit that we 
are numerically identical with the human animals. However, we could be human 
animals whether or not we are essentially human animals. He further claims that I am 
also numerically identical with a student, a philosopher, and a scholar, in addition to 
being an animal, with all these being my accidental properties. 
Olson asserts that Weak Animalism is compatible with the claims that (1) we are 
not essentially human animals and that (2) our persistence conditions are not the 
persistence conditions of the human animals. According to Olson, there are two kinds 
of identity relations. The first one is called “is of identity.” It can only occur between 
two singular terms (proper names), such as ‘Superman is Clark Kent” or “Water is 
H2O.” The second is the “is of predication” which features in the sentence “Olson is 
standing.” According to Olson, sentences like “Olson is a parent” does not employ the 
“is of identity” but the “is of predication.” Similarly, “Olson is an animal” is another 
instinct of “is of predication” rather than “is of identity.” A precise description to 
express the idea of “is of predication” is that “nothing could be an F without being 
identical to an F, or be identical to an F without being an F” (Olson 2015, p. 8). The 
corresponding logical formulation should be ?x[Fx?Ǝy(Fy&x=y)]. 
In his view, Weak Animalism answers the question “What we are” whereas the 
psychological continuity criterion of personal identity (the so-called Lockeanism) 
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answers the question “What does it take for us to persist through time.” They ask 
different questions, the answers of which are independent of each other. Under this 
picture, the animalists are not responsible for affirming or denying the statement 
“human animals do not persist by virtue of psychological continuity.” Olson further 
points out that there is no inference of “what we are” from Lockeanism, and that 
Lockeanism does not rule out our being animals. In his modified version of Animalism, 
Olson withdraws from being a rival with Lockeanism. 
In proposing Weak Animalism, Olson thinks that he has asserted an important 
view which pleases everyone. Weak Animalism has all the virtues of Classical 
Animalism without its drawbacks; it lacks the implications the opponents object to. 
For example, the opponents falsely assume that Animalism implies that one should not 
go with his transplanted brain. This assumption is based on the view that our 
persistence conditions are that of the human animals. Nevertheless, Weak Animalism 
does not make this assumption. 
Weak Animalism has important philosophical implications that exclude 
suspicious metaphysical view regarding our nature. Olson maintains that Animalism 
is contrasted with (1) Constitutionalism proposed by Lynne Rudder Baker (2007) et 
al., (2) theories of embodiment – theories saying that we are parts of animals (such as 
brains) by Derek Parfit (2012) and Jeff McMahan (2002), (3) substance dualism (such 
as theories of souls) proposed by Roderick Chisholm (1991) and Richard Swinburne 
(2003), and (4) persistence theory of time (such that we are temporal parts of animals) 
by David Lewis (1976). On these views, each of us is numerically distinct from the 
corresponding animal. 
 
1.2   A Dualist’s Objection to Animalism 
 30 
 
Weak Animalism does not provide the information about our essential properties. As a 
philosophical question, I regard the question of personal ontology as expecting 
something more fundamental than a normal question of “what you are” when one 
communicates with one’s neighbors and expects one’s neighbor to answer, “I am a 
lawyer” or “I am a teacher.” When philosophers make such an inquiry about personal 
ontology, they aim to provide the essential but not the accidental properties of 
ourselves. 
Weak Animalism is a view that the statement “I am a human animal” has no 
difference in kind from the statement that “I am a teacher.” Both statements do not 
denote an essential property of ourselves. To recall, it is commonly agreed that an 
object x has an essential property e if and only if necessarily, x exists only when it has 
e. One might agree that we are animals and at the same time deny that “being an animal” 
is our essential property. I believe that Weak Animalism is too weak since it does not 
provide an answer to the essential properties of ourselves. Furthermore, Weak 
Animalism does not provide an answer to our persistence conditions either. This is not 
what I want as an answer to a fundamental philosophical question of “what we are.” 
Moreover, the Thinking Animal Argument that intends to support both Weak 
Animalism and Classical Animalism may not be sound if one takes a standard 
(Cartesian) substance dualist position. Either premise 1 or premise 2 of the thinking 
animal argument would be dubious. 
To elaborate on this idea, I now introduce some terminologies. I define an entity, 
an object, a substance, or a thing as an individual that has properties. I assume here 
that the terms “substance,” “entity,” “object” and “thing” are equivalent. Let me 
assume that standard (Cartesian) substance dualism maintains the following claims: (1) 
necessarily, for any property x, x is a mental property if and only if x is a what it’s 
likeness characteristic. In other words, necessarily, for any entity x, x has a mental 
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property at time t if and only if x is phenomenally conscious at t. Also, (2) necessarily, 
for any property y, y is a physical property if and only if y is a property defined in terms 
of basic physical, mathematical, and logical vocabulary. Furthermore, (3) necessarily, 
for any entity x, x is a physical entity if and only if x has at least one physical property, 
and (4) necessarily, for any entity y, y is a mental entity if and only if y has at least one 
mental property. According to Cartesian substance dualism, mental substances and 
physical substances are two kinds of fundamental substance, not reducible to each 
other. Mental substances only have mental properties, and physical substances only 
have physical properties. 
 I define a subject as follows: necessarily, for any x, x is a subject of experience if 
and only if x has conscious experience. Under Cartesian substance dualism, a subject 
of experience is a mental entity, whose essential property is to be conscious. If we 
assume that I am a subject of experience, which is a mental entity, then I am not a 
physical entity according to Cartesian substance dualism. 
Let us go back to the Thinking Animal Argument. I take it that the Classical 
Animalists assume that the physical theory of human animal is the correct theory, 
according to which the term “human animal” refers to a particular type of physical 
entity (physical organism), the persistence of which is determined by the sameness of 
life. When one adopts the physical theory of human animal, then if there were zombies 
in our world whose physical organization is indistinguishable from us and yet they do 
not have phenomenal consciousness, they should also be categorized as human animals 
under the physical theory of human animal. 
If substance dualism is true, and if I am a subject of experience, which is a purely 
mental entity, then I am not a physical entity. If the animalists assume the physical 
theory of human animal, then the substance dualists would say that premise one of the 
thinking animal argument that “there is a human animal sitting there, thinking” is false. 
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For the substance dualists, the physical entity does not think; only the mental entity 
thinks. If the human animal is a physical organism (entity), then it follows that the 
human animal does not think. What thinks is the mental entity that presumably has 
certain intimate causal relation with the human animal. The substance dualists would 
reject premise one. 
On the other hand, a hybrid theory of human animal states that the term “human 
animal” here refers to the sum of the mental entity plus the physical entity. 
Philosophers who hold this theory would think that when people are talking about the 
human animal, they are talking about a composite object that has two components: the 
mental part and the physical part. Under substance dualism, the two components are 
themselves substances. When there is a human animal, there are two substances: one 
mental substance and one physical substance, in intimate causal relation to each other. 
If one holds the view that the human animal thinks, then it follows that the hybrid 
entity thinks. Furthermore, if one holds the view that I am a subject of experience, 
which is a mental substance, then I am not numerically identical with the hybrid human 
animal; I am just the mental part of the animal. One may need to say that there are two 
thinkers, one being the subject of experience which is part of the human animal, and 
the other being the human animal as a whole. 
I call the view that we are the thinking part of the human animals “the 
mereological view.” The mereological view is held by philosophers such as Jeff 
McMahan (2002), Derek Parfit (2012), and Galen Strawson (2011). For them, the 
human animal thinks in virtue of having a thinking part that thinks. The defenders of 
the mereological view usually deny that there is only one thinker. There are two 
thinkers – the thinking part and the whole human animal. The proponents of this view 
would have to say that premise two of the Thinking Animal Argument that “There is 
one and only one thinking being sitting in your chair” is false. The human animal has 
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psychological properties and can be regarded as conscious in virtue of having the 
conscious mind as a part that thinks.  
Some people would then be worried that it would be ontologically expensive if 
there are two conscious entities that think when I think. Both McMahan and Parfit bite 
the bullet and insist that there are indeed two conscious entities that think. However, 
they don’t think it is problematic to say that there are two thinking beings in the chair. 
Both of them believe that this phenomenon can be explained in a benign way. 
McMahan uses a tree as an analogy. Suppose there is a tree with two major branches. 
One of them grows, and the other stay unchanged. We are willing to say that the tree 
grows because part of it grows. Even if there is another part, such as the other branch, 
that does not grow at all; we still regard the tree as growing because the tree grows in 
virtue of the growth of one of its main branches. There are two growing entities, 
namely, the branch and the whole tree. This approach is commonsensical even if it is 
ontologically expensive. Similarly, it does not seem problematic to say that there are 
two thinkers - both the mind and the whole organism thinks. 
In summary, if one holds both the hybrid theory of human animal and substance 
dualism, one would firmly deny premise two of the Thinking Animal Argument and 
regard the argument as unsound. 
 
1.3   Animalism and the Unity of Consciousness 
There is yet another approach to defending Animalism. There is the question of the 
individuation principles of ourselves - what makes it the case that there is one self but 
not many? If we are subjects of experience, then the individual principle of ourselves 
would be the individuation principle of subjects. The prominent individuation 
principle of subjects is the representational unity theory of consciousness, according 
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to which the individuation of subjects is determined by representational unity. For 
these theorists, necessarily, for any subject x and mental states M1 and M2, x has M1 
and M2 only if M1 and M2 are representationally unified. Necessarily, for any mental 
states M1 and M2, M1 and M2 are representationally unified if and only if (1) the 
representational (propositional) contents of M1 and M2 do not involve logical 
contradictions, and (2) the representational (propositional) contents of M1 and M2 are 
“integrated with each other.” (Bayne 2012, p. 10) 
Paul Snowdon (2016) thinks that there is not any satisfactory functional unity 
theory of consciousness. He uses the term “functional unity” to mean the 
representational and behavioral unity of the subject. For him, there is no satisfactory 
individuation principle of subjects. On the other hand, Animalists aim at identifying 
us with a certain type of physical organism, namely, human animals. Snowdon thinks 
that it is one advantage of Animalism. Based on this, he thinks that we better say that 
we are human animals, and individuate ourselves by the individuation principle of 
human animals instead of individuating ourselves by any unity theory of consciousness. 
According to Snowdon, Animalism implies that every one of us is one and only 
one human animal. If every one of us is one and only one subject of experience, then 
every human animal is one and only one subject.8 In other words, if you are an 
animalist, then you do not need to develop any psychological or phenomenal principle 
for the individuation of ourselves since our individuation principle is just the 
individuation principle of human animals. 
To explain this idea, Snowdon discusses the case of commissurotomy introduced 
by Roger W. Sperry (1974) in which the patient’s corpus callosum (the link between 
the two hemispheres of the cerebral cortex) was severed. The patients do not have 
detectable abnormalities in their daily lives; abnormalities are generated during 
                                                     
8 Snowdon (2016) assumes that every single token experience can have only one subject. 
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experimental conditions. In the experiment, the word “key” is projected onto the right 
side of each retina, and the word “ring” is projected onto the left half. They are flashed 
for one-tenth of a second in front of the patient to prevent her from moving her eyes. 
The setup is thus launched because the left half of the retina feeds to the left 
hemisphere and right to the right hemisphere. According to the neuroscientists, the left 
hemisphere controls speech and the right one controls the left hand. If the patient was 
told to point with her left hand to the thing the word of which she saw, she pointed to 
a key but not a ring. However, if she was asked to verbally report what word she has 
seen, she said she saw the word “ring.” According to Snowdon, it is straightforward 
for the neuroscientists to interpret the data as that the left hemisphere “saw” one thing 
and the right another. Some may say that there are two subjects of experience located 
in one brain.9 
Snowdon calls the proposal that there is one patient who “has” two subjects in 
the above experiments “the pluralizing approach.” He calls the proposal that there is 
one patient who “has” one subject “the singularist approach.” For Snowdon, the 
Animalists should take the singularist approach. They should hold that (1) every one 
of us is numerically identical with one and only one human animal, (2) every one of 
us is numerically identical with one and only one subject of experience, and that (3) 
the human animal persists as one single human animal after its corpus callosum is 
severed. It follows that (4) there should only be one single subject involved after the 
operation. To demonstrate this, let us assume that the subject, call it S, is numerically 
                                                     
9 Some may be interested in what the patient would say if she is asked to explain her behavior. There 
is no test in this very experiment about the patients’s verbal report of their own behaviors. However, 
in one similar experiment in which an image of a naked man is shown to the right hemisphere of a 
female split-brain patient, she began to laugh, but she could not explain why she was laughing. In 
another trial, the left hemisphere of a split-brain patient read the word “apple” at the same time her 
right hemisphere was shown a nude picture. The patient still laughed, but she reported that she 
laughed because she likes apple. This result suggests that the left hemisphere which is responsible for 
language and verbal report does not have access to the information to the right hemisphere. In many 
cases, the left hemisphere tries its best to provide language-based explanations for one’s behaviors. 
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identical with the human animal A, then if the animal A persists after the operation, so 
does S. If A experiences after the operation, so does S. Since there is only one animal 
A, S should be the only one subject involved. An animalist, therefore, should be a 
singularist. 
Snowdon examines several principles of function unity of conscious experience 
that take the pluralist approach for the above case. For the pluralists, the mental states 
of the patient cannot be ascribed to one single subject of experience. He argues that 
versions of the functional unity theory of consciousness that take the pluralist approach 
are all flawed – they cannot explain the behaviors of the split-brain patient. He is thus 
skeptical about the idea that there are principles of unity of conscious mental states 
that challenges a singularist account for the split-brain experiment. He concludes that 
the animalist-singularist approach remains undefeated and is on the right track. 
 
1.4   My Objections to Snowdon’s Theory 
I disagree with Snowdon’s attempt to withdraw from any principle of unity of 
consciousness. My objection to Snowdon is basically two-fold. My first observation 
is that only the Classical Animalists, but not Weak Animalists, are subject to the 
restriction that there should be a one-to-one correspondence between the number of 
animals and the number of subjects of experience. 
To recall, Classical Animalism holds the views that (1) we are numerically 
identical with the human animals, (2) we are essentially human animals, and (3) our 
persistence is that of the human animals. As discussed, for Classical Animalists, if I 
am a subject S, and also, am numerically identical the human animal A (A=S), then it 
follows that insofar as I persist as the animal A, the subject S also persists. However, 
Weak Animalism does not require that I am essentially a human animal, nor that my 
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persistence conditions are that of an animal. Moreover, it allows that I go with part of 
the brain, part of the animal, or whatever, after the split-brain operation. In the above 
experiment, a Weak Animalist can admit that the human animal “has” two subjects 
after the operation, and I persist without being a human animal. For instance, one can 
say that I become the left hemisphere, and I am one of the two subjects, after the 
operation. 
My second objection is that Snowdon’s proposed unity principles are constructed 
under the idea that conscious mental states belong to one single subject of experience 
only when there is functional (representational and behavioral) unity between the 
mental states. This is a very limited view. There are many versions of the Unity Thesis 
of consciousness available in the contemporary literature. One may not need to endorse 
the view that a subject of experience can only have mental states that are 
representationally unified at the same time. 
In what follows, I introduce the Phenomenal Unity Thesis of Consciousness 
proposed by Tim Bayne (2010). I believe that a modified version of Bayne’s view can 
provide a satisfactory solution to the problem of the unity of consciousness raised by 
Snowdon. There is at least one cogent way to individuate subjects, and there is no need 
for us to adopt an animalist approach for individuating ourselves. 
 
1.5   Phenomenal Unity and Individuation of Subjects 
In his book “The Unity of Consciousness,” Tim Bayne (2010) opts for a phenomenal 
construal of the Unity Thesis, a doctrine saying that “for any conscious subject of 
experience S and any time t, the simultaneous conscious states that S has at t will 
necessarily be subsumed under a single conscious state.” (Bayne 2010, p. 16) He gives 
the following example. Suppose that there is something it is like to hear the flute (E1) 
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and something it is like to see a person playing the flute (E2). The two experiences are 
phenomenally unified if there is something it is like to hear the flute while seeing the 
person playing the flute (E1&E2). Bayne also claims that necessarily, a subject s at time 
t has a “fully unified consciousness if and only if every one of s’s conscious mental 
states at t is phenomenally unified with every other conscious mental state had by s at 
t.” (Bayne 2010, p. 15) 
Bayne argues that the representational unity theory of consciousness cannot be 
the individuation principle of consciousness. He maintains that the fact that some 
mental states are representationally unified is only at best a necessary condition for 
their belonging to the same subject. For example, there are many consistent and 
coherent mental states in the world, but we don’t regard them as belonging to the same 
subject. Furthermore, Bayne proposes that the view that a subject always has 
representationally unified mental states faces tough challenges from contemporary 
psychology; representational unity often breaks down in various normal and 
pathological cases. There are many situations in which a subject exhibits very little 
representational integration, and yet we have reasons to believe that one’s mental states 
are phenomenally unified and are had by one single subject.  
Bayne discusses various everyday forms of conscious experience and some 
clinical disorders in which the representational unity of mental states of a person fall 
apart in fundamental ways. Examples of everyday dis-unified experience are Müller-
Lyer Illusion and Waterfall Illusion. Take the Waterfall Illusion first described by 
Aristotle and further discussed by John Frisby (1979), Tim Crane (1988), and more 
recently, Michael Tye (2003). It is one famous illusion produced by looking at a 
waterfall for a period and then observing a stationary object afterward. In this case, we 
are simultaneously conscious of the target object as both moving and not moving. One 
can say that one perceives the target object as both moving and not moving, and thus 
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there is representational disunity within our perceptual content. This well-known 
illusion is an example that aims to show that the representations of the mental states 
of a normal person are not necessarily representationally unified. Moreover, every one 
of us has the first-person experience of having the illusion. Therefore, Bayne thinks 
that there are reasons for us to believe that there is one single subject having the illusion 
and the representationally disunified mental states. 
Apart from cases that occur for normal healthy people, there are plenty of 
representational disunities of mental states found in patients with split-brain, dementia, 
schizophrenia, and various kinds of dissociative disorders. There are kinds of 
dissociative identity disorders in which the patients manifest multiple conscious selves, 
or lose the sense of owning their conscious states, or possess two streams of 
consciousness with representationally disunified mental states respectively at the same 
time - a “central” stream responsible for the patient’s overt report and a “hidden” 
stream responsible for one’s covert report.10 Bayne’s replies that representational 
disunity is not sufficient to show that the two mental states are phenomenally dis-
unified. He provides reasons from the first-person perspective to suspect that patients 
retain a more primitive form of conscious unity – phenomenal unity, despite having 
representational disunity. Although the argument from introspection is not decisive, it 
does provide us with respectable evidence for the unity thesis.11 
 I believe that Bayne’s phenomenal unity theory of consciousness is a satisfactory 
                                                     
10 For more discussions of dissociative identity disorder, see David et al. (1996) and Ellenberger (1970). 
11 Snowdon (2016) has also briefly discussed the phenomenal unity theory of consciousness. He thinks 
that there is no reason to support the claim that the patient has phenomenal unified mental states. 
He writes: “There is nothing it is like to have a split brain, and for some pairs of experiences enjoyed 
by a split-brain patient there is nothing it is like to conjointly have them. It is, therefore, akin to begging 
the question simply to affirm that the simultaneous experiences of a single subject must be something 
it is like to undergo as a whole. We are still without a reason to accept that principle.” I disagree. First, 
I agree with Bayne that we have first-person experience of having representationally dis-unified mental 
states. Second, I suggest that we can understand the split-brain patient as not being able to express 
her experience of phenomenal unity, instead of saying that she does not have the “what it’s likeness” 
of the phenomenally unified experience. 
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solution to the problem of the unity of consciousness proposed by Snowdon. I suggest 
that we can hold that necessarily, mental states are had by the same subject if and only 
if they are phenomenally unified. I call this claim “the Phenomenal Unity Thesis of 
consciousness.” This thesis can provide a clear explanation of how the singularist 
approach – that there is one single subject of experience that has representationally 
disunified mental states is feasible. Also, the case of conscious mental states had by a 
split-brain patient at a certain time discussed by Snowdon can thus be explained as 
follows: there is one single subject with mental states that are phenomenally unified 
and representationally disunified.  
In summary, we can be a singularist even if we find no satisfactory functional 
(representational and behavioral) unity theory of consciousness. Also, we do not need 
to be an Animalist in order to be a singularist. We have some other choices; we can 
adopt the Phenomenal Unity Theory of Consciousness. 
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2   Constitutionalism 
 
One of the direct opponents of Animalism is Constitutionalism. Constitutionalists 
think that loosely speaking, we can still say that we are human animals. Under 
thorough investigations, however, one discovers that the terms “is/are” here are used 
in the sense of “being constituted by.” Constitutionalists believe that we are essentially 
persons, and persons are constituted by human animals. One early defender of the 
thesis is Kevin Joseph Corcoran (1999, 2001, 2006). There is also Lynne Rudder Baker 
(2007, 2012, 2013), a representative Constitutionalist who clearly defines the 
conception of constitution. In addition, there are various approaches to 
Constitutionalism proposed by philosophers such as Sydney Shoemaker (1984, 1996, 
1999, 2016) and Mark Johnston (2007). In what follows, I will discuss different 
versions of Constitutionalism and point out the problems of each of them. My basic 
stance is that the constitutional approach, in general, is problematic. I will also argue 
that my Conscious Subject View does not suffer from the same problems. 
 
2.1   Constitutionalism and First-Person Perspective 
Constitutionalism of persons is a view saying that you are not numerically identical 
with a human animal but are constituted by a human animal. The situation is like a 
clay statue and the lump of clay out of which the statue was formed. In most cases, 
when talking about constitution, we automatically think of total constitution because 
this is what we are most concerned with in metaphysical discussions. For a total 
constitution, the lump of clay is all the substance that is needed for the statue to exist. 
When we declare a total constitution relation between the two, it is generally assumed 
that there is not any other substance or stuff that constitutes the statue - the statue is 
constituted by the lump of clay and by nothing else. I thereby use “constitution” and 
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“total constitution” interchangeably to refrain from lengthy expressions. 
Generally speaking, constitution implies distinctness. Although the lump of clay 
is all the material needed for the existence of the statue, there is a set of penetrating 
differences between the statue and the lump of clay. First, constituted objects usually 
have different persistence conditions than their constituents. For instance, a river R at 
any moment is constituted by an aggregate of water molecules - call the aggregate A. 
The persistence conditions of R and A are different. If A had been scattered all over 
the universe at a certain time, A would still be there, but R would not exist anymore. 
Second, and relatedly, constituted objects have different essential properties from their 
lower-level constituents. A statue, for example, is essentially in a certain shape, but the 
lump of clay that constitutes the statue is not essentially in that shape. Instead, the 
essential properties of the clay are its material composition and its property of being a 
kind of heavy, sticky earth that becomes hard when it is baked. A Classical identity 
relation between A and B (an identity relation that satisfies Leibniz’s law), in contrast, 
implies that it is impossible for A and B to have different persistence conditions or 
essential properties. 
There is another important modal difference between constitution and identity. 
The correlation between a constituted object and its constituents is contingent. If A is 
identical with B, then given that A exists, A is necessarily B. However, the fact that A 
constitutes B leaves room for the possibility that B exists without being constituted by 
A. For example, the river R is constituted by the aggregate of water molecules A. It is 
always a contingent relation that R is constituted by A since R may have been 
constituted by a totally different aggregate of water molecules A?. The contingent 
relation is usually manifested such that if A constitutes R, it is possible that R is 
constituted by A during t1 - t2, but R may not be constituted by A after t2. This also 
renders constitution relation a temporal relation. Using the old example, river R at t1 
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is constituted by an aggregate of water molecules A, but R can be constituted by a 
totally different aggregate of water molecules A? at t2. One can consequently arrive at 
several widely agreed logical features of constitution. First, constitution is 
asymmetrical – declaring A constitutes B automatically entails the claim that B does 
not constitute A. Second, constitution is irreflexive as there is nothing that constitutes 
itself. Third, constitution is a transitive relation. If A constitutes B, and B constitutes 
C, then A also constitutes C. 
 
2.1.1   Baker’s Constitutionalism of Persons 
In the early 00’s, Constitutionalists such as Corcoran did not face an urge to provide 
us with a clear definition of constitution in general. Discussions regarding what a 
constitution relation exactly is has become a heated debate in the next decade. Lynne 
Rudder Baker is one of the representative philosophers who come up with a clear 
definition of the conception of “constitution.” In what follows, I introduce Baker’s 
Constitutionalism of Persons. What makes Baker’s Constitution view special are two 
notions – (1) primary kind and (2) K-favorable circumstances.  
According to Baker, an entity x has a primary kind P if and only if necessarily, 
when x exists, x belongs to the kind P. Every object is of a certain primary kind 
essentially, where it has its persistence conditions in virtue of its primary kind. Baker 
thinks that a cat is a primary kind – when one ceases to be a cat, it also ceases to exist. 
A student is not a primary kind; one ceases to be a student when one graduates, but it 
doesn’t mean that one ceases to exist. For Baker, constitution is a relation among things 
of different primary kinds.12 For the case of the statue and clay, the statue falls under 
the primary kind ‘statue” and the clay “clay.” In saying this, Baker assumes that 
                                                     
12 It is noted that Baker’s idea of constitution is different from the common notion of composition. For 
composition, it is totally fine for an entity to be composed of other entities of the same kind. 
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constitution means total constitution, such that there is not any other substance or stuff 
that constitutes the statue - the statue is constituted by the lump of clay and by nothing 
else. 
Baker also introduces the conception of “K-favorable circumstances.” She states 
that “K-favorable circumstances entail instantiation of every property, except for 
primary-kind properties, that must be exemplified for something to be a K. For any 
particular place and time, the presence of K-favorable circumstances is a necessary, 
but not a sufficient, condition for the property K to be instantiated then and there. The 
presence of something of a suitable primary kind in K-favorable circumstances is 
sufficient for K to be instantiated then and there.” (Baker 2000, p. 42) For instance, 
the lump of clay has statue favorable circumstances because it has sufficiently many 
properties that are possessed by the statue, such as acquiring a statuesque shape, having 
a particular location, being intended to be a work of art, etc. The property it lacks for 
being a statue, for example, is that the lump of clay has the primary kind property of 
being a lump of clay but not that of the statue. 
Baker’s definition of constitution involves several criteria. First, some 
abbreviations: 
 
F and G are distinct kinds. 
F* designates being essentially F 
G* designates being essentially G. 
D designates G favorable circumstances. 
 
Baker’s definition of constitution relation is as follows. X constitutes y at t1 if and only 
if: 
 
1. X spatially coincides with y at t1 
2. X has F* and y has G* 
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3. X is in D at t, 
4. It is necessary that, for any object z and for any time t*, if z has F* and z is in D at 
t*, then there is some object u such that u has G* and u coincides with z at t* 
5. It is possible that: there is some time t* such that x exists at t* and there is no object 
w such that w has G* and w coincides with x at t*.13 
 
Baker assumes that two distinct entities can be spatially coincident. She proposes that 
spatial coincidence as one of the criteria of constitution and restricts the constitution 
relation to be applied only to physical objects. In other words, it is necessary that for 
A to constitute B, A must spatially overlap with B. For instance, given that the lump 
and the statue share the same matter and same physical parts, there is spatial 
coincidence between the two. 
Baker’s reasons for proposing that we are essentially persons, not human animals 
are briefly that persons are essentially able to think, feel, and experience, but animals 
think only in certain stages. For instance, a fetus does not think; a human animal in a 
vegetable state does not think. However, they can all be regarded as animals under a 
certain sense. For Baker, we simply shouldn’t identify ourselves with these 
unconscious physical organisms – we should be something more. Furthermore, 
persons can survive events such as brain transplant, whereas the corresponding 
organisms cannot. The persistence conditions of persons are thus different from that of 
the human animal. Third, Baker believes that by the gradual replacement of parts, some 
persons might one day come to coincide with a wholly inorganic machine. In this case, 
we may persist without being an animal or any kind of physical organism at all. This 
case shows that being a particular human animal is only a contingent feature of us. 
 
2.1.2   The First-person Perspective 
                                                     
13 This definition is adopted and modified from Gallois 2017, pp. 75-76. 
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What, then, are persons? What are the essential properties of being a person? Baker 
maintains that a person is a material object essentially having a first-person perspective. 
A first-person perspective is a dispositional property exemplified in two stages – the 
rudimentary and robust stages. A rudimentary first-person perspective is the first stage 
of a dispositional property that carries two important features. First, it is a disposition 
to be disposed to perceive the external world from a spatiotemporal location. Second, 
it is the default location of the conscious subject, the origin of one’s perceptual field, 
and the location from which one perceives the environment that one interacts with. 
The existence of a rudimentary first-person perspective is independent of any linguistic 
or conceptual abilities. An infant who does not have any language skills or conceptions 
can still have a rudimentary first-person perspective. 
 
2.1.3   The Robust First-person Perspective 
There is also the robust stage of the first-person perspective, which is a conceptual 
ability to conceive of oneself as oneself as the subject of one’s own thoughts from the 
first-person point of view. Those who have a robust first-person perspective also can 
use first-person pronouns such as “I,” “me,” and “mine” effectively. Baker provides 
an example to illustrate how a person with a robust-person perspective uses language. 
When her niece discovered that her friend Donald took her toys, she cried out, “Donald, 
mine!” And this, according to Baker, is a clear manifestation of a robust first-person 
perspective. Nevertheless, it does not require an extra ability to describe oneself with 
an objective viewpoint. A person may wake up in the hospital with amnesia asking, 
“who I am” and “where I am.” She loses the information on her objective identity such 
as her name, her past, and her present situation, etc. Nevertheless, she can still 
successfully refer to herself from a first-person perspective. Under Baker’s picture, she 
still has a robust first-person perspective.  
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Baker thinks that this ability is uniquely human. It is the criterion of how we 
distinguish ourselves from other animals. Human animals are distinguished from other 
animals by virtue of the fact that nonhuman animals never develop a robust first-person 
perspective - they can only have rudimentary first-person perspective. Therefore, only 
human animals are persons in the actual world. When our biological ancestors 
developed a robust first-person perspective, entities of a new kind – person – came 
into being. For Baker, this is not a modal claim but an empirical fact about the actual 
world. It is metaphysically possible for there to be nonhumans that are persons, but 
there are no nonhuman animals that are persons in the actual world. Here is Baker’s 
articulation: 
 
[A] human infant, a person, is of a kind that develops robust first-person perspectives; 
an animal with a rudimentary first-person perspective is of a kind that does not. For 
animals, there is only the first stage of a first-person perspective; an animal may have 
only a rudimentary first-person perspective, and that’s it. (Ibid., p. 44) 
 
2.2   Objections to Constitutionalism 
There are several objections to Constitutionalism in the current literature. In the 
following, I discuss four – the problem of Many Thinkers, the Problem of Constitution 
Inducing, and the Problem of the Boundary of a Person. 
 
2.2.1   The Problem of the Many Thinkers 
The main problem of a constitutional view is that it claims that we are not numerically 
identical with the physical organism. If we admit that the physical organism could 
think and could have conscious experience, then there would be two things having 
conscious thoughts – one is the physical organism, and the other is you. The argument 
is usually called “the Problem of Many Thinkers,” which is proposed by Paul Snowdon 
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(1990) and Eric Olson (1997, 2007). The structure of the argument is outlined as 
follows: 
 
1. The animal is sitting there, and it thinks. 
2. You are sitting there thinking, and you are not the animal. 
_____________  
C.  There are at least two thinkers sitting there, thinking. 
 
Andrew M. Bailey (2016) has a modified version of the Problem of Many Thinkers. 
According to the Constitutionalist, there are two ways for an entity to have a property 
– to have it derivatively or to have it non-derivatively. Also, I am either an animal 
derivatively or an animal non-derivatively. If I am an animal derivatively, then there 
would be two human animals sitting in the chair - the derivative animal and the non-
derivative animal. However, we would typically think that there is only one animal in 
the chair. Therefore, he concludes that I am an animal non-derivatively. He formulates 
his argument in the below formula: 
 
(1) ANIMALITY. I am, in some sense or other, an animal.  
(2) TWO WAYS. If I am, in some sense or other, an animal, then either I am an animal 
in the derivative sense or I am an animal in the non-derivative sense.  
(3) PLURALITY. If I am an animal in the derivative sense, then there are two human 
animals in my immediate vicinity. 
(4) ONE ANIMAL. But there are not two human animals in my immediate vicinity. 
(5) Therefore, I am not an animal in the derivative sense (from PLURALITY and ONE 
ANIMAL).  
(6) Therefore, if I am an animal, then I am an animal in the non-derivative sense (from 
TWO WAYS and 5).  
(7) Therefore, I am an animal in the non-derivative sense (from ANIMALITY and 6). 
(Bailey 2016, p. 207 - 208) 
 
Bailey calls this “The Animality Argument.” As we can see, it adopts the notion of 
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derivativeness proposed by the Constitutionalists to argue that there would be two 
animals sitting in the chair. Since we do not want to accept this disastrous result, we 
should either say that we are numerically identical with the human animals, or that we 
are human animals non-derivatively. 
 
2.2.2   The Problem of Constitution-inducing 
In addition, Eric Olson (2007) objects to Constitutionalism by questioning which 
properties should be regarded as “constitution-inducing,” and what the underlying 
criteria are there for them to be constitution inducing. According to the opponents of 
Constitutionalism, a property P is constitution-inducing if and only if necessarily, 
whenever an individual possesses P, it constitutes a new entity that essentially has 
property Q, which is a constitutional correlate of P. If a thing’s having property P is 
sufficient for it to constitute another object that essentially has a property Q, then P is 
constitution inducing, and also, P and Q are constitutional correlates. Olson thinks that 
if Constitutionalism is true, there must be answers to the question of what makes it the 
case that first-person perspective is constitution-inducing. Upon reviewing some 
possible solutions, Olson declares that none of them is satisfactory. 
His discusses the generous view, according to which all properties are 
constitution-inducing. We are reluctant to accept the generous view since it implies 
that there is a new being every other moment by your having a new thought. It 
contradicts our common sense that there are not many but one thinking being 
throughout the whole period of continuous thought. Suppose I begin to think about 
Plato. The generous view implies that I come to constitute a new being that thinks 
about Plato essentially. She is not me because I do not think about Plato essentially. It 
follows that whenever I think about Plato, I would become are one of at least two 
beings thinking about Plato. For Olson, this is problematic because I could never know 
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who I am. I can either be the one who essentially thinks of Plato, or I can be the 
persisting person who thinks of Plato occasionally. Olson thinks that since both are 
thinking the same thoughts, one can never tell which me is. Moreover, Olson points 
out that many mental properties appear to be intrinsic. This alternative fails to solve 
the above problems since it also suggests that you coincide with at least one, or even 
more, mental being(s) at any moment. 
Olson is suspicious of what makes the first-person perspective particularly 
constitution-inducing among various mental properties. The capacity for sense 
experience and the ability to breathe are vital for us too. Baker should at least give 
some reasons to demonstrate how a first-person perspective is such a prestigious 
property that becomes the essential property of personhood. 
For Baker, it is a primitive fact that a human animal must have the essential 
properties it has. Asking why a person essentially has a first-person perspective is like 
asking why a proton is positively charged. Since this description concerns the basic 
level of properties, there is no further explanation underlying it. Olson thinks that it is 
problematic to assert that the modal properties of things are primitive.  
Suppose every individual located in the Rocky Mountain National Park coincides 
materially with a being that is essentially in the Rocky Mountain National Park - call 
them “essential parkers.” If you were to cross the border of the park, the essential 
parker coinciding with you would necessarily perish. If modal properties of objects are 
primitive, your essential parker’s not being able to exist outside the Rocky Mountain 
National Park would be an unexplainable, brute, yet essential property of her. If one 
agrees that the idea of an essential parker is silly, and that of an essential thinker is not, 
there should be a reason for us to discriminate between the two cases. The 
Constitutionalists are expected to give an answer to this question. Baker’s proposal, 
nonetheless, lacks this explanation. 
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2.2.3   The Problem of the Boundary of Person 
Both the Animalists and the Constitutionalists have to answer the question of why the 
boundary of this animal is also my physical boundary. In the third objection, Olson 
thinks that Constitutionalism fails to provide satisfactory answers to the above 
question. 
One might adopt Locke’s theory of the extended consciousness. Locke suggests 
that a being extends spatially as far as one’s consciousness extends. According to 
Locke, our bodily parts are “vitally united to this same thinking conscious self, so that 
we feel when they are touch”d, and are affected by, and conscious of good or harm that 
happens to them, are a part of our selves” (Locke 1975, p. 336). In other words, my 
being able to feel my feet explains why my feet are parts of me. 
Olson’s criticizes Locke’s suggestion. He thinks that Locke’s theory implies that 
a limb of you that is entirely numb fails to be a part of you. Moreover, Locke’s proposal 
would have to admit that the blood and fluid in your body are not part of you since you 
cannot directly feel their existence.14 There are so many bodily parts that you cannot 
feel. If you are in total sensory deprivation, Locke’s theory will imply that you do not 
consist of any physical parts at all. But then this conclusion sounds very counter-
intuitive to us.  
According to Baker’s view, although we are constituted by a human being, there 
is nothing substantial that exists over and above the human being. We are wholly 
physical. According to Baker’s definition of constitution, x constitutes y if and only if 
x and y spatially coincide. If x is a physical part of y, and y constitutes z, then x is also 
                                                     
14 Olson’s interpretation of Locke’s idea that the parts of ourselves should be parts that we are 
conscious of good or harm that happens to them is controversial. Surely we are affected by, and can 
experience the good or harm that happens to my blood in my body. However, I cannot directly 
experience my blood - I cannot feel my blood when it is touched. 
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a physical part of z. For her, persons are constituted by human animals, and any 
physical part that belongs to the human animal should also belong to the person. Under 
this physicalist picture, a person constituted by a human animal should have the 
physical boundary of a human animal. However, if one adopts Locke’s criterion of the 
boundary, a person constituted by a human animal with total sensory deprivation does 
not have any physical parts. There is an apparent inconsistency in Baker’s theory. 
A possible reply is that whenever one thing constitutes another, the two things, 
by definition, share their boundaries and their parts. Given that the animal constitutes 
the person, they should have the same boundary regardless of whether the person has 
bodily experience. In reply to this, Olson returns to the original question of what makes 
it the case that animals constitute us, and why not things a bit larger or smaller than 
animals. 
 
2.3   My Reply to the Objections 
2.3.1   My Reply to Olson’s Objections 
In my opinion, Olson’s first objection of “why some entities are constitution inducers, 
and some are not” can be answered by Baker’s theory. Baker proposes that there is a 
property-constitution-relation which holds between property-instances at different 
levels. She thinks that there are higher-level constituted events that are irreducible to 
lower-level events. Also, higher-level properties have causal powers that cannot be 
accounted for by or reduced to that of their constituents. According to Baker, “An 
irreducible higher-level property-instance (x’s having F at t) has independent causal 
efficacy if and only if 
 
(1) x’s having F at t has an effect e, and 
(2) x’s having F at t would have had the effect e even if its constituting property-instance 
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had been different, and 
(3) x’s having F at t confers causal powers that could not have been conferred by its 
constituting property-instance alone.” (Baker 2013, p. 216) 
 
Let us investigate whether the property instance “being in the Rocky Mountain 
National Park” is constitution inducing. First, one can easily think of x’s being in the 
Rocky Mountain National Park as having an effect, such as that of being happy. We 
can suppose that x is happy every time she is in the park. The first criterion is fulfilled. 
Second, we should examine whether x’s being in the Rocky Mountain National Park 
would be happy even if the constituting property-instance had been different. Suppose 
x is now having a walk in the park and being there makes her happy. The many possible 
constituting property-instance are such as x’s dancing in the park, x’s sleeping there, 
eating ice-cream there, swimming there, etc. All these properties are constituting 
property-instances which constitute that property instance “being in the Rocky 
Mountain National Park.” Even if the constituting property-instance had been different, 
x’s being in the Rocky Mountain National Park at t would have had the effect of 
making x happy – as assumed, x is happy if she is in the park. In other words, there is 
no such thing as x’s being in the Rocky Mountain National Park at t confers causal 
powers that could not have been conferred by its constituting property-instance alone. 
Criterion three, therefore, cannot be fulfilled. Following this, the property “being in 
the Rocky Mountain National Park” is not an irreducible higher-level property-
instance which has independent causal efficacy. Given that a property is constitution-
inducing if and only if it induces new causal contribution, then it is clear that “being in 
the Rocky Mountain National Park” has no new causal contribution and thus is not a 
constitution inducing property. 
Moreover, if Baker’s proposal that first-person perspectives have haecceities 
were successful, the problem of essential parkers would also be resolved. In any sense, 
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essential parkers are of course different from persons. Baker thinks that persons are 
haecceitistic, and their persistent conditions should be determined by haecceities; 
whereas essential parkers are not haecceitistic. By definition, their persistence is much 
shorter than that of the subject, and their persistence conditions should be different 
from that of the person – their persistence is not determined by haecceities of the first-
person perspective. I will discuss the conception of “haecceity” later in this thesis, and 
I will not discuss this idea in detail here. 
Baker proposes that persons have haecceitistic implications because persons 
essentially have first-person perspectives, and first-person perspectives have 
haecceities. Persons, therefore, are ontologically not reducible to their lower-level 
constituents such as the human animal. The property of “having a first-person 
perspective” is constitution inducing because necessarily, whenever a physical 
organism acquires a first-person perspective, it constitutes a new object, namely, a 
person. Baker asserts that x is constituted by y if and only if y is at an ontologically 
higher level than x, and y has novel causal powers that x does not have. There are new 
causal powers once a constituted object comes into being. An example given by Baker 
is a fire escape. She thinks that the fire escape has novel causal powers that the sum of 
particles that constitute the fire escape does not have. More specifically, the fire escape 
has the power to save a life non-derivatively whereas the sum of the particles that 
constitute the fire escape has the power derivatively in virtue of that fact that the sum 
constitutes a fire escape. However, the sum of the particle may not constitute the fire 
engine and thus may not have the causal power it has. The fire escape has the power 
to save a life in virtue of its function but not in virtue of its material constituents.  
For Baker, persons are agents that can bring out intentional actions, and thus are 
things that confer causal powers that could not have been conferred by their 
constituting property-instances alone. Olson’s first objection can be answered in this 
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way: there is enough evidence to show that persons are ontologically significant and 
are discriminated from the other things. 
 
2.3.2   My Reply to Olson’s Second Objection 
I cannot address Olson’s question of “what makes it the case that animals, but not 
something smaller or bigger, constitute us.” This is an intriguing question, and I don’t 
think there is an easy answer to it. Nevertheless, I aim to show that the problem of 
determining our physical boundary is a threat to Classical Animalism rather than to the 
Constitutionalism of persons. 
Constitutionalism suggests a flexible boundary for a person, but Animalism does 
not. Constitutionalism allows that the constituted object may not have been constituted 
by the constituent. It is possible that our boundary is larger than, or less than, that of 
an animal. If a person is not constituted by an animal anymore at a certain time, it can 
be constituted by other things else. For instance, a person may persist throughout a 
gradual replacement of bodily cells such that she is totally silicon-based one day.  
We don’t necessarily have the physical boundary of the human animals since the 
property of having such a boundary is merely a contingent fact. One may have a much 
larger boundary in future if the technology is enhanced, and our physical boundary 
may not be that of the physical organism at all. For instance, we may have artificial 
complementary wings and tails. It is also possible that one possesses a much smaller 
boundary – consider our brain being fully supported by nutrient fluids in a vat one day, 
or that our minds are uploaded to a computer server. The brain or the computer server 
is certainly not at all an animal, but in this case, we may concede that our boundary is 
that of our brain or that of the computer. 
The idea of an extended bodily boundary can also be understood via the Extended 
Mind View proposed by Andy Clark and David Chalmers (1998). They argue that 
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external objects can be regarded as parts of the mind when our cognitive processing is 
improved, and when those external objects have the same purpose as the internal 
process of cognitive processing. More specifically, when the external object is coupled 
with the mind to form one single working system, the mind should no longer be 
regarded as bounded within the skull. For instance, if one’s cognitive processes are 
greatly improved by one’s smartphone in the above way, then one’s mind should be 
regarded as extended to the smartphone. 
By contrast, the problem of determining our physical boundary should instead be 
a disadvantage for Classical Animalism. Since Classical Animalism is the view that 
we are numerically identical with the human animals and are essentially human 
animals, then our boundary is also necessarily the boundary of the animal. Our 
physical boundaries may be ill-defined when new technologies are launched. 
Technologies such as brain transplants, uploading, and silicon brain replacement are 
all threats to Classical Animalism. For instance, if one’s brain is removed and placed 
in vats, one no longer considers the bodily boundary of the animal as one’s boundary 
anymore. Similarly, if one’s body and the brain is gradually replaced by silicon chips, 
then one no longer has a bodily boundary of a physical organism afterward. These 
strongly suggest that we do not essentially have the physical boundary of an animal. 
In sum, I would say that the problem of determining our physical boundary threatens 
Classical Animalism without harming Constitutionalism. 
So far, I have argued that the problem of our physical boundary poses a threat to 
Classical Animalism rather than to the Constitutionalism of persons. Constitutionalism 
allows for flexible bodily boundaries of persons, but Animalism does not. 
 
2.3.3   My Reply to the Problem of Many Thinkers 
I believe that the most powerful argument against Constitutionalism of Persons is the 
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Problem of Many Thinkers. Even if Baker argues that the person thinks non-
derivatively and the human animal thinks derivatively, there are still two distinct 
thinking entities in the chair. It is difficult to avoid committing to the view that there 
are more than one thinkers in the chair. Constitutionalists may argue that the human 
animal thinks in virtue of the thinking activity of the person. However, given that they 
both think that same thought, it is difficult for us to determine which one I am. As 
argued by Olson, I may be the human animal or the person because they have exactly 
the same thoughts. 
I suggest one possible way out for the Constitutionalists. The Constitutionalists 
could answer this question of “which one I am” via modal notions. Since the 
persistence conditions of the person are different from that of the human animal, and 
it is possible that I persist as a person but not as an animal, I should be the person but 
not the human animal. This reply, however, presupposes that the persistence of human 
animal is determined by the sameness of life. 
Although this is a cogent reply to the question of whether I am the person or the 
animal which thinks, it does not give an answer to the problem of the Many Thinkers. 
The Constitutionalists still have to admit that there are at least two thinkers. 
In contrast, Cartesian substance dualism does not imply that there is more than 
one thinker. This view is theoretically more advantageous than the Constitutionalism 
in the sense that the Problem of Many Thinkers does not arise. According to Cartesian 
substance dualism, there is only one thinker because there is only one subject of 
experience. The subject of experience thinks, whereas the human animal, as a physical 
entity, does not think. For substance dualism, I am a purely mental entity, and I am 
causally intimately related to a particular human animal. The human animal is a purely 
physical entity that does not think. If there is only one single thinker sitting in the chair, 
then there is no problem in finding out who we are – I am the subjects of experience.  
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Some people would think that there is also the human body, the mere hunk of 
matter, and the human body minus its left hand, etc. There are many candidates for the 
owner of thoughts. How can Cartesian substance dualism avoid the Problem of Many 
Thinkers? My answer is that all these physical entities described above do not think. 
They have intimate causal relations with the same subject of experience, and only the 
subject of experience thinks. The subject of experience S1 which possesses the human 
body (in a causal sense of possession) is numerically identical with the subject of 
experience S2 which possesses the mere hunk of matter, which is also numerically 
identical with the subject of experience S3 which possesses the human body minus its 
left hand, etc. As S1 = S2 = S3 =…= Sn, there is only one subject of experience that 
thinks, but not many. That is how the Cartesian substance dualism replies to the 
Problem of Many Thinkers. 
 
2.4   The De-person Objection 
In what follows, I propose an objection to Baker’s Constitutionalism of persons. My 
argument has a structure as follows. First, (1) the rudimentary and the robust first-
person perspectives are not two stages of one single property but are two different 
properties; (2) we do not necessarily have a rudimentary first-person perspective; and 
(3) we do not necessarily have a robust first-person perspective. The conclusion is that 
it is not the case that we are essentially persons with first-person perspectives. To begin, 
let us reveal how Baker defines the essential properties of a person: 
 
[A]ny being that has a first-person perspective (rudimentary or robust) essentially is a 
person. (Baker 2013, p. 40) 
[A]lthough what is distinctive about human persons is their robust first-person 
perspectives, the property in virtue of which they are persons—a property that they have 
essentially—is a first-person perspective, rudimentary or robust. (Ibid.) 
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From the above quotations, it is clear that Baker thinks that persons essentially have 
first-person perspectives, rudimentary or robust. According to Baker, the rudimentary 
and the robust first-person perspectives are two stages of the same property. I aim to 
show that one can have a robust first-person perspective without having a rudimentary 
first-person perspective, and vice versa. Therefore, they are not different stages of the 
same property but are totally different properties. If this is true, then Baker is vague in 
defining the essential properties of a person. In other words, she is not clear in stating 
which is(are) the essential properties in virtue of which I exist. One can further 
question the significance of rudimentary and robust first-person perspectives for my 
existence. 
Let me illustrate what it usually means to say that one property has two stages. If 
one describes a property with a rudimentary stage and a robust stage, the following 
features should necessarily be involved - when the robust stage is achieved, the 
characteristics which at the rudimentary stage still retain. An example will clarify. 
Suppose I am now learning Japanese in an institution that provides two tests for foreign 
learners at different stages. The first test is for learners at the rudimentary stage. It 
requires that one be able to use Japanese to introduce oneself and to write a short essay 
in a hundred words. There is another exam for advanced students during which one 
would need to participate in a short conversation and to write a formal letter. When I 
pass the second test, it is assumed that the abilities that I have at the rudimentary stage 
are still there. Upon reaching the robust stage, I gain more skills and become more 
sophisticated in handling the language. The basic creed here is that necessarily, if a 
property x has two stages, then given that an entity that acquires the property x with 
its being at the robust stage, it also possesses the property x with its being at the 
rudimentary stage. 
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It seems that the rudimentary and the robust stages of first-person perspectives do 
not work like that. According to many philosophers, one can have a robust first-person 
perspective without having a rudimentary first-person perspective, and vice versa. It is 
dubious that the existence of a robust first-person perspective requires the existence of 
a rudimentary first-person perspective. First, there can be a being that thinks of itself 
as itself, and possess this cognitive ability of self-referencing, without having the 
disposition to perceive the world from a spatiotemporal perspective. One example is a 
person in the sensory deprivation tank proposed by G. E. M. Anscombe (1975). 
Suppose that there is an individual in the tank who lacks the five senses. She does not 
have bodily perceptions nor the experience of perceiving the world from a particular 
spatiotemporal perspective. We can go on to assume that the individual in the sensory 
deprivation tank has permanently lost the rudimentary first-person perspective – the 
ability to perceive the world from a spatiotemporal perspective. According to 
Anscombe, this person can still think “What happens to me? I cannot figure out where 
I am. That is terrible!” Since she is able to think of herself as herself, it is clear that her 
capacity for perceiving herself as herself remains intact. The robust first-person 
perspective is still there. This is an example of an individual who has a robust, but not 
a rudimentary, first-person perspective. 
More examples can be found in the recent literature of philosophy of mind. There 
is the famous argument for the irreducibility of phenomenal consciousness to 
psychological functions by David Chalmers (1996). According to Chalmers, the 
existence of zombies is conceivable and metaphysically possible. Chalmers defines 
zombies as beings that have psychological functions such as self-referencing 
mechanisms, speech, and behaviors resembling that of a normal person, but without 
phenomenal consciousness. These beings have robust first-person perspectives 
because they are able to refer to themselves using first-person pronouns. However, 
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they do not have rudimentary first-person perspectives because they never experience 
and perceive the external world from a spatiotemporal location. If we follow the 
common understanding that perceptions are conscious, phenomenal experiences, then 
zombies have robust but not rudimentary first-person perspectives.15 Furthermore, in 
Barry Dainton’s (2016) essay “I – The Sense of Self,” he puts forward the idea of a 
conscious experience without the spatiotemporal location from which it perceives the 
world. He provides an example of a conscious computer with a self-referencing 
function that has thoughts such as “I am now talking to X” and “I know that 1+1=2” 
without perceiving the external world with a spatiotemporal perspective. Dainton 
writes: 
 
Since she [the computer] has no body — or at least no bodily experience — as far as I 
can see, her remaining experience would be entirely non-presentational and non-
perspectival in character. Moreover, since she has no sense of subjective location, it 
would not seem to her that her thinking was taking place at any particular place. (Dainton 
2016, p. 137) 
 
All these are examples in which one has a robust first-person perspective without 
having a rudimentary first-person perspective.  
We find plenty of evidence showing that there can be a being who has a 
rudimentary first-person perspective without a robust first-person perspective. A worm, 
an ant, and many other lower animals do have rudimentary first-person perspectives. 
However, they do not have robust first-person perspectives throughout their lives. 
Adding the two claims together, the conclusion is that the presence of a rudimentary 
                                                     
15 The claim that zombies do not have perceptions is controversial, and it depends on how we define 
perceptions. Since we assume that zombies are able to do all the things that we do, and we can do 
things that require perceptions (e.g. taking a drink from a fridge), some scholars such as Daniel Dennett 
(1991) would think that we should also regard zombies who are able to do the same things as having 
perceptions. Here I take phenomenal consciousness as “what it’s likeness” and perceptions as a kind 
of conscious, phenomenal experience. For me, even if zombies can do what we can, they do not have 
perceptions. 
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first-person perspective is independent of the presence of a robust first-person 
perspective, and vice versa. These two dispositional properties do not necessarily co-
exist. An individual can have one kind of the first-person perspective without having 
the other. If the presence of a robust first-person perspective does not guarantee the 
presence of a rudimentary first-person perspective, and vice versa, then the two 
perspectives are two distinct properties instead of two stages of the same property. 
Below is my formulation: 
 
1. Necessarily, if a property x has two stages, then given that an entity which acquires 
the property x with its being at the robust stage, it also possesses the property x with 
its being at the rudimentary stage. 
2. One can have a robust first-person perspective without having a rudimentary first-
person perspective, and vice versa. 
__________________ 
C. The rudimentary and the robust first-person perspective are not two stages of the 
same property. 
 
One might argue against my proposal by saying that there are two kinds of dependence 
relations: the (1) ontological dependence and (2) developmental dependence relations. 
Although the two stages of the first-person perspective do not necessarily coexist, a 
rudimentary first-person perspective is developmentally necessary for the existence of 
a robust first-person perspective. We can try the following construal: A is 
developmentally necessary for B if and only if A is nomologically necessary for the 
development of B. By this definition, B can exist at time t1 without the existence of A 
at t1. For instance, sunlight is nomologically necessary for the formation of fruits, but 
the existence of a particular fruit on a tree at t1 does not require sunlight to be there at 
t1. In this sense, can we say that the rudimentary first-person perspective is 
developmentally necessary for the robust first-person perspective? 
Maybe. In the actual world, nomologically speaking, we do find strong evidence 
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for the claim that an individual would need to have a rudimentary first-person 
perspective before acquiring a robust first-person perspective. That said, it is quite 
plausible that the robust first-person perspective needs the rudimentary first-person 
perspective as the necessary condition for its development. However, this idea is not 
without its problems. First, there are so many things, besides the rudimentary first-
person perspective, that are developmentally necessary for a robust first-person 
perspective. For instance, some philosophers believe the experience of the presence of 
other conscious entities is probably one of the developmentally necessary conditions 
for the establishment of a robust first-person perspective. If we admit that all the 
properties that are developmentally necessary for a robust first-person perspective are 
essential for a person’s existence, it sounds really weird. Indeed, many of the properties 
that are developmentally necessary for my existence are metaphysically not necessary 
for my existence. The presence of other conscious entities is one example – we 
certainly exist and can think of ourselves as ourselves even if we are on an isolated 
island. Even if the presence of other conscious entities is plausibly one of the 
developmentally necessary conditions for us to have robust first-person perspectives, 
it is definitely not metaphysically necessary for our existence. The conception of 
“developmental necessity” is too weak for our discussion of the essential properties of 
a person. 
In a nutshell, I have argued that the two stages of first-person perspectives are 
different properties that can exist independently. Even though it may be the case in the 
actual world that the rudimentary first-person perspective is developmentally 
necessary for the robust first-person perspective, the relation is too feeble for us to 
consider the two stages of the first-person perspective as one single essential property 
of the existence of a person. Baker thus owes us a clear picture in defining the essential 
properties of a person. Her proposal leaves open a question of the significance of each 
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of the stages of the first-person perspective for my own existence. 
I now propose that I still exist even if I do not have a rudimentary first-person 
perspective. To illustrate this, one can adopt the thought experiments discussed 
previously – Anscombe’s sensory deprivation tank is an example that I can “wake up” 
in such a tank asking myself “where am I” and “what happened?” As I do not have a 
spatiotemporal perspective from which I perceive that world when I am in the sensory 
deprivation tank, I do not have a rudimentary first-person perspective. However, I still 
have conscious thoughts, and I certainly exist at that moment. Again, one can also use 
Barry Dainton’s idea of “conscious computer” to illustrate this: the conscious 
computer does not have a spatiotemporal viewpoint to perceive the external world, and 
it can never be regarded as having a rudimentary first-person perspective. If it is 
possible that our minds are uploaded to a computer server, such that I can think and 
can communicate with others via connecting to other computer servers, I can be 
regarded as persisting as a non-human person after uploading. I never acquire a 
rudimentary first-person perspective anymore, but I still exist. My conclusion is simply 
that I can exist without having a rudimentary first-person perspective.  
I will argue in the final chapter of this thesis that I can have zero, one, or more 
than one spatiotemporal perspectives from which I perceive the world. In other words, 
the presence of a rudimentary first-person perspective is not the essential property of 
my existence. For one thing, even if it is true that my essential property is having a 
rudimentary first-person perspective, this fact does not make us special – we all know 
that many other conscious beings such as cats, dogs, rats, and primates all have 
rudimentary first-person perspectives. A cat’s subject of experience also has the ability 
to perceive the external world from a spatiotemporal perspective. That is not what 
Baker wishes – she definitely wants to distinguish ourselves from other animals. 
Now I further argue that my essential property is not having a robust first-person 
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perspective. It is possible that I exist even if I do not have a robust first-person 
perspective. Suppose there is a kind of human beings, called “de-persons,” which is 
genetically modified. There is no difference between a person and a de-person before 
they reach the age of 40. However, de-persons are automatically “de-personalized” 
from 40. At the date of birth at 40, a de-person suddenly has a rapid deterioration of 
mental complexity and becomes a being that is capable of being conscious but can 
never exhibit a robust first-person perspective. A de-person lives a deprived life 
afterward, not being able to refer to herself as herself. Unfortunately, there is 50% of 
the whole population nowadays suffering from this disease, and there is no current 
technology that can tell whether one is a person or a de-person when one is under 40.  
Suppose I am wondering whether I am a person or a de-person. According to 
Baker, there is a person before 40, and the person does not exist anymore after that. 
Since Baker thinks that I am essentially a person, I should no longer exist after 40 
(there is not any person anymore after the individual reaches 40.) However, the more 
intuitive postulation for me is that I will survive let alone in bad condition. Admittedly, 
I will have much less meaningful experience because the variety of experience will be 
severely declined. The situation of being a de-person is like having an unfortunate 
accident that destroys my nervous system and causes me to lose a lot of abilities. In 
this situation, however, I will still be able to feel pain and enjoy eating, sleeping, and 
many other basic activities. I can still run in the grass, swim in the pool, dream of 
dancing in the sun, and play simple games with my fellow de-persons, just like what 
the dogs do with their mates. I am similar to a dog in the sense that I would have a 
rudimentary first-person perspective but can never have a robust one anymore - I can 
never regain the capacity to think about myself as myself. 
I do exist even if I permanently lose the capacity to develop a robust first-person 
perspective. If I belong to the kind “de-person,” and that I may exist without having 
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the capacity to develop a robust first-person perspective, then I am not an entity that 
essentially has the capacity of developing a robust first-person perspective. I can 
totally lose the capacity of developing the robust first-person perspective at the age of 
40 but would still continue to exist afterward. My existence does not require any 
exemplification of a robust first-person perspective. The essential property of my 
existence, hence, should be something other than the capacity of developing a robust 
first-person perspective. 
Some people would have an intuition that in the absence of most of what makes 
you a person, a de-person is not the same person as you were. They would think that 
Baker is right in saying that the de-person after 40 is not the same person as the one 
before 40. I totally agree with this claim. I believe, however, that there is an important 
difference between a person’s persistence and my persistence.  If one adopts Baker’s 
definition of personhood, it is quite reasonable to think that the de-person after 40 is 
not the same person as the individual before 40. However, it seems intuitive and 
plausible to me that I can survive without being the same person throughout my 
lifetime. I persist throughout the rapid deterioration of my mental life, and I now exist 
as an unfortunate de-person (who should not be regarded as a person according to 
Baker’s definition. It is merely a mind / subject with minimal experience). It would 
still be me who suffers from the disease and has those miserable experience afterward. 
In this case, my persistence conditions and essential properties are different from that 
of a person. 
So far, I have introduced Baker’s Constitutionalism of persons and delineated 
four main objections to Baker’s Constitutionalism. I comment on Olson’s arguments 
and provide my objection to Baker’s theory. My argument consists of three 
independent claims. First, I propose that the rudimentary and the robust first-person 
perspectives are not two stages of the same property but are two distinct properties that 
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can exist independently of each other. Baker’s Constitutionalism of persons thus fails 
to provide a clear picture of the essential properties of our existence. Second, I argue 
that it is possible for me to exist without a rudimentary first-person perspective. Third, 
I show that one can permanently lose the robust first-person perspective but go on to 
exist. Adding these together, the result is that since neither the robust nor the 
rudimentary first-person perspective is necessarily there when I exist - none of them 
are essential for my existence. 
 
2.5   Functionalism and Constitutionalism 
A contemporary analytic philosopher, Sydney Shoemaker (2011, 2016), proposes a 
constitutional view that presupposes a functional interpretation of personhood. 
Shoemaker thinks that human animals cannot think. He believes that persons and 
animals are different entities because they have different persistence conditions. Yet, 
they share some properties with each other. His theory entails that there can be distinct 
entities that spatiotemporally coincide and are made up of the same matter. 
Shoemaker proposes the representational unity theory of consciousness which 
can be applied to the individuation of personhood. According to his theory, two mental 
states are owned by the same person if and only if (1) “they are linked by a chain of 
stages such that each member of the series is directly connected psychologically to the 
consecutive preceding members,” (Shoemaker 1984, pp. 95 - 96) and (2) no such chain 
of stages that link them diverges to two branches. For Shoemaker, mental states are 
functional states with sensory inputs and behavioral outputs, which bear intimate 
relations to other functional mental states as well. A mental state can be identified by 
its place in a causal network of functional mental states. For example, there is a belief 
that it is rainy outside. Together with some sensory experiences, desires, and beliefs 
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such as “I want to keep dry” and “an umbrella can keep off rain,” a person tends to 
take the action of bringing an umbrella with her. Furthermore, the belief in such 
examples is also connected to many other beliefs, such as that the floor outside is wet, 
that there will be fewer people on the street, etc. 
For Shoemaker, the individuation of persons at a time is determined by the 
synchronic unity of the causal network of mental functions. Also, the diachronic unity 
relation of a person holds when the property instances at various times are causally 
related. The nodes in the network jointly cause actions; only when one’s beliefs and 
desires are unified could one perform an action. The diachronic identity of a person is 
determined by the causal relation between the psychological properties. Moreover, one 
can determine an entity’s synchronic unity relation by the same causal means. For 
instance, there is one single person having the desire to eat an apple and the belief that 
some actions would result in the eating action. If the desires and beliefs are causally 
related and thus synchronically unified, they jointly result in the consequential actions, 
such as the person’s hand grasping the apple and putting it into her mouth. Moreover, 
the action of the person would become diachronically unified with the former desires 
and beliefs. The memories, beliefs, and desires of a person are causally and 
counterfactually dependent on her past life. If there are causal relations between some 
properties such that they jointly produce, or are apt to produce some effect, then those 
properties are synchronically and diachronically unified. He writes: 
 
[For] what is involved in the possession of certain mental properties, it seems central to 
their causal profiles that their instantiation causes or contributes to causing successor 
states of certain sorts in the future career of the same person. It is characteristic of many 
mental states that they leave memories of themselves. Beliefs give rise, in reasoning, to 
other beliefs to which they give deductive or inductive support. Beliefs and desires give 
rise to intentions, and intentions give rise to decision and actions. In all these cases the 
successor states belong to the same subject as the states that give rise to them, and it 
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seems central to the concepts of these states that this should be so. (Shoemaker 2009, p. 
359) 
 
Shoemaker claims that mental states are functional states that need not be conscious. 
For instance, one’s memories of the old school days are mental states that exist in one’s 
mind even if one is having a deep unconscious sleep. The unconscious psychological 
dispositions are also classified as mental states. His view is based on the idea that all 
properties are individuated by causal profiles. Properties are individuated and 
classified in the sense that properties having the same causal profile are identical with 
each other. For him, properties of an entity are synchronically unified only if they 
jointly produce certain effects under certain circumstances. If the properties of an 
entity jointly produce certain effects under some circumstances, these properties are 
said to be synchronically unified. The property instances are synchronically unified 
only if the co-instantiation of those properties produces an effect of a kind that belongs 
to the causal profiles of the instantiated properties. For example, if an instance of 
hardness, sharpness and that of a certain mass jointly produces the effect of a piece of 
wood being cut when pressure is applied to it, these property instances all belong to a 
single entity, say, a knife. 
Shoemaker introduces the conceptions of thin and thick properties to show that a 
person and the human animal with the same physical body can carry different 
properties. According to Shoemaker, the existence of a persisting entity is constituted 
by a set of property instances united by relations of synchronic and diachronic unity. 
The term “thin properties” refer to those properties that are shared by different kinds 
of things with different persistence conditions. Some typical examples of thin 
properties are size, shape, and mass. Thick properties, on the other hand, are properties 
that are only instantiated in things of a certain kind. Moreover, the causal profiles of 
these thick properties are such that their continuous instantiations determine the 
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sameness of the entity through time. For instance, the persistence of a tree is 
determined by the causal profiles of its (thick) biological properties. Even if the tree is 
struck by lightning such that there are drastic changes in those of its thin physical 
properties, such as its size and shape, it still persists by virtue of the continuity of the 
instantiations of its thick biological properties, such as its genetical makeup. 
Shoemaker proposes that we are essentially persons. We have psychological 
properties as our thick properties, and our persistence is determined by psychological 
continuity. If a belief and a desire jointly give rise to an action, then these property 
instances are owned by the same person. The continuous instantiations of the thick 
mental properties cause the future mental and physical properties of the persisting 
person. For instance, beliefs and desires cause the intentions of a person, which further 
give rise to her mental and bodily actions. If there is a set of mental properties with 
synchronic and diachronic unity, then this set constitutes a history of a single persistent 
person. 
For Shoemaker, the person, her animal, and her body are not identical but are 
spatiotemporally coincident. He regards a body as the physical entity owned by a 
person in virtue of which one perceives and interacts with the external world. The body 
continues to exist as a corpse after death. Moreover, he defines a human animal as a 
biological organism, the continuity of which is determined by the continuity of life. 
The human animal does not exist anymore after the organism dies. 
According to Shoemaker, these three coincident entities (the person, her animal, 
and her body) share only some but not all properties. The person, the animal, and the 
body share some physical properties. Nevertheless, mental properties are only had by 
the person but not the animal nor the body. My physical body and my human animal 
share all of my thin properties but not my thick properties and persistence conditions, 
and thus I can come apart from them. For Shoemaker, my body’s having certain 
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physical properties and the environment together determines that something else, 
namely, me (the person), who has certain mental properties. On the other hand, animals 
have biological properties as thick properties, but our persistence conditions are not 
determined by those properties. 
Certain microphysical states of affairs are realizers of thick mental and physical 
properties for the person. However, this microphysical state occurs in the person and 
also its animal and body. For Shoemaker, we can say that the microphysical state of 
affairs is weakly embedded in both the human body and the human animal, but is 
strongly embedded in the person. There are different thick biological properties that 
are responsible for the synchronic and diachronic identity of the body and the animal 
respectively. The microphysical state of affairs weakly embedded in the body and the 
animal only instantiate thick biological properties for them, but not thick mental 
properties for the person. 
Since the causal profile of the person, the animal, and the body is different, they 
have different thick properties and persistence conditions. One example is the brain 
transplant, in which the person is separated from both the body and the animal. In this 
case, we normally think that your identity goes with the person with the original brain, 
whereas the organism with an empty skull is not you. The physical property “is 
immune to smallpox” can be applied to both the person and its animal before the 
operation. However, after the person’s brain is transplanted to another human body 
whose owner has not been vaccinated for smallpox, the resulting entity no longer 
possesses the physical property “is immune to smallpox.” On the other hand, the 
human animal with an empty skull that keeps functioning is still immune to smallpox. 
This example shows that the physical property “is immune to smallpox” is a thick 
property for the animal but a thin property for the person. The reason is that this 
physical property is necessary for, and contributes to, the sameness of the human 
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animal over time, but it is not necessary for and does not contribute to the sameness of 
person over time.  
Apart from mental properties, persons also have thick physical properties which 
instantiate the mental properties. These microphysical realizers also have a kind of 
unity the constitutes the synchronic and diachronic unity of the person. These thick 
physical properties, in turn, are supported by some other thin physical properties such 
as mass and density. Therefore, persons also have thick and thin physical properties. 
Although we essentially have some physical properties, most of the physical 
properties we have are not our thick properties. We have mental properties, whereas 
those mental properties are realized by some physical properties. In saying that, he 
assumes that mental properties always have their physical realizers. Since the mental 
states of a person are caused by sensory inputs to the sense organs of the physical body 
and the bodily actions performed by a person are caused by her volitional states, there 
is an intimate relation between the physical states of the body and the mental states of 
a person. However, it should be noted that those physical realizer properties will be 
neural properties whose nature are mystical to us. These physical properties are not 
what we normally ascribe to a person in our daily lives, such as height, weight, etc. 
According to Shoemaker, if my volitional states are physically realized, the property 
instances of their physical realizers stand in relations of synchronic unity to instances 
of other physical, bodily property instances, such as those of the muscular and nervous 
system. These physical properties, in turn, are synchronically united with property 
instances such as mass and shape. 
Shoemaker believes that one can use the conceptions of thin and thick properties 
to solve the Problem of Many Thinkers. He claims that the Thinking Animal Argument 
is incorrect in the sense that it assumes that the human animal thinks. For him, the 
animal does not think. Shoemaker proposes that the person and the human animal only 
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share all the thin physical properties but not the thick physical properties. Those thick 
physical properties that realize mental states and the mental properties belong only to 
the person, but not to the coincident biological animal or the human body. 
 
2.5.1   My Objections to Shoemaker’s Constitutionalism  
Shoemaker’s theory of personal identity is problematic in several ways. First, I argue 
that Shoemaker’s individuation of persons is problematic. Second, I propose that it is 
quite plausible that we can persist in two or more distinct and discontinuous person-
phases. If this is true, then we are not essentially persons with functional unification. 
Third, I aim to show that we can exist as a subject of experience of pain without the 
psychological complexity of being a person. I now discuss these three objections. 
For Shoemaker, we have psychological properties as our thick properties, and our 
persistence is determined by psychological continuity. The continuous instantiations 
of the thick mental properties cause the future mental and physical properties of the 
persisting person. I argue that this picture is incorrect – we have a strong intuition for 
our persistence in cases in which there is no psychological continuity. I now provide a 
thought experiment to show that I can persist as two totally distinct persons. If it is the 
case, I am not numerically identical with a person, and my persistence is determined 
by something else rather than that of a person. 
Suppose I had an accident and became totally unconscious for a hundred years. 
My family does not allow the hospital to remove the machine that helps my body 
survive, and they are rich enough to pay for all the medical expenses for a hundred 
years. After those many years, a genius scientist manages to do an operation to wake 
me up. Unfortunately, since my brain has not been working (e.g., to produce conscious 
thoughts) for such a long time, all memories of the past are gone. I have to learn how 
to speak, walk, and eat from the very beginning. The worse thing is that all my relatives 
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that I knew before have passed away. My case is then referred to the Social Welfare 
Department, and I am eventually adopted by a kind and rich couple from Africa. I learn 
to speak Afroasiatic languages and various skills such as building roundhouses. I now 
enjoy my life in Africa and do not have any memory of what has happened to me 100 
years ago. 
I have two life experiences. One is a philosopher in Hong Kong; another one has 
a life in Africa. The two life experiences are discontinuous, but yet, it is still me who 
has both phases of experiences. I believe that most of us do have the same intuition as 
me. It is still me after the operation. In this case, I have been two distinct persons, and 
the latter person is not psychologically continuous with the former at all. Yet, 
according to Shoemaker’s Embedded Person View, I am essentially and fundamentally 
a person who has certain psychological complexity, and my mental states are unified. 
I can only be one of the two persons. Since the two are numerically different persons, 
it would be impossible for me to be numerically identical with the latter person if I am 
the former person. This sounds weird to me. 
My second objection to Shoemaker’s theory is that it is possible for me to exist 
without having the psychological complexity enough to be regarded as a person. 
Suppose I now have an experience of pain without remembering myself as a person in 
any objective sense. I do not remember who I am or what I have done in my life. If 
such a scenario is possible, then it is questionable for us to say that we are persons that 
have certain psychological complexity with a certain long-enough duration. Similarly, 
some philosophers such as Galen Strawson (2011) propose the existence of transient 
selves, according to which the subjects of experience only last for less than a second. 
Moreover, Hud Hudson (2012) uses a thought experiment of the morphing block to 
illustrate that any psychological criterion of personal identity that presupposes that we 
necessarily are things with a causal history fails when there are holes in the growing 
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block of time. He concludes that our persistence should be an unanalyzable fact.  
Shoemaker’s Constitutionalism obviously does not allow us to be minimal 
subjects of experience - it presupposes that we are entities with a relatively long 
duration. He understands a person as an entity of psychological complexity that 
contains certain memories of the past, psychological traits, and anticipation of the 
future. If we are persons, we cannot exist as a subject of experience of pain and nothing 
else for this moment, and this violates our intuition. 
Another pitfall for Shoemaker’s theory is that there are lots of cases in which one 
experiences representational disunity from a first-person perspective. I have already 
discussed in the first chapter how Paul Snowdon (2012) delineates that any 
representational unity theory of consciousness does not seem to be an effective way to 
individuate consciousness in the case of brain-splitting. Shoemaker’s functional 
account of individuation of persons implies that there would be many persons 
throughout an individual human being’s lifetime. When I experience the waterfall 
illusion, two persons will arise at the same time, one with the representational content 
that the object is moving, and the other with the representational content that the object 
is not. However, intuitively, I should be perceiving both perceptions, for if I am only 
one of them, it won’t be the case that I am the individual who has the waterfall illusion. 
However, Shoemaker’s theory does not allow that I am both because there is 
representational disunity between the two mental states. His theory thus has difficulties 
in explaining the individuation of ourselves during the waterfall illusion. 
Shoemaker explicitly claims that mental states need not be conscious because 
they are functional states. Mental states are functional states with sensory inputs and 
behavioral outputs and that bear intimate relations to other functional mental states as 
well. In my opinion, his theory does not place any importance on phenomenal 
consciousness – such a functional theory of mental states is even compatible with the 
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claim that we are all zombies. This sounds very dubious to me. Taking my own 
existence for example. If none of the mental states instantiated by, say, my physical 
organism, were conscious at all since birth, then I would be suspicious of my existence 
in this scenario. It seems that there should be something more, such as my phenomenal 
consciousness, or the “what is it likeness of being me,” that supports my existence 
apart from those functional aspects of my psychology. Shoemaker’s theory of the 
individuation of persons is counterintuitive in the sense that the phenomenal aspects 
of our lives are totally neglected. 
I also object to Shoemaker’s idea that properties are individuated and classified 
in the sense that properties having the same causal profile are identical with each other. 
He defines that for any property x, x should have a certain causal profile as an essential 
element. In my opinion, this classification misses out the possibility that there can be 
a subject that observes the flow of its mental states without remembering any one of 
them or taking any actions. We can even conceive of a subject of experience having 
various experiences at different times that are not causally linked together by any 
means. For instance, we can imagine a patient with lock-in syndrome who cannot act, 
talk, or even move her eyeballs. At some moment, she is lying on the bed peacefully, 
letting her thoughts flow. From t1 to t2, she suddenly remembers something that 
happens to her many years ago, and during t2 to t3 she starts to think about a 
mathematical proof. These thoughts, however, are very chaotic that there is no causal 
link between them. It seems that this scenario is highly plausible.  
We sometimes have disorganized thoughts in a dream. But yet, we still believe 
that there is one single subject of experience which has all these disorganized thoughts. 
I can dream of being a butterfly from t1 to t2, and dream of being a lion from t2 to t3. 
Suppose that there are no causal connections between the behaviors in being a butterfly 
in the first dream and the behaviors in being a lion in the second dream. It seems that 
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Shoemaker would have to admit that the person having the butterfly dream is different 
from that of the lion dream. The description that “this person had two separate dreams 
last night” would simply be wrong. However, psychologists told us that it is quite 
normal for a person to have several dreams with disconnected contents during one 
single night.16 Something must be wrong here - either Shoemaker’s definition of 
personhood is not applicable to our daily lives, or the psychologists have 
misunderstandings about what a person is. My stance is that if Shoemaker’s theory of 
personhood does not fit into our common understanding of the conception of person, 
his functional individuation of personhood may not be a good choice. 
 
2.5.2   Person as Functional 
As we have noted, Shoemaker believes that mental states are functional states and 
persons are individuated in terms of functional, psychological unity. Some people may 
then be inclined to think that persons are wholly functional, and we are functions. In 
what follows, I propose that the assertion “a person is functional” is problematic. 
Admittedly, this approach is appealing in several ways. First, it avoids the 
vagueness of derivativeness - we do not need to find a criterion to determine which 
physical part thinks non-derivatively, and which parts do not. Second, the idea that we 
are psychological functions of the brain avoids the problem raised by Eric Olson (2003) 
that there may be a non-functioning brain of a human animal, being removed from the 
skull, and being placed in a jar. According to the Derek Parfit’s (2012) Embedded 
Person View, if we are the physical parts of human animals responsible for thinking, 
then one would need to admit that after Parfit’s brain is removed from the skull and 
put in the jar, Parfit is now in the jar. A functional view, on the other hand, avoids the 
pitfall of declaring we are non-functioning brains. 
                                                     
16 Empson (2002) claims that we usually have three to five dreams per night. 
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Albeit having these advantages, I propose that the view that we are functions does 
not work. To say that we are functions is to say that we are the kind of things that are 
multiply instantiable. Suppose you are a complex psychological function. In thought 
experiments of tele-transportation, as extensively discussed by Sydney Shoemaker 
(1984) and Derek Parfit (1984), the tele-transporter produces two resultant entities on 
Mars, each having the same psychological function with the original person. There can 
be more than one instantiation of the same set of psychological functions at a time, and 
the claim that we are psychological functions would imply admitting that you can be 
instantiated more than twice simultaneously, and so can I, and all other people. This is 
not a consequence we desire to have – we normally think that in cases of tele-
transportation, the two resultant entities are two different persons with the same 
psychology, and you just cannot be both. 
Correspondingly, there is the famous reduplication problem raised by Bernard 
Williams (1973). He describes a case in which a person called Charles claims himself 
to be the reincarnation of Guy Fawkes: 
 
All the events he claims to have witnessed and all the actions he claims to have done 
point unanimously to the life of some one person in the past…Guy Fawkes. Not only do 
all Charles’ memory-claims that can be checked fit the pattern of Fawkes’ life as known 
by historians, but others that cannot be checked are plausible, provide explanations of 
unknown facts and so on. (Williams 1976, p. 332) 
 
Williams argues that the evidence for supporting a case of reincarnation is the memory. 
However, continuity of memory (which is a psychological function) cannot be the 
criterion for determining the sameness of person over time because there can be 
another person, say, Charles’s brother, Robert, who also remembers being Guy Fawkes. 
But since two people cannot be one person, at least one of them has false beliefs. If the 
reduplication case shows that the continuity of psychological functions cannot 
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determine the sameness of person over time, in the original case where no 
reduplication exists, one still cannot use the continuity of psychological functions as 
the criterion to determine the sameness of person over time. 
For Williams, the presence of Robert should not affect the intrinsic relations 
between Charles and Guy Fawkes. Whether an identity relation obtains should be a 
fact independent of what happened to other people. This is a thought experiment 
originally intended to overturn the psychological criterion of personal identity. The 
idea is now adopted to show that we cannot identify ourselves with a psychological 
function because functions can be reduplicated many times simultaneously, but you 
cannot be all of them. Intuitively, if your psychological function is reduplicated and 
reproduced on Mars and the original person remains intact on Earth, the person on 
Mars is another being; it is not you. 
Williams concedes that the defenders of hylomorphism, a view saying that we are 
forms of particular beings, might enable the soul “to transcend its adjectival status” 
(Williams 1986, p. 197) by conceiving of it as a form of individuated mental 
organization that could be realized in a physical body the configuration of which is 
capable of accommodation. However, as conceived in this way, one single soul could 
in principle be multiply instantiated. Moreover, my existence would have to be that of 
a type of thing rather than that of a single entity. Williams thinks that it is problematic 
and thus opposed to hylomorphism.  
In summary, the functional criterion for the individuation and personal identity is 
the culprit for Shoemaker’s theory. Functions are things that are multiply instantiable. 
Since we are not multiply instantiable, we should not be functions. I suggest that we 
withdraw from functional considerations regarding our existence and persistence. 
3   The Embedded Part Views 
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Now we have come to conclude that we are not persons that are constituted by human 
animals. What, then, are we? There are still some alternatives, such as the claim that 
we are parts of the human animals. There are claims saying that we are physical parts 
of the human animals, and some philosophers also think that we are mental parts of 
the human animals. In what follows, I investigate each of the views and study the pros 
and cons of these views. 
 
3.1   The Embedded Physical Part Views 
We will now take a look at Derek Parfit’s Embedded Person View. In his recent paper 
“we are not human beings,” Parfit (2012) proposes that we are not human beings but 
parts of them. He proposes the view that we are the controlling parts of the human 
animals. He calls his view an “Embodied Person View.” He writes: 
 
I hope to show that we are not human beings, or animals, but are the conscious, thinking, 
controlling parts of these animals. (Parfit 2012, p. 21) 
The animal’s thinking is done for it by something else, the part whose physical 
basis is the cerebrum. This human animal could not think on its own, since without this 
part it could not think at all. But the conscious thinking part can think on its own, as it 
would do in some of the imagined cases that we have been considering. (Parfit 2012, p. 
15) 
 
For Parfit, a human being thinks consciously by virtue of a smaller part – the person. 
He adopts an analogy to illustrate the mereological relation between ourselves and the 
human animals. A locomotive is powerful by virtue of having a powerful engine within. 
Similarly, a human being thinks consciously by virtue of the brain, a smaller part of 
the human animal. 
Parfit thinks that there are two ways to understand what it means to say that an 
entity derivatively thinks. The first is a weak claim saying that “we are merely thinking 
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again what someone else thoughts first, and led us to think.” (Parfit 2012, p. 22) For 
instance, if I think of Zeno’s Paradox derivatively in the weak sense, I think of it 
because a professor whose class I am attending has just thought of, and has talked 
about, Zeno’s Paradox. Her discussions of Zeno’s Paradox influences what the 
students think. Parfit also provides an example of the moon shining at night 
derivatively in this weak sense that the reflecting light comes not from itself but the 
Sun. However, for the claim that an animal thinks derivatively, we should not 
understand the word “derivatively” in the weak sense. Instead, the derivativeness here 
should be in a strong sense. A being thinks in a strong non-derivative sense only if all 
of its parts are directly involved in its thinking. Furthermore, the thing that thinks on 
its own in a non-derivative sense is a person. Parfit proposes: 
 
We can then truly claim that we are not human beings in the sense that refers to human 
animals, but are the most important parts of these animals, the parts that do all the things 
that are most distinctive of these human animals, as conscious, thinking, rational beings. 
(Parfit 2012, p. 22) 
 
3.1.1   The Inner-I and Outer-I 
Discussions in mereology usually assume no ontological restriction on the field of 
parthood. Abstract entities like properties and universals can also be parts. Moreover, 
some concrete things have part-whole relations. One can say that “emotions are part 
of our psychology,” and “p” is part of the word “part.” By virtue of what can we regard 
the person as part of an animal? One may challenge Parfit’s view by saying that the 
claim that we are the thinking part of an animal does not match descriptions in our 
daily life with the assumption that I extend to the whole body. For instance, we would 
say “I am six feet tall,” “I have two hands,” etc. How should the Parfit’s view explain 
this phenomenon? 
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Parfit admits that we sometimes use “I” and “me” more widely rather than merely 
our physical bodies. To explain the relation between the thinking part and other parts 
of a human animal, Parfit suggests that one can use the phrase “Inner-I” to refer to the 
Lockean person in mental terms, and “Outer-I” to refer to the human animal. The 
Inner-I is part of the Outer-I, and the Outer-I thinks indirectly, or derivatively, in virtue 
of having the Inner-I as part of it. He defines the two notions as follows: 
 
(A) Inner-I am the person, the conscious, thinking, controlling part of this animal, which 
is directly thinking this thought; 
(B) Outer-I am the animal that is indirectly thinking this thought, by having a part, Inner-
I, that does the thinking. (Parfit 2012, p. 21). 
 
As illustrated by Parfit, sometimes, we refer to the “Inner-I,” the Lockean person, 
whereas other times we use the same word “I” to refer to the “Outer-I,” the human 
animal. 17  When the Inner-I (the person) thinks, the Outer-I (the animal) which 
contains a thinking part thinks derivatively (in the strong sense). The thinking activity 
of the person does not rely on any external agent; it thinks in itself. We may also say, 
the Inner-I directly thinks these thoughts and the Outer-I thinks the thoughts indirectly. 
There are also similar uses for terms such as “me,” “you,” “he,” “she,” “we,” etc. Parfit 
is explicit in saying this: 
 
The animal is a person only in the derivative sense of having a Lockean person as a part, 
there are not too many persons here. (Parfit 2012, p. 21) 
We are each part of a human animal, and we make this animal able, in a derivative 
way, to understand and respond to reasons. Outer-We are, in that sense, rational animals, 
because Inner-We are rational persons. (Ibid., p. 23) 
 
An animal thinks only in a derivative sense as there are many redundant parts involved. 
                                                     
17 See p. 6 of the thesis for the Lockean definition of a person. 
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Your hands, heart, and lungs do not directly contribute to your mental activities. Since 
the Inner-I is a non-derivative thinker, strictly speaking, my lungs and heart are not 
parts of the Inner-I. 
Parfit further defends the Narrow Brain-Based Psychological Criterion, a theory 
saying that for there to be the same person over time, there should be enough of the 
same brain that supports unique psychological continuity. He asserts: 
 
If some future person would be uniquely psychologically continuous with me as I am 
now, and this continuity would have its normal cause, enough of the same brain, this 
person would be me. (Parfit 2012, pp. 5-6) 
 
According to this view, the replica newly produced by the tele-transporter in the 
thought experiment will never be identical to the original person because the resultant 
entities do not have the same brain as the original person. Nevertheless, Parfit (1984) 
declares that identity is not what matters. Even if there is not identity, given that there 
are psychological connections and continuity between the two, the situation would be 
as good as ordinary survival.  
According to Parfit, the Embodied Person View is a feasible alternative to 
Animalism. Animals have many parts; if one regards the person as part of the human 
being, then there is only one thinker (the person) but not many who think non-
derivatively. The animal thinks only derivatively by virtue of having a smaller part, 
the person, that does the thinking. Moreover, even if there are still lots of parts of the 
human animal that thinks, as some philosophers may assert, all these parts of the 
human animal, if they think, only think derivatively. There is only one single entity 
that thinks derivatively, namely, the person. This is a solution to the Problem of Many 
Thinkers because there is only one entity that thinks non-derivatively. 
It is noted, however, that his view is compatible with the idea that there is more 
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than one thing that thinks non-derivatively. Again, if a physical organism is a vague 
object, and there are many equally good candidates for being the human animal, then 
there may well be many entities that think derivatively. 
Second, Parfit claims that the Embedded Person View gives a satisfactory answer 
to the Problem of Many Thinkers.18 To restate the problem, if the animal thinks 
derivatively and the person thinks non-derivatively. Whenever you think about Plato, 
there are at least two beings thinking about Plato, and you are one of them. This is 
problematic because when you think you could never know who you are. Parfit 
proposes that there will not be the problem of an animal believing falsely that it is the 
person. Instead, the animal believes in both claims, “I am a person” and “I am the 
human animal” by having a part that does the thinking and judgments. The animal 
correctly believes that it is a person in virtue of having a thinking part – a person that 
thinks that it is a person. 
 
3.2   My Objections to the Embedded Physical Part Views 
Parfit’s view is not without problems. According to Parfit’s Embedded Person View, 
we are essentially persons that are parts of human animals. There are several versions 
of the Embedded Person View. One version of this view is simply that the thinking 
thing is the brain. I call it the Embedded Brain View. Parfit believes that this version 
is cogent and feasible. He says, 
 
Olson rejects this view because he assumes that an animal’s thinking part would have to 
be claimed to be its brain. (Parfit 2012, p. 15) 
What Olson calls the brain view is, however, only one version of the Embodied Part 
View. This version is not, I believe, absurd. (Ibid.) 
                                                     
18 This is one of the objections to Constitutionalism of Persons by Olson. See my thesis p. 21. 
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Parfit claims that there is another version of the Embedded Person View which is 
preferable to the Embedded Brain View. He suggests that we may regard the relation 
between the person and the brain as one similar to that between the animal and its 
physical body: 
 
The thinking part of a human animal, we could say, is related to this animal’s cerebrum 
or upper brain in a way that is roughly similar to that in which this animal is related to 
its whole body. … (Parfit 2012, p. 15) 
 
There is yet a third version of the Embedded Person View, according to which we are 
essentially persons in the Lockean sense, and the person is part of the human animal. 
Parfit thinks that this version is the best among the various versions of the Embedded 
Part Views. Although he thinks that the first two versions of the Embedded Person 
Views are less preferred, he nevertheless thinks that all these versions are feasible: 
 
No one, we should agree, thinks that we are just heads. But we might be embodied heads. 
And most of us would believe that, for us to survive, it would be enough that our head 
survives, and continues to be the head of a conscious being. The body below the neck is 
not an essential part of us. (Ibid., p. 17) 
 
The three versions of the Embedded Person Views are all possible for Parfit. In my 
opinion, it is because Parfit’s claim that we are thinking parts of the human animals 
does not say anything about what exactly we are. More specifically, he does not 
address the question of whether we are the physical parts or the mental parts of the 
human animals. The vagueness in the definition of our fundamental nature may lead 
to a disastrous consequence. In particular, it is hard to define which part thinks directly, 
and which part thinks indirectly. 
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Let me first analyze the Embedded Brain View. Many people would be tempted 
to think that the animal thinks only derivatively by virtue of having a smaller part, the 
brain, that non-derivatively does the thinking. The situation is analogous to the 
situation for other functional parts of the human animal. Parfit adopts eating as an 
example - the stomach is a part responsible for digestion, and the nose is a part that 
does the sneezing. The animal sneezes by having a nose that does the sneezing, and 
there is only one single sneezing action involved. The brain, in turn, is a part, that does 
the thinking. That said, we are brains, and are physical parts of the human animals. 
Philosophers such as Thomas Nagel (1986), and more recently, Barry Dainton (2008), 
explicitly endorse the view that we are essentially brains capable of thinking. 
The Embedded Brain View, prima facie, has some advantages over other views. 
It resolves the famous puzzle of the Remnant Person Problem19 by admitting that you 
go with the brain, not the animal. In the case of brain transplant, the conscious being 
can be regarded as existing first as the thinking part of a human animal and then for a 
while on its own during the operation. After that, it exists as the controlling part of a 
different human animal. In addition, such a view gives a satisfactory answer to the 
hard case of conjoined twins raised by Jeff McMahan (2002) in which a single human 
being has two heads and two brains. It is enticing for us to believe that there are two 
people. The Embedded Brain View successfully admits that there are two people in the 
situation where there are two brains. 
Baker defines non-derivativeness as: y instantiates F non-derivatively only if 
there exists an entity x, where x ?y and x constitutes y, and x would fail to instantiate 
F if x did not constitute y.20 For instance, the statue instantiates the property of 
“representing Alexander the Great” non-derivatively because the lump of clay that 
                                                     
19 See Johnston (2007). 
20 This definition is adopted from Blatti 2016. See (Baker 2000, p. 46–58; 2007, p. 38-40, p. 166–69) 
for more details. 
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constitutes the statue would fail to instantiate the property of “representing Alexander 
the Great” if the lump of clay did not constitute the statue. Furthermore, one may want 
to adopt the idea of partial constitution, according to which there is some additional 
stuff C2 that constitute A together with C1. For instance, part of the lump of clay, call 
it C1, together with the other parts of the lump of clay, call it C2, constitutes a statue S. 
In this case, it is reasonable for one to assert that C1 partially constitutes S. In this 
construal, a partial constitution relation may well be a cogent metaphysical notion for 
explaining similar situations. Based on the idea of a partial constitution, there can be a 
formulation according to which we are brains that thinks non-derivatively. There 
would be part of the brain C1, which partly constitutes the brain together with another 
part C2. If the brain thinks directly or non-derivatively, that means both parts are 
essential in instantiating thinking – the idea is simply that if any of these parts does not 
constitute the brain, then the brain cannot instantiate thinking. More specifically, “x” 
would be referring to any part of the brain, say, a whole brain minus a brain cell C1. 
Consequently, y should be the brain, and F the thinking activity instantiated by the 
brain. One would thus formulate the idea of Embedded Brain View like this: brain 
instantiates thinking non-derivatively if and only if the whole brain minus brain cell C1 
fails to instantiate thinking if the brain does not have brain cell C1 to constitute the 
brain. 
Such an Embedded Brain View, in my opinion, is problematic. In particular, the 
idea that we are the physical parts of human animals that think non-derivatively is 
flawed. I now delineate my argument for this claim by using the above conception of 
“non-derivativeness” in a partial constitution relation. In what follows, I explain the 
problem step by step. 
Let us first assume that I am the brain, the physical part that directly thinks. 
Suppose a particular water molecule, M, partly constitutes a brain, B. As we all know, 
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any brain would need some water molecules to sustain its function. Now we may ask 
whether this particular water molecule, M, should be regarded as part of the non-
derivative thinker. It seems not. The main reason is that even if M had been absent, 
there would still have been another water molecule, N, that plays the role. Given that 
M is not a part of the non-derivative thinker, under this picture, B thinks only 
derivatively. Below is the argument: 
 
Notations: 
? B is the brain, 
? M is a water molecule that partly constitutes B, 
? T is to a thought 
 
Argument: 
1. B instantiates T derivatively if and only if “B-M” would instantiate T even if M did 
not constitute B. 
2. “B-M” would instantiate T even if M does not partly constitute B.  
_____________ 
C. B instantiates T derivatively. 
 
In the next step, I argue in a similar form that any cells in the brain are just like the 
water molecule M. My argument is as follows. Suppose my brain is composed of brain 
cells (A1 to An). Let us randomly pick one, say, A3, from the set, and call the reminding 
set of brain cells B-. We observe that when one feels pain, the brain cell A3 is activated. 
Now we are inclined to think that the brain cell, A3, is directly responsible for my 
feeling of pain. Nevertheless, under the above definition of non-derivativeness, the 
brain with cell A3 is not regarded as having pain in a non-derivative sense. The main 
reason is that I can still feel pain without the brain cell A3. There could have been 
another brain cell, A4, which can also produce the experience of pain. The other 
possibility is that I may grow some brain cells, A5, that replaces A3, and performs the 
same function. 
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In the recent literature of brain science, researchers have found evidence that there 
are still new brain cells being grown right before a person dies.21 Since any brain cell 
fits well into this argument, the brain thinks only in a derivative sense. My argument 
is as follows: 
 
Notations: 
? B is the set of brain cells < A1 to An >. 
? B- is the set of brain cells < A1 to An > minus the brain cell A3. 
? T is a thought. 
 
Argument: 
1. B instantiates T derivatively if and only if B- would instantiate T even if A3 did not 
partly constitute B. 
2. B- would instantiate T even if A3 did not partly constitute B. 
_____________ 
C. Therefore, B instantiates T derivatively. 
 
Since every brain cell fits into this argument, we come to conclude that the brain thinks 
only derivatively. If any brain cell x that partly constitutes B results in the conclusion 
that B thinks derivatively, then we cannot find a minimal brain such that all of its parts 
are directly involved in its thinking. 
I have so far argued that the brain, being composed of the brain cells, thinks only 
derivatively. Strictly speaking, one simply cannot regard any physical part of an animal 
that is non-derivatively thinking. A possible objection concerning this argument is to 
say that one could understand “non-derivativeness” in a de dicto sense. For example, 
one may say that there are certain water molecules supplying the operation of the brain, 
                                                     
21 In the paper “Neurogenesis in the adult human hippocampus,” researchers at the Salk Institute in 
California studied the brains of five terminal cancer patients. The patients first received a chemical “tag” 
that marks the newly-divided cells. After they died from cancer, their brain tissues were investigated. 
New neurons were found, and these neurons should have been generated right before they died. 
(Eriksson et al. 1998) In another study reported in a 2013 journal Cell, the brain still produces about 
700 new neurons in the hippocampus per day. (Spalding et al. 2013) 
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and they (in a de dicto sense) constitute a necessary part of the thinking activity. 
Similarly, there are some brain cells that support the psychological functions, and they 
form a necessary part for the mental activity. We can understand the notions “de re” 
(which means concerning the thing) and “de dicto” (which means concerning the 
datum/proposition) in the way that Quine introduces. Consider the two sentences: 
 
(1) The thing Alice is thinking about is necessarily an odd number. 
(2) Necessarily, the thing Alice is thinking about is an odd number. 
 
These two sentences mean different things. The first sentence is an ascription of de re 
modality, whereas the second sentence is an ascription of de dicto modality. (1) tells 
us that a certain object is essentially an odd number. Since the number three is odd, (1) 
is true. However, sentence (2) tells us that a certain proposition, namely, the 
proposition that “the thing Alice is thinking about is an odd number” is necessarily 
true. Since Alice may have thought about other things, such as the dinner yesterday, 
(2) would have been false. Sentence (1) can be expressed as: 
 
Notation: 
Ox: x is an odd number 
(1*) ?!x[(Alice is thinking about x) & (?Ox)] 
 
In this expression, the modal notion “?” modifies only a narrow scope, which 
modifies a thing within the scope of one’s propositional belief. Nevertheless, sentence 
(2) should be expressed as: 
 
(2*) ?!x{?x [(Alice is thinking about x)&(Ox )]} 
 
The modal notion “?” covers has a wide scope – it binds a variable that occurs freely 
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within the whole sentence. Return to our own discussion of the idea that the brain 
thinks non-derivatively. One could understand “non-derivativeness” in a de dicto sense. 
For example, we can declare that necessarily, there are some water molecules that 
supply the normal functioning of the brain. Hence, necessarily, these water molecules 
(in a de dicto sense) are essential for instantiating the thinking activity, without which 
we cannot think. Maybe this construal would avoid the pitfall of falsely proposing a 
particular water molecule, M, without which we cannot think. Similarly, one can assert 
that necessarily, there are some brain cells that support thinking. Necessarily, these 
brain cells (in a de dicto sense) are essential for thinking. By saying this, one does not 
make a mistake by saying that there is a particular brain cell A3, without which one 
cannot think. Applying the de dicto modality, we may try this construal: 
 
An ascription of de re modality: 
(1) By saying that the brain thinks non-derivatively, I mean the set of brain cells < A1 to 
An > thinks non-derivatively. 
 
An ascription of de dicto modality: 
(2) By saying that the brain thinks non-derivatively, I mean a set of brain cells, x, such 
that necessarily, all cells in x are responsible for producing thoughts, and the set of 
brain cells thinks non-derivatively. I do not mean it is essentially this fixed set of 
brain cells < A1 to An > that thinks non-derivatively. 
 
This project seems promising, but I found it too fast and easy. My observation is that 
this modified definition of the brain, with the de dicto sense of necessity, would be 
incomplete. One can do a little trick by first defining those water molecules in a de 
dicto sense as those playing the functional role of producing the thoughts, then further 
saying that they are necessary since they play this functional role. If necessity is 
already presupposed in the de dicto definition, then the definition in (2) would not be 
useful in defining derivativeness. More specifically, one cannot use this definition to 
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discriminate things that think non-derivatively from those that think derivatively 
because it is just to say that the set of cells that think non-derivatively are the cells that 
are necessary for thinking. We make one further step by introducing another notion, 
“necessary for thinking” without explaining what it means by saying that the cell is 
necessary for thinking. The definition of non-derivativeness in a de dicto sense is thus 
incomplete. 
One might object by saying that one could also adopt Parfit’s definition of 
derivativeness to devise an Embedded Part View such that the brain thinks non-
derivatively only if all parts of a brain are directly involved in its thinking.22 Since 
such a definition of “non-derivativeness” does not involve counterfactual conditions, 
it is a weaker definition which allows replacement of brain cells. Even if there can be 
another brain cell A4 that can substitute A3 in the brain to produce thoughts, A3 can still 
be regarded as directly thinking. 
In replying to Parfit’s definition of “non-derivativeness,” I am with Eric Olson 
(2015) that Parfit’s definition of direct involvement is still problematic. The main 
reason is that one cannot clearly define which part of a human being is the directly 
thinking part. Take walking as an example; it is not clear which part of the body is 
directly involved in walking, and which is not. Normally, one regards her feet as 
necessary for walking. Moreover, it seems that some water molecules have to be 
directly involved in my walking because my feet would need some energy supply for 
the movements. If we go on to think about the necessary ingredients for walking, the 
list will be much longer. 
On the other hand, it seems obvious that one’s toenails do not contribute to 
walking although they are parts of the feet. There are also parts of my feet that hinder 
my walking. For instance, I have excess water in my feet that makes me hard to walk. 
                                                     
22 For the ideas of derivativeness and directness, see please (Parfit 2012, p. 22-23). 
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So, our list excludes some parts that we normally think as necessary. So now we come 
to a question: is there a clear principle for us to determine which molecules are directly 
involved in walking and which are not? The proponents of an Embedded (physical) 
Part View thus owes us a clear picture of how to draw even a vague line between direct 
and indirect involvements. The definition of “direct involvement” is, in this sense, 
incomplete. 
I have so far argued that the view that “we are thinking brains” faces difficulties. 
Concepts such as “directness” and “derivativeness” are not helpful in explaining which 
physical parts are essential for thinking. One cannot clearly define which physical part 
of a human being is the non-derivatively thinking part. By a de re definition of 
derivativeness, the brain thinks only derivatively: we cannot find a minimal brain such 
that all of its parts are directly involved in its thinking. Moreover, a de dicto sense of 
derivativeness is problematic in the sense that we are just making one further step by 
introducing another notion, “necessary for thinking” without explaining what it means 
to say that these cells are necessary for thinking. 
 
3.3   The Embedded Mind Views 
Another approach is to propose that we are essentially mental parts, but not physical 
parts, of the human animals. We are minds, or subjects of experience, of the human 
animals. In this section, I discuss the Embedded Mental Part Views advocated by Jeff 
McMahan and Galen Strawson. The Embedded Mind Views have advantages over the 
Embedded Brain Views, but they still face objections. 
Jeff McMahan (2002) proposes the Embodied Mind Account, according to which 
we are essentially embodied minds. This account has implications on the problem of 
personal identity. It suggests that personal identity is determined by the functional 
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continuity of the brain that supports consciousness with any degree of broad 
psychological continuity. 
McMahan argues for the Embodied Mind View by pointing out the counter-
intuitive consequences of Derek Parfit’s (1984) early view of personal identity. In 
particular, he addresses Parfit’s Classical idea that (1) we are persons and that (2) 
personal identity is determined by the unique psychological continuity over time. 
McMahan rebuts the psychological continuity criterion of personal identity by 
pointing out that this theory denies our existence in some situations in which we 
intuitively think that we persist. In what follows, I briefly introduce Derek Parfit’s 
(1984) early view regarding personal identity, in particular, his psychological 
continuity criterion, and then present McMahan’s objections. 
Parfit (1984) holds a radical reductionism of persons, a view according to which 
“one could give a complete description of reality without claiming that persons exist.” 
(Parfit 1984, p. 212) In this view, the problem of the exact time when a person comes 
into existence is analogous to the problem of when a group of twenty philosophers 
started to exist. For the latter case, Parfit maintains that different opinions are due to 
different ways of how we use the term “group.” We are free to use the concept in a 
different way because language is just a matter of convention. Moreover, it simply 
does not matter when the group begins to exist because after-all we already know all 
the relevant facts about the group of philosophers. 
According to Parfit, there is psychological continuity if and only if there are more 
than half of the psychological connections that hold over each day for an organism. 
Psychological connection denotes the continuation of mental properties such as 
psychological traits, memories, dispositions and long-term goals of a being. He 
maintains that psychological continuity is a notion without vagueness. Either there is 
psychological continuity, or there is not. This idea is thus defined to fit with our 
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intuition that personal identity is an all-or-nothing notion. There is personal identity 
only if there is non-branching psychological continuity. Otherwise, there is not. 
McMahan’s criticism of Parfit’s theory is mainly of the conception of 
psychological continuity. McMahan first illustrates that the conception of a person in 
Parfit’s Embedded Person View refers to a being with a rich and complex mental life 
with a high-order sophistication. Second, a person is an entity with a sufficiently rich 
mental life such that there is strong psychological connectedness throughout her life. 
Given that we are essentially persons, “person” should be a substance-sortal. If one 
ceases to be a person, one also ceases to exist. Furthermore, the claim that we are 
essentially persons implies that we would cease to exist when our psychological 
continuity and complexity comes to an end. To say that we are essentially persons is 
to say that we never existed as fetuses or infants. Many philosophers tend to think that 
fetuses or infants should not be regarded as persons because they do not have self-
consciousness, long-term memories of the past, and many other psychological 
complexities, but persons are beings that essentially have these psychological 
complexities. 
According to McMahan, the problem of Parfit’s Embedded Person View 
originates from the fact that the psychological development of human beings is a 
gradual process. For instance, one is typically not self-conscious in early infancy until 
one reaches one year and a half. In addition, there is a period during which it is 
indeterminate whether there is self-consciousness, memories, and personalities or not. 
If we focus on the definition of personhood in terms of the ability of self-consciousness, 
then according to the Parfit’s view, I do not exist before one and a half years old 
because there is no self-consciousness. In addition, my existence is indeterminate 
sometime in my life for a period during which it is indeterminate whether there is self-
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consciousness. However, intuitively, I certainly exist before two or even half a month. 
There is thus a tension between our intuition and the Parfit’s personal ontology. 
McMahan’s second objection is that the conception of personhood in Parfit’s 
theory is problematic. McMahan argues that the idea of “person” should be a phase-
sortal rather than a substance-sortal. As discussed in chapter 1, the distinction between 
substance-sortals and phase-sortals is that an entity necessarily falls under the former 
for its whole existence, whereas an entity may not always fall under the latter.23 
According to McMahan, if it is the organism that thinks and experiences, it should 
be that the organism itself that gradually becomes a person through progressively 
having a richer and more complex mental life. If the organism literally becomes a 
person, then a person should be a phase in the lifetime of an organism. The phrase 
“being a person” should be a description that applies to a certain stage or period of an 
organism. However, if we are essentially persons, “person” becomes a substance-sortal. 
Nevertheless, McMahan thinks that I may exist without being a person - to recall, one 
is typically not self-conscious in early infancy until one reaches one year and a half. If 
we admit that we exist at that moment without being persons, the concept of “person” 
should be a phase-sortal instead. He writes: 
 
“[P]erson,” as I understand the term, must be a phase-sortal. For it is clear that human 
organisms begin to exist before they acquire a mental life sufficiently complex to allow 
them to qualify as persons, and it is equally clear that they may lose the capacity for self-
consciousness, and therefore cease to be persons, and yet not only continue to exist but 
also remain alive and conscious. (McMahan 2002, pp. 24-25) 
 
McMahan thinks that the psychological account of egoistic concern suggests that the 
person has no reason to be egoistically concerned about the post-person. McMahan 
                                                     
23 For the definitions and discussions of substance-sortal and phase-sortal, see chapter 1 of this thesis, 
pp. 47-48, 57. 
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adopts the definition of egoist concern proposed by Marya Schechtman (1996), who 
says, “we all know the difference between fearing for our own pain and fearing for the 
pain of someone else. The difference here consists not in degree—I may care more 
about the pain of my beloved than about my own—but in kind.” (Schechtman 1996, p. 
52) McMahan calls this special kind of concern about oneself in the future “an egoistic 
concern.” The reason for proposing that one has no reason to be egoistically concerned 
about the post-person is that there is no broad psychological continuity relation 
between the person and the post-person. In contrast, McMahan believes that we have 
the intuition that if you are in the early stage of the Alzheimer’s disease, you foresee 
that the post-person in the later stage of the disease who is going to have excruciating 
physical suffering being is you. You would fear it and would try your best to prevent 
it from happening. We care about the future post-person in an egoistic way. The fear 
and self-concern of the post-person stem from the belief that the person and the post-
person are actually the same individual. For McMahan, the psychological account fails 
to provide a ground for explaining our egoistic concern for the post-person. 
According to McMahan, we should abandon the idea that “person” is a substance-
sortal because we can cease to be persons and yet continue to exist. He further proposes 
an Embodied Mind View, according to which we are essentially minds but not persons. 
Furthermore, I am not identical with a human animal, nor am I constituted by one. I 
am in fact a mental part of an animal, a separable part that is capable of persisting on 
its own without the support of the rest of the physical body. The rest of the body is not 
my essential part. Also, he denies that we are human animals. The main reason is that 
the capacity of being conscious is not an essential property of a human animal – there 
can be a human animal that does not have conscious experience throughout its lifetime 
– human infants born without cerebrums is one example. We are essentially minds, 
and animals may not have minds. 
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Furthermore, McMahan proposes the modified psychological account of personal 
identity according to which minds persist with any degree of broad psychological 
continuity. According to McMahan, there is broad psychological continuity if and only 
if there are overlapping chains of psychological connectedness with any degree of 
strength. Psychological continuity in any stronger sense is not necessary. He further 
proposes that there is the same mind over time only if there is (1) psychological 
connectedness and (2) broad psychological continuity. In addition, the egoistic concern 
is proportional to the degree of broad psychological continuity. When there is stronger 
continuity, one has reason to have a more egoistic concern. He writes: 
 
Let us say that there is broad psychological continuity whenever there are overlapping 
chains of psychological connectedness of any degree of strength. Broad psychological 
continuity may be strong or weak. (McMahan 2002, p. 50) 
 
McMahan maintains that you persist as the post-person in the late stage of the 
Alzheimer’s disease and are justified for an egoistic concern with these beings. The 
patient in the early stages of the disease is not psychologically continuous with the 
post-person in the later stages for there would be fewer than half of the psychological 
connections that hold over each day for such a patient. In this case, the proponents of 
the view that we are essentially persons, such as Derek Parfit, would bite the bullet 
and say that the patient in the later stages of the disease is not the same person with 
that in the early stage. Even though you may be egoistically concerned with being in 
the later stage of the disease, that would not be you. Under a Parfitian picture, in 
particular, one could have an egoistic concern with entities that are not identical to 
oneself, for identity is not what matters. On the other hand, McMahan argues that even 
though the post-person is not psychologically continuous with the person, they still 
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have overlapping chains of weak psychological connectedness, and this gives the 
person a reason to be egoistically concerned about the post-person. 
McMahan insists that we should provide a criterion of personal identity that is 
closely aligned with the basis of our egoistic concern. For him, when we consider 
personal identity, we also put ourselves into the scenario and think of the criterion for 
re-identification of ourselves. Personal identity is a sufficient basis for justified 
egoistic concern. McMahan thinks that it is common for us to have assumed that 
personal identity is what matters, and this does not look like an accident. McMahan 
proposes that considerations of egoistic concern constrain our idea of personal identity 
since personal identity is commonly assumed to be the basis of egoistic concern. We 
presuppose that when there is a ground for our egoistic concern, there is also personal 
identity. For McMahan, this phenomenon sheds light on the significance of seeking a 
maximum coherence between the justification of egoistic concern and personal 
identity when choosing a theory of personal identity. His idea is different from that of 
Parfit’s, according to which (1) there is never a deep and ontologically substantial fact 
about personal identity, and that (2) disagreements about personal identity are merely 
disagreements about how one can interpret the already known facts about our world. 
 
3.4   My Objections to the Embedded Mind Views 
McMahan’s theory has several advantages in the sense that (1) it provides a 
satisfactory solution to most of the problems the animalists have, such as the Remnant 
Person Problem and the Problem of the Corpse by claiming that our identity goes with 
the mind, not the human body; and (2) it matches our intuition that we persist as the 
post-person with Alzheimer’s disease. However, he does not explain why broad 
psychological continuity justifies one’s egoistic concern. In what follows, I point out 
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a drawback of McMahan’s theory and further propose that even broad psychological 
continuity is not what grounds our egoistic concern. 
The first challenge concerns the minimal degree of psychological continuity. 
Suppose there is a post-person in the final stage of the disease who is merely a 
conscious subject capable of being conscious and experiencing pain. Call this post-
person the minimal subject. The minimal subject does not have any psychological 
connectedness in any sense with the person in the earlier stage. According to 
McMahan’s view, this post-person, being a minimal conscious subject, should not be 
regarded as the same individual as the person who existed in the earlier stage of the 
disease. However, most people would believe that the person in the early stage still has 
some reason to be egoistically concerned about this minimal subject. McMahan’s reply 
is that (1) we are not the minimal subject merely capable of being conscious and 
experiencing pain and (2) the intuition that we have reason to egoistically concern with 
this minimal subject is illusory. More specifically, the intuition is illusory because it 
stems from our incorrect common beliefs that (1) we are the human animals and that 
(2) there is still the same individual so long as the human animal is alive. He writes: 
 
But it is possible that the cessation of psychological connectedness from day to day may 
leave, for a short while, a conscious entity—a subject capable, for example, of 
experiencing pain. Even on the revised Psychological Account, this conscious subject 
would not be the same individual as the person who existed in the early stages of the 
disease. …This residual commitment to the existence of a post-person seems a minor 
embarrassment for the revised version of the Psychological Account. (McMahan 2002, 
p. 54 - 55) 
It…may instead be an inference drawn, perhaps unconsciously, from the 
conjunction of the view that we are living organisms and the belief that identity is what 
matters. (Ibid., p. 55) 
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McMahan’s main arguments are mostly based upon common intuitions. If his theory 
is proposed to match our intuition, why not propose an even looser constraint, such 
that we are justified to have an egoistic concern with the minimal subject, the post-
person with the minimal experience? His theory would then be even more intuitive, 
for it would then match our intuition that we survive as the post-person with minimal 
experience. 
The second challenge concerns the relation between the sameness of mind, 
physical continuity, and psychological continuity. Let us look at McMahan’s very 
definition of “mind”: 
 
[A] particular field of consciousness at one time is the same consciousness as a certain 
field of consciousness at another time if and only if all the various conscious states are 
states of one and the same person. (McMahan 2002, p. 67) 
 
McMahan thinks that there is the same consciousness if and only if the conscious 
mental states belong to the same individual. There is more on the persistence of mind 
by McMahan: 
 
A mind, it seems, is individuated by reference to its physical embodiment, just as an 
individual mental state is. (Ibid.) 
What I think can be asserted with some confidence is that, if a single mind has 
hitherto been realized in certain regions of a single brain, the undivided survival and 
continued, self-sufficient, functional integrity of those specific regions is both a 
necessary and sufficient condition of the continued existence of the same mind. (Ibid. 
My Italics) 
 
His stance becomes clearer as he writes that the individuation and persistence of mind 
are determined by its physical embodiment. McMahan is concerned with the 
possibility that a brain supports two different minds at the same time. Based on this, 
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he thinks that physical embodiment is only a necessary condition of the persistence of 
mind. However, if there is a one to one correlation between the brain and the mind, 
then enough of the same single brain to support and retain the capacities for conscious 
mental states would be necessary and sufficient for the persistence of mind. 
My question for him is as follows. Suppose there is enough of the same brain is 
already there that supports the sameness of mind, why do we still need the broad 
psychological continuity criterion to determine our persistence? What is the use of 
adding the broad psychological continuity to his theory? The claim that broad 
psychological continuity determines the sameness of mind would then be redundant. 
McMahan proposes that broad psychological continuity is determined by overlapping 
chains of psychological connectedness of any degree of strength from day to day. He 
also proposes that broad psychological continuity is supported by a sufficient amount 
of the same brain: 
 
Usually the functional continuity of these areas of the brain involves broad psychological 
continuity, but in the very earliest phases of an individual’s life and in some instances 
near the end, the same mind or consciousness persists in the absence of any degree of 
psychological connectedness from day to day. (McMahan 2002, p. 67 - 68) 
 
McMahan wants to put forward the idea that broad psychological continuity is the 
necessary and sufficient condition of our persistence. He has been explicit in claiming 
that (1) our persistence is determined by sufficient amount of the same brain that 
sustains the capability of consciousness, and (2) there is broad psychological 
continuity only if there is sufficient amount of the same brain. However, there may not 
be broad psychological continuity even if there is the sufficient amount of the same 
brain. The sufficient amount of the same brain is just the necessary condition for broad 
psychological continuity, but not sufficient for it. To conclude, McMahan fails to 
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provide a ground for the claim that broad psychological continuity is necessary for the 
persistence of the individual.  
The problem of McMahan’s argument is revealed by the fact that the definition 
of broad psychological continuity presupposes that there is sufficient amount of the 
same brain over time, and that already supports the persistence of mind. McMahan’s 
argument thus has no explanatory power over why the persistence of the individual is 
determined by the broad psychological continuity. 
I suggest that McMahan revise his theory. For instance, he could assert a weaker 
claim that broad psychological continuity is not necessary for our persistence and that 
it is our egoistic concern that has a positive correlation with broad psychological 
continuity. This claim succeeds in underlying our intuitions that (1) we persist as post-
persons with minimal conscious experience and (2) our egoistic concern is grounded 
in broad psychological continuity. In this picture, we are essentially minimal conscious 
beings, subjects of experience capable of experiencing pain and joy. However, this 
theory would be a view saying that egoistic concern is not necessarily aligned with our 
persistence. 
Another option for McMahan is to totally eliminate the conception of broad 
psychological continuity and to claim that our persistence and our egoistic concern is 
determined and justified by the sameness of mind, which is supported by the sufficient 
amount of the same brain. In this view, you persist so long as your (minimal conscious) 
mind persists. By my lights, the second alternative is preferable to the first one. The 
latter view is advantageous in the sense that it explains why we naturally have egoist 
concerns with the post-person who only has minimal conscious experience.  
I believe that it is not a problem for a philosopher to explicitly acknowledge the 
fact that sometimes we just cannot provide any explanation of an intuition. One may 
further question by virtue of what the sufficient amount of brain guarantees the 
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sameness of the conscious being. Maybe we would have to admit that the first premise 
remains unexplained. However, it is not disastrous at all to bite the bullet and declare 
that this is our limit – sometimes this is just what we can do and ought to do as a 
philosopher. To disclose a primitive intuition openly is better than to disguise it as a 
fact that can be further explained by yet another fact, whereas it turns out it is not.  
Michael Lockwood (1985, 1988) proposes a similar stance to what I have just 
proposed. He thinks that we are not essentially entities constituted by any kind of 
psychological continuity but are entities the existence of which grounds psychological 
continuity and explains the presence of that continuity. More specifically, we are 
essentially entities of which these higher-level continuities manifests. He says, 
 
“[W]hat underlies the discernible continuities of memory and personality is a continuity 
of physical organization within some part or parts of a living human brain persisting 
through time.” (Lockwood 1985, pp. 22–23.) 
 
Lockwood’s idea is that we should not focus on psychological continuity but should 
investigate what sustains them. He thinks that there may always be a certain structural, 
physical continuity when there is the same individual over time, but these physical or 
structural continuities may not be what we are really concerned with as the ground for 
egoistic concern. In my opinion, McMahan may instead propose that the structural, 
physical continuity and nothing else supports that sameness of conscious being over 
time. Although structural, physical continuity is not what we are concerned with; we 
are justified to be egoistically concerned with a future individual that is structurally 
physically continuous with me since the continuity of physical structure grounds the 
same consciousness over time. 
McMahan is aware of the fact that his theory of broad psychological continuity 
cannot justify our intuition that we can persist as post-persons with minimal experience. 
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In my opinion, the problem with his theory is that he proposes that any degree of broad 
psychological continuity is necessary for the sameness of individuals without a 
justification. I have shown that broad psychological continuity is redundant in 
determining our persistence, and it renders his theory counter-intuitive. If he states 
instead that the sameness of a conscious mind is determined by a sufficient amount of 
the same brain that supports the capacity of conscious experience, then his theory 
would be reasonable and feasible. It matches the intuition that (1) we persist as post-
persons with minimal experience, and (2) we are justified to have egoistic concerns 
with such a post-person. In summary, what I suggest is to loosen the appeal to any 
requirement for psychological continuity, including McMahan’s broad psychological 
continuity.  
Furthermore, any part-whole relation between ourselves and the human animal 
would be committed to the claim that there are two thinkers, the mental part of the 
human animal and the whole human animal. As a result, one who claims that we are 
parts of the human animal would have to say that there is more than one thinker. Apart 
from being ontologically extravagant, the theory may need to answer the question of 
how one knows which entity one is, given that they have the same thoughts at the same 
time. 
McMahan uses a tree as an analogy to illustrate that it is benign to say that there 
are two thinkers, and I have talked about this in chapter 1. In the analogy, the tree has 
two branches, and one of them grows while the other does not. Overall, the tree grows 
in virtue of the growth of one of its branches. As a result, there are two growing things 
– the branch and the whole tree. The tree grows in virtue of having a branch that grows. 
Similarly, the whole human animal thinks in virtue of having a mental part that thinks. 
For McMahan, although this requires an expensive ontology, it is necessary, and it 
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does not involve inconsistency. McMahan thus concludes that an Embedded Part View 
is benign. 
In my opinion, the Embedded Part View does not provide a satisfactory solution 
to the problem of how we know whether we are human animals or minds. Given that 
there are two thinkers, namely, the mind and the whole human animal, why are we 
sure that we are the mind but not the whole human animal? I believe that the 
mereological theorist such as McMahan would answer this question in this way via 
some modal notions. The persistence conditions of the mind are different from that of 
the human animal. Since it is possible that we persist as minds but not as animals, we 
should be the mind but not the animal that thinks. This reply presupposes that the 
persistence of human animal is determined by the continuity of the physical 
organization. I am happy with this modal solution to the problem of the many Thinkers. 
I think this is a successful reply to the question of whether I am the mind or the animal 
which thinks. However, this reply does not address the problem of the Many Thinkers 
at all. The Embedded Mind Theorists still have to admit that there are two thinkers. 
As discussed, I believe that we can have a simpler solution to the Problem of 
Many Thinkers. I believe that Cartesian Substance Dualism provides a neat and tidy 
solution to the Problem of Many Thinkers. In my view, the subject of experience is 
not part of the human animal. The subject is a mental entity, and the human animal is 
a physical entity – they are distinct entities. As a result, there are not two thinkers – 
there is only one. The subject of experience that possesses (in a causal way) a human 
body thinks. Cartesian Substance Dualism also avoids the problem of “derivativeness” 
and “directness” I raised in the preceding section. According to my view, there are not 
two entities that think – there is only one. The subject of experience thinks. It is not 
the case that the subject non-derivatively thinks and the human animal derivatively 
thinks. The human animal just does not think. 
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3.5   Strawson’s Conscious Subject View 
In what follows, I introduce Galen Strawson’s (1999, 2011) theory of subjects of 
experience. He proposes that we are essentially subjects of experience, which he calls 
SESMETs. He also believes that SESMETS are parts of the human animals. In this 
picture, we can regard Strawson’s view as an Embedded Part View. I briefly delineate 
Strawson’s ontology of subject of experience and raise several objections to his view. 
For Strawson, a subject of experience is a mental thing that exists whenever there 
is experience. He proposes that subjects of experience exist. He calls a subject of 
experience a SESMET, an abbreviation of “a subject of experience that is a single 
mental thing.” (Strawson 2011, p. 4) For him, a subject of experience is an owner of 
conscious experience, which is a mental thing, a single unified object at any given time. 
It is a thing (object or entity) because it is something that can undergo mental processes 
and be in some mental states. Moreover, it is concrete; for Strawson, an object is 
concrete if and only if it is something in time and is a unified thing. He also calls them 
“thin subjects of experience.” He proposes that the subject of experience can be very 
thin; it does not necessarily have a certain personality or agency, possess psychological 
traits, or memories.24 The main reason for his claim that a subject does not necessarily 
have the above qualities is that one can have a minimal form of experiences, such as 
an experience of redness or experience of pain, without having the above abilities and 
complexities. He writes: 
 
[T]he minimal form of self-experience has four fundamental structural elements: 
SUBJECT, THING, MENTAL, SINGLE (synchronically). At the very least, SELF-
                                                     
24 For Strawson, a subject x has agency only if it has the capacity to carry out bodily actions. Also, one 
has the sense, or the experience, of being an agent if one has the sense, or subjective feeling, of having 
intentional actions. 
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experience figures the self as a subject of experience; as a thing in a sense that has been 
explained; as something that’s mentally propertied, that has mental being; and as 
something that’s single — a unity — at least during the lived present of experience. 
(Strawson 2011, p.204) 
[N]one of the other three remaining proposed elements of ordinary human SELF-
experience?AGENT, PERSISTING, and PERSONALITY - survive either. (Ibid., p.182) 
 
Strawson asserts that there are various grades and types of physical unity. He proposes 
three types of unity and suggests that a concrete object essentially has at least one type 
of unity. He maintains that some candidates for objecthood are stronger than others, 
where the subject of experience is the best candidate for objecthood. He does not say 
what unity is. There are questions such as whether it is something that unites things, 
or whether it is a feature p such that the Xs having p grounds (or metaphysically 
explains) the Xs composing an object. Strawson expresses that “a concrete object is a 
certain kind of physical unity” (Strawson 2011, p. 297) and “to be an object is simply 
to be a ‘strong unity’” (Strawson 2011, p. 298). It seems that unity, for Strawson, is 
regarded as identical to the entity that is unified. According to him, the first type of 
unity is genuine metaphysical unity, which is the strongest among the three. It is the 
logical unity for metaphysically simple entities. There is also the concretely actualized 
unity. A concrete object possesses concretely actualized unity if and only if it is united 
by physical (which includes chemical and biological) force(s) of bonding. One easy 
example is an organism such as a bird. This type of unity, however, does not require 
the entity to be composed of the same stuff or substance over time. The third is 
functional unity, the force of which is the weakest among the three. The object is so 
called because of the unity of its functions, and there may not be any significant 
physical force of bonding between various parts of a functionally unified object. A 
computer, for example, is regarded as a physical entity, but its parts, such as the mouse, 
the keyboard, and the screen, are spread over different locations. 
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According to Strawson, the synchronic identity conditions of subjects can be 
settled in an entirely general manner. The synchronic identity of a subject is inferable 
from the metaphysical unity it possesses at any moment. He argues that subjects of 
experience, considered synchronically in the living moment of experience, are strong 
unities that possess the first type of metaphysical unity. He does not say explicitly that 
entities with metaphysical unity are also mereologically simple entities, but it is highly 
plausible that he would endorse the idea that subjects are indivisible. For him, the unity 
of thought presupposes the metaphysical unity of a subject. Subjects are therefore 
exemplary candidates for being concrete entities. A subject is not the same thing as a 
human being considered as a whole but has a part-whole relation with the whole human 
being. Things such as chairs and tables are distinctly inferior candidates when taken 
metaphysically seriously. In the paper “Fundamental Singleness,” he states the idea 
eloquently: 
 
Selves themselves are unities, in a certain strong sense, and indeed that they qualify for 
the title ‘object’ in fundamental metaphysics – if any things do. (Strawson 2010, p.2) 
 
Strawson defends a process metaphysics which entail a novel conception of object / 
entity.25 He proposes that there is a real distinction between two things if and only if 
one of them can concretely exist without the other. 26  Consider the properties 
“triangularity” and “trilaterality” in a closed-plane rectilinear figure. There is a 
conceptual distinction between them since they can be held apart in thought. However, 
there is no real distinction between them because they cannot exist apart in concrete 
reality. For instance, if there is a concrete triangle that exists from t1 to t2, both its 
                                                     
25 In his book “selves,” he does not explicitly state the distinction between substance, object, and thing. 
It seems that he thinks substance has a stronger unity than objects. 
26  Since the term “concrete” here means “existing in spacetime,” Strawson’s definition of real 
distinction excludes abstract objects such as numbers.  
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triangularity and its trilaterality are always co-instantiated. The identity relation 
between them, if established, would be necessarily such that the two cannot be 
separated in all possible worlds. By the same token, a concrete object cannot have any 
real distinction from its properties because no concrete object can exist without having 
all its properties. We can distinguish a concrete particular from its properties and can 
make conceptual distinctions between the two, but there is no ontological 
subordination of the object’s properties to the object itself. Our ordinary languages 
assume the categorical differences between objects and properties. For Strawson, the 
object-property discrimination is an enshrined linguistic habit. As philosophy aims to 
say how things are in reality, it is possible that it conflicts with ordinary thought and 
language. 
In so doing, Strawson further proposes the Experience/Subject/Content Identity 
Thesis (The [e=s=c] Thesis), the claim that the subject of experience (S), its experience 
(E), and the content of experience (C) are conceptually distinct but metaphysically 
identical.27 There is merely a conceptual distinction but not a real distinction between 
the subject, its experience, and the content of the experience. For Strawson, experience 
or thinking is an attribute, a fundamental or general property, while an experience such 
as “seeing Paris” or “hoping it will rain” is a mode, a specific way of experience or 
thinking. The fact that an attribute cannot possibly be instantiated without being 
instantiated in a certain mode means that there is no more a real distinction between 
the existences of an object considered at a given time and the existence of the particular 
modes that its attributes exemplify at that time. If there is merely a conceptual 
distinction but not a real distinction between the subject and its experience, there is no 
need to propose a Cartesian soul-like entity as a non-reducible substance over and 
above the experience. 
                                                     
27 For Strawson, content of experience is the information given in an experience. 
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The [e=s=c] Thesis implies that an experience with a particular content couldn’t 
have had a different subject. I cannot logically have your experience, nor can you have 
mine. Suppose you and I are having qualitatively identical experiences because we are 
both somehow related to the same type of brain activity. Even so, there are numerically 
speaking two distinct occurrences of the same type of experiential content, whereas 
one occurrence can exist without the other. But Strawson regards e, s, and c, as 
particulars that are counterfactually invariable relative to each other: 
 
I suspect that [e = s = c] is a deep truth. I think that the point that s and c stand in an 
intensely intimate relation given which they can’t possibly exist apart—so that there is 
(in my augmented Cartesian terms) at most a conceptual distinction and no real 
distinction between them—is solid. As for the claim that if two concrete particulars aren’t 
really distinct, and can’t possibly exist apart, then they must be numerically 
identical…(Strawson 2011, p. 412) 
 
In the current literature, a process is usually defined as a temporal period of event(s) 
involving intrinsic or extrinsic changes. Typical examples of a process are a game of 
chess and a football match. An object, in contrast, is usually defined as a bearer of 
properties that possesses diachronic identity through changes. Paradigmatic examples 
are a chess piece and a football. Objects and processes are basic metaphysical entities 
that are not reducible to each other. Nevertheless, Strawson also holds that an object is 
identical with the processes it undergoes. He proposes that the object/process/property 
conceptual cluster is structured by the strongly demarcatory, ontologically separatist 
habits of thought. They are highly natural, effective, and inevitable in everyday life but 
are deeply misleading when taken to have implications for metaphysical truths. 
Strawson provides two arguments for a process metaphysics. First, contemporary 
physicists are increasingly content with the view that the ultimate stuff consists only 
of the existence of fields of energy without individuation. If there is no ultimate simple, 
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then it is appropriate for us to regard the world as a huge process of change with the 
flow of energy. If this view is correct, our pre-theoretical conceptions of space, time 
and matter would be largely wrong. Our ordinary conceptual scheme may not be 
isomorphic to that of metaphysics. Second, a concrete object is necessarily a 
spatiotemporal thing. We usually think of matter as spatially extended. Nevertheless, 
we are told that space and time are ontologically interdependent. If an object is 
extended in space, then necessarily, it is also extended in time, even for a very short 
period. Also, if an object is essentially extended in time, then it is “essentially 
changeful in time.” (Strawson 2011, p. 301)28 He says, 
 
[M]atter is essentially dynamic, essentially in time, and essentially changeful in time. 
(Ibid.) 
 
For Strawson, the term “I” is used with the intention to refer to either a human being 
considered as a whole or the subject of experience. We sometimes naturally use “I” to 
refer to the subject of experience in the ordinary use of language despite the fact that 
we also use “I” to refer to the human being. For instance, when I claim that “I am six 
feet tall,” the “I” here probably refers to the whole human being. In contrast, when I 
am thinking about my possibility of surviving death, the phrase “my possibility” as 
used here refers to the possibility of the subject of experience, SESMET. 
 
3.6   My Objections to Strawson’s View 
                                                     
28 Strawson does not provide an argument for the claim that an object with temporal extension is 
necessarily an object that changes through time. It may be that what he means is that an object with 
temporal extension is one “changeable” in time. Furthermore, there are different views about the 
ontology of change, which is related to the discussion of the nature of time. For instance, there are the 
Leibnizian Dynamic view and the Newtonian Block View of time which have different understandings 
of what change is. Strawson’s understanding of objects presupposes that changes exist, but does not 
have an implication of the nature of change. 
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I generally take Strawson’s line of thought. I propose that we are essentially subjects 
of experience. I also adopt his definition that subjects of experience are essentially 
conscious. In Strawson’s Subject Thesis, the existence of a subject of experience 
presupposes the existence of experience because a subject is a “subject of experience.” 
Furthermore, experience is taken to be conscious experience - he does not regard 
unconscious mental states as experience. His claim is dubbed “the essentially-
conscious-self thesis (ECS),” which admits that strictly speaking, I do not exist when 
I fall into an unconscious sleep. Proponents of this view explain common expressions 
such as “I am in the room during my unconscious sleep” with the idea that the “I” in 
some contexts refer not to the subject, but to the human being as a whole. The two uses 
of “I” explains why we get confused about our own nature - we sometimes talk about 
the self as a physical organism, whereas sometimes we refer to ourselves as the subject 
of experience. 
The idea that we are essentially subjects of experience is what I think closest to 
the truth. First, it meets with our intuition that we persist as the post-person with only 
minimal experience in late stages of the Alzheimer’s disease.29 Second, it explains 
why we have the intuition that so long as there is continuity of our brain, we persist. 
This intuition can be explained by our belief that the continuity of our brain supports 
the sameness of subject of experience.30 Third, this view does not have the Problem 
of the Remnant Person and the Problem of the Corpse. As I have discussed these in 
previous chapters and will argue for my own Conscious Subject View in the next 
chapter, I am not going to elaborate them here. 
Nevertheless, I wish to point out that there are several dubious claims within 
Strawson’s theory of minimal selves. In what follows, I raise several objections to 
                                                     
29 See my discussion of McMahan’s Embodied Mind View in chapter 3 for the definition of post-
persons. 
30 I will give an argument for this claim in chapter 4. 
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Galen Strawson’s [e=s=c] Thesis. I argue that there are distinctions between a subject 
and its process. 
 
3.6.1   The Problem of Modality 
Strawson thinks that an object, in general, is identical with the process it undergoes. 
The [e=s=c] thesis is the view that the subject s is identical to the experience e and also 
its experiential content c. My objection to the [e=s=c] thesis is twofold. I first offer a 
counterexample to the assertion that if two things necessarily coexist in every possible 
world, then they are identical. Second, I reveal several disadvantages of a process 
metaphysics. My argument is mainly based on the idea that when one identifies a 
subject with a process, some information on the subject is neglected. More specifically, 
we may lose the information on modal properties such as essential properties. 
To begin, Strawson’s claim is ambiguous - there are two methods of interpreting 
the claim that two things necessarily co-exist. The first method is to read the [e=s=c] 
thesis with the idea that the subject s at time t is numerically identical with its 
experience e at time t, and it is also identical to the content c of the experience c at 
time t. More specifically, the subject s at t1 is numerically identical with a particular 
experience e it has at t1 and a particular content c of that particular experience at t1. 
This idea can be expressed as follows: 
 
Let a be the set of x’s properties  
(Fixedsubject): If [necessarily (x exists if and only if a exists)], then x = a 
 
If this understanding is correct, then after a second, say at t2, the subject certainly has 
another experience e? with content different c? where e?e? and c?c?, it automatically 
follows that the subject s? at t2 is not the same subject s at t1. 
Strawson can, of course, bite the bullet and admit that subjects are indeed as 
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transient as a second. Indeed, he proposes that selves are transient. However, there is 
still a problem with his claim. In general, every physical object in the actual world is 
undergoing some changes. If every slightest change entails that the entity ceases to 
exist, and another new entity comes into existence, this metaphysical view will result 
in an overflow of entities. Every second we have infinitely many new physical objects, 
and all of them are transient in the sense that the slightest change would destroy them. 
For instance, the table at t2 is not the same one as that at t1 because one atom leaves 
the table between t1 and t2. Metaphysically speaking, there is no such thing as a 
persisting concrete object. 
The second method of interpreting the claim that two things necessarily co-exist 
is to admit that for any subject to exist at any time, there must be some experience at 
that time, and the experience should have at least some content. It does not matter 
whether the subject of experience s possesses this particular experience e with a 
particular content c. Any experience with any content is sufficient for having the 
subject of experience s. Since a subject necessarily coexists with some experience, 
there is only a conceptual distinction between the subject s and the experience, 
whatever it is, the subject has at any time. This idea can be expressed as follows: 
 
(Variablesubject): If [necessarily (subject x exists if and only if the set of x’s properties 
exists)], then x = x’s properties 
 
The existence of the subject does not necessarily depend on that particular experience 
e at time t1, but just that the subject necessarily has some experience, whatever it is, at 
any time. The situation is analogous to that of a river. The river necessarily has some 
water molecules that flow, but the existence of the river does not necessarily depend 
on one particular aggregate of water molecules.  
However, such a characterization of the [e=s=c] thesis is not without problems. 
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There are cases in which two things cannot exist without the existence of the other, yet 
they are distinct things. An obvious example is the action and reaction force. There 
cannot be an action force if there isn’t a corresponding reaction force and vice versa. 
However, there are indeed real distinctions between the two forces. These two forces 
act on different bodies and are in opposite directions. Indeed, a reaction force R can be 
triggered by different action forces. For instance, either my pushing the object with 
force A or Peter pushing the object with force A? both result in the reaction force R 
with a particular magnitude from the object. The existence of a reaction force R may 
not necessarily coexist with a particular action force A because A? can do the same 
thing too. But still, such a modal definition of necessary coexistence does not result in 
the identity of the two forces. The action force and the reaction force act on different 
bodies and they have vectors in opposite directions. 
Some may challenge my worry by saying that the coexistence of the two forces 
is merely nomologically necessary but not metaphysically necessary. The action and 
reaction forces are, therefore, not appropriate to serve as a counterexample. In reply to 
this, the natural idea is that if the conceptions of the two forces are defined in a way 
that the action-reaction pair necessarily coexists, then the nomological necessity in this 
physical law may also contribute to metaphysical necessity. More specifically, one can 
define action and reaction forces with de dicto necessity as follows: necessarily, x is a 
reaction force exerted by an object A if and only if there exists another force in the 
opposite direction with equal magnitude with x, and it acts on A. Similarly, necessarily, 
x is an action force exerted by an object A if and only if there exists a force in the 
opposite direction with equal magnitude with x, and it acts on A: 
 
(VariableReaction Force): [necessarily (reaction force x exists if and only if x’s action force 
exists)] 
(VariableAction Force): [necessarily (action force x exists if and only if x’s reaction force 
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exists)] 
 
Following this definition, there is hence no possible world in which there is an action 
force without a reaction force, and vice versa. 
Strawson (2011, 2013, 2017) characterizes identity in a broad sense. He accepts 
and extends Descartes’s descriptions about “conceptual distinction” and “real 
distinction,” and further articulates that A and B can be regarded as identical if there is 
no real distinction between them. He writes: 
 
Any actually existing case of triangularity is, I propose, literally identical to the case of 
trilaterality that it can’t exist without. …The (concrete) being of the one is—is identical 
to—the (concrete) being of the other. (Strawson 2011, 306) 
 
The conception of identity in a broad sense not only entails many more identity 
relations between geometrical entities; it poses a threat to physical entities and 
properties in fundamental science. Another example is a cause and its effect. Although 
there are various controversial theories of causation, most of them require a mutual 
dependency of the cause and the effect. A cause and its effect mutually depend on the 
other’s existence. We can define cause and effect as follows: 
 
(VariableCause): [necessarily (cause x exists if and only if x’s effect exists)] 
(VariableEffect): [necessarily (effect x exists if and only if x’s cause exists)] 
 
Philosophers of causation undoubtedly acknowledge a real distinction between a cause 
and its effect. The distinction suggests that the mutual dependency of existence of two 
things is insufficient for showing that the two have no real distinctions or that they are 
the same. 
Let us return to the case of subjects and their experience proposed by Strawson. 
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As mentioned, he takes it that experience is a concrete particular, an experience of 
somebody. But even if experience is a particular, the subject is not merely those 
experiences - we can still use the counterfactual conditions to discriminate between a 
subject and its experience. An object and its process have different counterfactual 
conditions. Suppose that you have a certain experience E from t1 to t2. Things could 
have been different; there could have been a different experience E?. In this case, that 
would still be you, just that you would not experience E but E?. These cases are clearly 
possible. If your subject of experience could have a totally different experience, the 
identity relation between the subject of experience and the experience breaks down. 
There is a real difference between the subject S and its experience E because S survives 
without the existence of E. As none of the entities could have existed without the 
existence of itself, it is clear that the subject S is not numerically identical with its 
experience E. Strawson has also thought about it, and he addresses this problem by 
saying: 
 
[1] there is no real distinction between an object considered at any given particular time 
t and its propertiedness at t. (Ibid., p. 308) 
We can perfectly well say that [18] O might not have had the properties it does now 
have… (Ibid., p. 314) 
It’s possible to read [1] in such a way that it’s challenged by [18]; but if one does, 
one simply misses—chooses to ignore—the fundamental metaphysical truth expressed 
by [1]. Some philosophers like to distinguish ‘compositional’ or ‘constitutive’ identity, 
on the one hand, from plain identity on the other. This is a well-equipped philosophical 
playground. But the truth and problem-dissolving power of [1] remain untouched. (Ibid.) 
 
We can see that Strawson thinks that the difference in counterfactual situations 
between an object and its properties does not render them distinct. The trivial claim [1] 
is not affected by the truth of claim [18]. My strategy is to first argue against claim [1] 
separately by providing a counterexample for the situation, namely, the action and 
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reaction force. I then conclude that claim [18] is true, and there is a modal difference 
between an object and its properties. Since the modal properties of an object and its 
properties are different, we should also accept that the two are distinct things. 
 
3.6.2   The Problem of Process Metaphysics 
I now go on to discuss the disadvantages of process metaphysics. There are several 
reasons raised by contemporary philosophers for discriminating a process from an 
object. I believe that Strawson’s claim that an object is numerically identical with the 
whole experiential process it undergoes is an undesirable option. 
According to the process philosophers, processes are the only basic ontological 
categories. In general, process ontology claims that there are no concrete static entities 
and that all things that exist are dynamic. As mentioned, it is widely agreed among 
philosophers in the Western tradition that a process is a temporal period of event(s) 
involving intrinsic or extrinsic changes, whereas an object is a bearer of properties that 
possesses diachronic identity through changes. There are two streams of process 
ontologies, one continental, and one analytic. The main difference between the two 
streams is that the latter emphasizes how process ontology could contribute to science 
and technology, whereas the former places less emphasis on it.  
There are discoveries in various streams of science that indicate a need for process 
ontology. In the philosophy of biology, process ontology is highly praised because of 
its usefulness in individuating biological entities. Ecological interdependence that 
occurs within cell biology and multicellular organism involve different classes of 
entities, and these phenomena do not fit well into any substance ontology. There is a 
complex network of interactions occurring within and between organisms, such that it 
is hard for us to regard them as independent and discrete individual substances. 
Because of these, philosophers of biology tend to believe that the identity through time 
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of any entity X is sufficiently determined by the continuous connection of the physical 
or mental states of X over time. The Genidentity View is proposed and discussed 
among philosophers of science, such as David L. Hull (1992), Boniolo & Carrara 
(2004), Pradeu & Carosella (2006), and Guay & Pradeu (2016, 2016b). According to 
the Genidentity Theory, the persistence of a biological entity is determined by 
continuous states of affairs. In “A Matter of Individuality,” Hull (1978) expresses the 
view that the continuity of internal organization is what determines the persistence of 
biological entities. He denies that there are essential properties of human beings. 
Instead, he proposes that there is no characteristic that could determine an entity to be 
a human being. The reason for proposing such a view, for Hull, is that there are many 
plants, fungi, and microbes that we find difficult to individuate via common sense. 
These organisms usually undergo significant changes such that no original substance 
remains after the dramatic changes occur. Moreover, there is no resemblance regarding 
shape, volume, or functions after such changes. In these cases, it seems that the only 
criterion for the persistence of these biological entities is the continuity throughout 
these changes. Only when the internal organization of the entity is heavily disrupted 
would it be a case in which a new entity emerges. 
Thomas Pradeu (2016) comments on Hull’s (1992) idea by saying that it is hard 
to understand what an internal organization means. There is not a clear definition of 
internal organization throughout Hull’s delineation. Pradeu further provides a criterion 
of individuation for difficult cases via immunological interactions. According to this 
view, an organism is a functionally unified entity constituted by heterogeneous but yet 
interconnected biochemical interactions and controlled by immune activities. One 
does not need to start with the individuation of an organism. Instead, one may study 
the biochemical and immunological interactions to investigate further how one should 
individuate an organism. In other words, an organism is in principle reducible to its 
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interactions and processes. 
 
3.6.3   Objections to Process Ontology 
Many philosophers believe that processes and entities are fundamentally different 
kinds of things and one cannot be reducible to the other. One Classical philosopher 
who objects to process ontology is Leibniz. He proposes substantialism, according to 
which there should be the individuation of an entity at a certain time. He also thinks 
that continuity is not sufficient for determining the persistence of objects over time: 
 
By itself continuity no more constitutes substance than does multitude or number . . . 
Something is necessary to be numbered, repeated and continued (Leibniz 1916 [1765], 
p. 169). 
 
One standard objection to process ontology in the contemporary literature is by Peter 
F. Strawson (1959). He proposes descriptive metaphysics, according to which our 
language and our conceptual scheme determine our metaphysics. His argument against 
process metaphysics can be briefly delineated as follows. First, we have perceptions 
of physical, objective particulars that are not identical to other co-existing entities, and 
that they are re-identifiable over time. Second, we need concepts of objective 
particulars re-identifiable and distinguishable from other things for communication. 
Third, we also need a framework for these entities to have their uniqueness, 
individuation, and conditions for the possibility of their persistence. Finally, 
spatiotemporal location is a framework that allows objective particulars to have their 
uniqueness, individuation, and persistence. If it is the case, then objective particulars 
should be three-dimensional entities with particular locations at any time, and they 
should persist through time with spatiotemporal continuity as a necessary condition. 
Given our conceptual scheme, those three-dimensional objective particulars should be 
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the basic things that exist. He writes: 
 
“That is to say they must be three-dimensional objects with some endurance through 
time … They must collectively have enough diversity, richness, stability, and endurance 
to make possible just that conception of a single unitary [space-time] framework which 
we possess” (Strawson 1959, p. 39). 
 
3.6.4   On Galen Strawson’s Process Ontology 
There is an obvious drawback for proposing that the subject of experience is a process. 
As mentioned by philosophers of biology such as Hull and Pradeu, only objects (as 
substances) would have modal properties such as essential properties of existence. A 
process carries information such as the time in which the process occurs, the total time 
the process lasts, and the smaller events involved in the process, but there are no 
essential properties for a process. Process ontology allows that a biological entity, such 
as a caterpillar, undergoes dramatic changes throughout its lifetime to become a 
butterfly, during which there is a total change of its constituting substance, structure, 
size, and appearance.  
Philosophers of biology claim that processes are categorically basic entities that 
do not have essential properties. If one adopts their conception of process, it would 
render Strawson’s theory inconsistent. To recall, as mentioned by Strawson, there are 
several essential properties of the subject without which the subject would not exist. 
Strawson proposes several essential properties of the subject of experience. For 
instance, the essential properties of a SESMET is the property of “being conscious” 
and “being a unified mental thing.” However, if we adopt the view of process 
metaphysics proposed by the philosophers of biology and regard this unified mental 
thing as a process, some information would be lost. For instance, we cannot describe 
the process as essentially synchronically unified, as it is generally considered to be. 
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Second, as argued by philosophers of biology, modal properties such as essential 
properties no longer apply when an object is regarded as a process; we lose some 
important information that characterizes the object. 
There is still another problem regarding process ontology when considering 
Strawson’s theory of subjects of experience. Strawson’s conception of subject of 
experience should conceptually allow that one single object has two or more 
discontinuous phases of experience throughout its existence. It is possible that we go 
out of existence when we sleep, then come back into existence. However, this isn’t 
how processes work. Contemporary views of process metaphysics, such as those 
proposed by philosophers of biology, assert that continuity of interactions between a 
system and its environment is necessary for the persistence of a process. This, I believe, 
is one significant drawback for a Strawsonian process theory of subjects. 
Let us follow Strawson’s definition and assume that all the asterisked pronouns 
refer to the subject of experience, SESMET, of that being. (Strawson 2011, p.76) For 
instance, the term “I*” refers to my subject of experience but not the human being as 
a whole, whereas the term “you*” refers to your subject of experience but not your 
human being. Now you ask yourself a question, ‘will I* experience tomorrow, after a 
deep unconscious sleep?’ I call this question Q1. There are three possible answers to 
Q1. If the subject now having an experience is the same as the subject having the 
experience tomorrow, then the answer is positive. If there is another subject of 
experience tomorrow, then the answer is negative. Another alternative is to say that 
this question makes no sense. There is no answer to a pseudo-question, either because 
there is a grammatical mistake or a conceptual mistake in the question. For instance, 
it may be that the question asks nonsense because it asks for the persistence of a non-
existent or intentional object. It is like asking whether the dagger you dreamt yesterday 
is the same as the one you dreamt last month. It is a misuse of language because there 
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is no such concrete thing as the dagger you dreamt. 
Does Strawson think that the subject of experience is an intentional object? His 
answer is clearly no. For him, the subject of experience necessarily coexists with 
certain experience even if the subject is not explicitly self-aware of its own existence. 
We do not create the subject out of our imagination or intention. To recall, his “subject 
thesis” is the view that there exists a subject of experience if and only if there is an 
experience. The idea of existence here is not deflationary at all because subjects of 
experience should be regarded as the best candidate for objecthood. The subject of 
experience certainly exists, and it is not an intentional object. 
For Strawson, the subject of experience is not an intentional object. It is 
reasonable for us to ask whether I* will experience tomorrow. An example would help 
- suppose there are two pills in front of you. If you take the red pill, that will be you* 
tomorrow. If you take the blue pill, there will be another subject of experience 
tomorrow, and it will not be you*. Whether it will be you* tomorrow is a significant 
fact for you. It matters a lot for you* whether the one who wakes up tomorrow is you* 
or not. The significant difference between the two facts results in an asymmetric 
decision you will make between which pill to take. You strongly prefer taking the red 
pill and continue enjoying your life, I suppose. Taking the blue pill is tantamount to 
committing suicide in a private way such that your relatives and friends will not be sad 
since they do not realize that your subject of experience is gone. 
Our intuition is that every totally unconscious deep sleep may result in a new 
subject, but there may also be the same subject as the previous one. It seems to us that 
both are possible. On the face value, we should not deny the metaphysical possibility 
of the occurrence of the same subject after a phenomenal unconscious break. However, 
strictly speaking, the subject does not exist during a phenomenal break. As defined by 
Strawson, a subject of experience is essentially conscious, and there is no such thing 
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as a subject of experience when I have an unconscious sleep. Both our intuitions allow 
the same subject to have two or more phenomenally separate experiences.  
On the other hand, if a subject of experience is a process, then the question “Is it 
still me* tomorrow?” can be firmly answered negatively. According to the definition 
of a process, discontinuity of existence is not allowed. However, if we follow 
Strawson’s definition of subjects of experience, subjects may in principle survive 
discontinuous phases. A subject thus should not be a process in which persistence is 
partially determined by the continuity of interactions between itself and its 
environment. 
Strawson’s [e=s=c] Thesis circumvents the diachronic identity condition of 
subjects of experience. In endorsing such a claim, we lost some important modal 
properties of the object such as its essential properties. It seems that there is some truth 
in the linguistic habit; we should treat the object-process discrimination seriously. 
To sum up, I argue that the existence of objects is necessary for our ontology. 
Furthermore, a subject of experience is an object, not a process because it has modal 
properties such as essential properties. 
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4   My Conscious Subject View 
 
One of the main claims of my Conscious Subject View is that I am a subject of 
experience, which is essentially conscious. 
I am inclined to substance dualism of the mental and physical. Substance dualism 
is the view that the mental entities and physical entities are two fundamentally different 
things. If substance dualism is true, and that I am a subject of experience which is a 
purely mental entity, then I am not a physical entity. If a human animal is a physical 
entity, then I am not a human animal.  
Substance dualism faces criticisms such as the Causal Closure of the Physical 
which states that every physical event has a physical explanation. In this case, if the 
mental entity also has causal powers, then the physical effects bring out by an 
intentional action would be overdetermined by both physical and mental events. This 
causes causal overdetermination, a claim that many philosophers are reluctant to 
accept. 
Second, there is also a heated debate on reductionism, which investigates how the 
success of scientific explanation could be extended to explain consciousness. 
According to the dualists in general, any mental property is not reducible to physical 
property. Many philosophers think that if A is reducible to B, then necessarily, “A is in 
a sense prior to B, is more basic than B, is such that A fully depends upon, or is 
constituted by, B.31 Saying that x reduces to y typically implies that x is nothing more 
than y or nothing over and above y. If one is committed to substance dualism, one may 
have to answer why consciousness is unique in the sense that many other streams of 
sciences can in principle have a reductive explanation about its laws, whereas 
conscious is sui generis – it is non-reducible to any physical properties in a lower-level. 
                                                     
31 See (van Riel, Raphael and Van Gulick, 2018). 
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These are all important and basic ontological questions of the nature of the mind. 
However, since the thesis is primarily concerned with our essential properties but not 
the relation between the mind and the body, due to time constraint, I am not going to 
deal with the objections to dualism in my thesis. I point out, however, that a subject of 
experience has haecceity, and is therefore not reducible to its mental properties. Also, 
the subject is not reducible to the physical properties of its possessed body. 
In what follows, I argue for the claim that I am essentially a subject of experience, 
I persist as a subject of experience. My view is different from McMahan’s Embedded 
Mind View and Strawson’s Conscious Subject View. First, I propose that (1) the 
subject is a mental thing, not identical to its experience or process, which is different 
from what Strawson proposes. Second, I argue that (2) its persistence conditions are 
not determined by any psychological continuity in whatever sense. This is what makes 
a difference in McMahan’s view. 
 
4.1   We are Essentially Subjects 
Now I propose that we are essentially subjects of experience, such that necessarily, 
when we exist, we are subjects of experience. My argument is basically as follows. I 
first define egoistic concern to be such that necessarily, I can only be egoistically 
concerned with entities that are numerically identical to me. I then argue that 
necessarily, I can be egoistically concerned with an entity E if and only if E is 
numerically identical with my subject of experience. If we follow the common 
definition of essential properties according to which s is the essential property of entity 
e if and only if e has s so long as e exists, then we are essentially subjects of experience: 
 
The Essentiality Argument 
1. Necessarily, my concern about X can be egoistic if and only if I exist and persist as 
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X. 
2. Necessarily, if my subject of experience is numerically identical with E at t, then 
my concern with an entity E at time t can be egoistic. 
3. Necessarily, if my subject of experience is not E at t, then my concern with an entity 
E at time t cannot be egoistic. 
______________ 
C. Necessarily, when I exist, I am a subject of experience. 
 
The conclusion is to say that I am essentially a subject of experience. All the premises 
in the Essentiality Argument are yet to be argued. I now argue for premise one, namely, 
the claim that our egoistic concern necessarily aligns well with our existence. To begin, 
let us review the recent literature on the egoistic concern. 
 
4.1.1   Premise 1 
There are two theories about what matters to us. The classical idea is that identity is 
what matters to us, and my concern with an individual can be egoistic only when I am 
going to persist as that individual. The idea has its recent descendants such as Ernest 
Sosa (1990) and Peter Unger (1991). There is also a voice in the recent debate saying 
that identity is not what matters, and there is something else that matters for our 
survival. One prominent approach within this view is to say that psychological 
connectedness is what matters. The representative philosophers who propose the 
psychological approach to egoistic concern are Derek Parfit (1984) and Jeff McMahan 
(2002). 
 
4.1.2   Identity Matters 
Peter Unger (1991) is one of the representative philosophers who believe that identity 
is what matters. He argues that physical continuity determines our persistence and the 
rational obligation for egoistic concern. For Unger, an individual’s core psychology, 
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such as the capacity for conscious experience and rationalist at the most basic level, is 
supported by the same physical realizer. In cases regarding our survival, the physical 
realizer would most probably be the brain, but there can be other physical realizers in 
other worlds responsible for being the realizer. Bernard Williams (1970) proposes a 
similar view by pointing out that we have strong intuitions from a first-person 
perspective to think that we are going to persist as an individual that has no 
psychological continuity but only physical continuity with us. Williams’s reason for 
supporting the necessity of physical continuity is based on the fact that when we 
consider the phenomenal qualities of the future being from a first-person perspective, 
the fear of future pain alerts us that there is a deeper sense of identity over and above 
the continuity of psychological traits and memories. 
There is also Ernest Sosa (1990), who proposes that identity is what matters in 
survival. He thinks that there are two types of survival, namely, survival in the strict 
sense which involves the persistence of one’s identity, and survival in a loose sense, 
according to which there is an extension of life. Sosa thinks that survival in a loose 
sense should not support our egoistic concern because there would be a slippery slope 
in the claim. His argument is basically that if survival in a loose sense supports egoistic 
concern, an individual should, in principle, be egoistically concerned with the future 
of 100 replications who are psychologically continuous with her. But we are not. 
Although one might think that the main threat for such a scenario is our fear that those 
beings would compete with each other for food, shelter, and intimate relationships, it 
is not what hinders us from enjoying a highly productive fission, as we would still not 
be interested in having multiple fission even if the resulting entities are put in separate, 
but predictable and controllable, environments. 
 
4.1.3   Identity does not Matter 
 130 
 
Derek Parfit (1984) thinks that identity is not what we ought to care about. He argues 
for a psychological connectedness account of what matters in survival, according to 
which one should instead be egoistically concerned with future individuals who are 
psychologically connected with us. The argument is briefly that there are cases in 
which there is no answer to the question of personal identity over time, but we are still 
rational to have an egoistic concern with future persons that are not identical to us. He 
proposes a thought experiment of the brain-splitting operation, according to which 
Brainy’s left brain is transplanted into a new body to form an individual called Lefty, 
and Brainy’s right brain is transplanted into a new body to form another individual 
called Righty. Suppose both resulting entities are fully psychologically continuous to 
Brainy. Normally, we think that there are three possibilities: (1) Brainy becomes none 
of them, (2) Brainy becomes one of them and that (3) Brainy becomes both of them. 
For Parfit, (1) is problematic because in the case of a person having a surgery with half 
of her brain removed, we still believe that the person survives the operation given that 
the resultant person is psychologically continuous with the original person. It should 
be that one could survive if half of one’s brain were successfully transplanted. Since a 
double success should not be a failure, (1) should not be right. The second alternative 
is also problematic since we have assumed that each half of Brainy’s brain is 
qualitatively the same. There is no reason for us to say that Brainy is, say, Lefty but 
not Righty. The third possibility is that Brainy is both Lefty and Righty. However, this 
description makes no sense after careful inspection. If we acknowledge that identity is 
transitive, then the two statements, namely, “Lefty is Brainy” and “Brainy is Righty,” 
automatically implies that Lefty is Righty. However, this simply cannot be right – 
Lefty and Righty are two distinct individuals, and they may have totally different lives. 
Parfit’s conclusion is that all possibilities are problematic, and the best strategy is to 
admit that Brainy survives as two different people without saying anything about their 
 131 
 
identity relations. He writes: 
 
The alternative, for which I shall argue, is to give up the language of identity. We can 
suggest that I survive as two different people without implying that I am these people. 
(Parfit 1971, p. 8) 
 
Parfit defines survival as a relation with a matter of degree – a person P survives as P′ 
if and only if there is at least P′ is a person who is alive and is psychologically 
connected to P. For him, psychological connection is a direct relation held between 
quasi-intentions and its intended action, or a quasi-memory and its corresponding 
experience. “Quasi-memory” is a notion invented to vindicate the psychological 
criterion of personal identity by saving it from circularity. There can also be quasi-
intentions, quasi-promises, quasi-responsibilities, etc. For Parfit, a person P1 quasi-
remembers having an experience of a person P2 if: 
 
1. P1 seems to remember having an experience, and  
2. Someone did have this experience, and  
3. P1’s apparent memory is causally dependent, in the right kind of way, on P2’s past 
experience. (Parfit 1984, p. 220) 
 
Parfit (1971) maintains that survival is grounded in psychological connectedness and 
/ or psychological continuity.32 There are several differences between identity and 
survival. First, identity is transitive, but since psychological connectedness is not a 
transitive relation, nor is survival. For instance, if x survives as y, and y survives as z, 
                                                     
32 Parfit is actually changing his mind about what grounds survival. In Parfit (1984), he claims that “I 
can claim that what matters is psychological connectedness and/or continuity, with any cause.” (Parfit 
2007, p. 368) However, in Parfit (2007), he states something differently: “if any relation matters in 
these ways, this relation is psychological continuity and connectedness, with any cause.” (Parfit 2007, 
p. 27) I adopt his earliest version of the definition of survival because Parfit (1971) claims that we 
should treat survival as a matter of degree: “I suggested that… what matters in survival can have 
degrees.” (Parfit 1971, p. 19) If survival were to be grounded in psychological continuity, survival would 
become a matter of all-or-nothing, and this is not what Parfit originally wants to propose. 
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it is not necessary that x survives as z. The reason is simple – z is psychologically 
connected with y, and so is y with x, but it is possible that z is not psychologically 
connected with x. Also, survival is different from identity in the sense that it is not a 
one to one relation – a person can survive as two. Moreover, most of what matters in 
survival, such as quasi-memories, is of a matter of degree. For instance, a person x can 
have more quasi-memories, and thus stronger psychological connections, with person 
y than with person z. However, personal identity is not of a matter of degree: either 
you are numerically identical with person P, or you are not. In the case of fission, 
Brainy survives as both Lefty and Righty, but we should not say that Brainy is identical 
to either of them or both of them. Similarly, one survives in both the single and double 
transplants of the brain, whereas one should withdraw from talking about identity in 
the case of double transplant with two resulting survivors. 
Parfit goes on to propose that fission is at least as good as, and most of the time 
better than, ordinary survival. His reasons are basically that both the survivors can 
carry on the individual’s goals and projects. Also, there are two survivors to fulfill 
one’s contradictory goals. Suppose Brainy is in love with two girls, A and B, but he 
cannot marry both due to various reasons. If he has two survivors, then Righty can 
marry A while Lefty marry B. Moreover, we can always answer questions of 
responsibility, goals of life, and future self-regarding concerns by psychological 
connectedness and continuity. We have the intuition that personal identity matters 
merely because personal identity, in many cases, would imply psychological 
connectedness and continuity. However, for Parfit, identity has no further practical 
implications apart from those implied by psychological connectedness and 
psychological continuity. Thus identity itself should not be of any significance for us. 
If we are rational enough, we should give up identity as the justification of our egoistic 
concern. In particular, if psychological continuity takes a branching form, we should 
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abandon the language of identity and consider survival as what is sufficient to support 
our egoistic concern. Parfit writes: 
 
Certain important questions [regarding survival, memory, and responsibility] do 
presuppose a question about PI (personal identity). But they can be freed of this 
presupposition. And when they are, the question about identity has no importance. (Parfit 
1984, p. 4) 
 
There is a difference between Parfit’s and McMahan’s theory of egoistic concern. 
McMahan thinks that we are justified to be egoistically concerned with the post-person 
of Alzheimer’s disease. He thinks that there is a reason for one to have some egoistic 
concern with the post-person because there are overlapping chains of weak 
psychological connectedness. Second, one should expect personal identity, and the 
justification of an egoistic concern to coincide in all cases except those involving 
branching in which both resultant entities share the continuity of the properties that are 
constitutive of personal identity. Similarly, the presence of justified egoistic concern 
is sufficient for personal identity in all cases except in those branching situations. 
McMahan thinks that we should seek an account of personal identity that is 
closely aligned with the basis of egoistic concern. His reason is that it is not an accident 
that we assume that personal identity is what matters. A robust account of personal 
identity should be compatible with our intuition that we always find a basis for egoistic 
concern in cases we encountered in our daily lives that involve reidentification of 
ourselves. It is highly plausible that the relations that are constitutive of personal 
identity are those that matter to us. In other words, McMahan believes that it is not 
identity, but the relations that underlie identity, that matters. 
Still, for McMahan, our belief that identity is what we concern with is a natural 
mistake because all the actual cases that happen around us are cases in which identity 
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always accompanies psychological continuity and connectedness. We always find 
identity in the cases where we have an egoistic concern. However, when we face hard 
cases such as brain splitting and tele-transportation, we discover that what matters is 
not identity, but psychological continuity that underlies identity. 
McMahan makes a cogent point here by pointing out that Parfit’s idea of egoistic 
concern is not what we normally think of as our egoistic concern. He notices that 
Parfit’s idea of egoistic concern is different from how other people understand it. For 
most of us, the term “egoistic concern” already entails one’s concerns about oneself in 
the future. In other words, one has an egoistic concern only with a future self that is 
identical to the present self. For McMahan, we can understand Parfit’s idea of egoistic 
concern in terms of a form of concern that is phenomenologically indistinguishable 
from the concern for the same self in future, whereas the concern may extend to some 
other individuals. 
Along with this line, there is also Raymond Martin (1998), who defends the view 
that identity is not what matters in survival. He thinks that one can have an egoistic 
concern about someone else because one could, in principle, rationally anticipate 
having experiences of somebody else. He thinks that even if I rationally anticipate 
having some future experiences of individual A, it does not mean that I believe that I 
would become A in the future. He also maintains that one’s anticipation of having 
others’s experience would require that one identifies with others, but it does not require 
the anticipator to regard the others as the same individual as oneself. For instance, fans 
of a football team or a country identify themselves with the team or country, such that 
they would feel proud when the team or their country wins. However, a fan of a team 
would not regard the team as the same individual as herself.  
Martin provides a thought experiment called “fission rejuvenation” to show that 
identity is not what matters in survival. The thought experiment is basically that you 
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are going to have a brain operation at the age of 30, in which your left brain is put into 
a new physical body A, and your right brain in a new body B, each has a physical age 
of 30. During the operation, there is a small device plugged into the hemisphere 
transplanted to body B, such that the brain’s structure with all its capacities and 
dispositions are synchronized with that of body A. Right after the operation, the body-
A-individual continues to live a happy and satisfactory life until death at 80, whereas 
body-B-individual is frozen in a fridge and is kept unconscious until the day when 
body-A-individual dies. At that very moment, body-B-individual is de-frozen, and it 
starts to live another wonderful life of 50 years from a point which is psychologically 
continuous with body-A-individual at its last moment. 
Martin thinks that fission rejuvenation is a procedure in which personal identity 
is lost. However, it remains an appealing option for most people. He also thinks that 
most of us would also choose fission rejuvenation because it fulfills our egoistic 
concern with there being continuers who have satisfactory and enjoyable lives, whose 
experiences and actions we are justified to anticipate having and exercising rationally. 
In this case, your anticipation of having body-A-individual’s and body-B-individual’s 
experience is justified since you successfully identify yourself with them, but it does 
not require you regard body-A-individual or body-B-individual as the same individual 
as yourself. He thus concludes that fission rejuvenation is a thought experiment that 
successfully shows that our persistence and thus personal identity are not what matters. 
 
4.1.4   Two Types of Egoistic Concern 
I argue along the lines of McMahan by saying that the Parfitian conception of egoistic 
concern is indeed different from what we normally concern about our future selves. 
By my lights, the psychological account of egoistic concern fails to provide an account 
for the fact that we are actually egoistically concerned with the post-person, which is 
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by definition neither psychologically connected with, nor psychologically continuous 
with, the person. I further propose that necessarily, my concern about X can be egoistic 
if and only if I exist and persist as X. 
In cases such as tele-transportation, it is commonly agreed that if the person on 
Earth continues to live, then the future entities generated on Mars are not identical to 
the original individual. Although the future person on Mars would be psychologically 
continuous with you in every aspect and would most probably enjoy a quality of life 
similar to yours, it is still crystal clear that it would not be you who continues to enjoy 
life on Mars. The entities on Mars are some other persons but not you who will enjoy 
their own lives. 
We are usually disappointed upon realizing that our lives are going to end soon 
because we can no longer accomplish our goals and continue with our social 
responsibilities. Indeed, the disappointment would be greatly alleviated if an 
individual discovers that there will be a future person with the same psychological 
traits, memories, and dispositions with herself, who promises to fulfill her goals, 
continue with her social responsibilities and roles, and take care of her parents and 
kids. Upon realizing this, she may even be so satisfied to the extent that she does not 
care anymore about her death. 
However, if she is asked, “are you going to enjoy the happiness of this future 
person?” She would start mourning one’s death again - we all know that the answer is 
no. It is worth noting that even Parfit and McMahan would agree the identity is lost in 
cases involving reduplication, such as cases of tele-transportation. Although the future 
person on Mars would be psychologically continuous with you in every aspect, and 
would most probably enjoy a quality of life similar to yours, it is still crystal clear that 
it would not be you who continues to enjoy life on Mars given that you continue your 
life on Earth even for a very short period after the tele-transportation. 
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Although it is reasonable to say that an individual very much concerns with the 
future person because she knows that the future person is going to achieve her goal 
and take her responsibilities, she would still be disappointed by the fact that it will not 
be herself who enjoys the moment of reward, who attends her son’s and daughter’s 
wedding ceremony, and who travels with her husband and enjoys the sunset on the 
beach during summer holidays. If Parfit insists on calling the concern of a future 
person in cases where identity is lost an “egoistic concern,” he should be aware that 
there would be a significant difference between the two kinds of concern mentioned 
above. More specifically, the latter will be accompanied by a disappointment (or relief) 
given that the present individual knows that it would not be herself who experiences 
and enjoys (or suffers from) the future moments.33 
According to Parfit, it is possible that one is justified to have an egoistic concern 
with a future individual that is not oneself, and it is also possible that one is not justified 
to have any egoistic concern with one’s future self. I believe that this approach can 
                                                     
33 Derek Parfit (1984, 2007) proposes the Moderate View, according to which a being B has reason for 
special concern about any future entity x if and only if there is psychological continuity between B and 
x. In his 2007 essay, he discusses that the idea of anticipatory concern, which seems to threaten the 
Moderate View. An anticipatory concern is a concern about one’s own experience to which one can 
look forward and anticipate. Even if B is identical to x, x may not be psychologically continuous with B. 
Since one cannot anticipate pain of an individual x if one is not identical to x, one should not have 
special concern about the future entity x. This contradicts the Moderate View. In reply to this, Parfit 
proposes “quasi-anticipation,” an anticipation of future experience without presupposing identity of 
the future entity. As we can quasi-remember past experiences from the inside without being identical 
with the individual who had those experiences, we can also quasi-anticipate future experience with 
being identical with the future individual who will have those experience. He endorses Bernard 
Williams’s claim that there is a significant difference between imagining being someone else and 
imagining ourselves being someone else. The former does not require one’s identity to enter into the 
content of the imagination, whereas the latter would have this requirement. Analogously, one can 
anticipate having some future experience without anticipating oneself having those future experience. 
However, Parfit also spots a problem with this view. The idea of quasi-anticipation is too wide that we 
can in principle quasi-anticipate future experience of any future individual, whether they are 
psychologically continuous with us or not. This conclusion, again, is incompatible with Parfit’s 
Moderate claim. Eventually, Parfit admits that the problem of anticipatory concern is indeed a difficulty 
faced by the Moderate claim, “I do not know whether Moderates could defend such claims. Perhaps 
anticipatory concern presupposes a belief in identity, and in more than a trivial analytic way. If we 
believe that our Replica will not be us, there may be no coherent and relevant sense in which we could 
quasi-anticipate our Replica’s pain. If that is so, this may threaten the Moderates’ claim that 
psychological continuity gives us reason for anticipatory concern.” (Parfit 2007, p. 23) 
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only work when one adopts Parfit’s idea that egoistic concern necessarily aligns with, 
and only with, psychological connectedness, which I think is not at all identical to 
what we think as an egoistic concern in the original sense. By the same token, 
McMahan’s claim that identity is sufficient but not necessary for justifying an egoistic 
concern is also based on the modified Parfitian definition of egoistic concern, which I 
would regard as an inappropriate use of the very conception of egoistic concern. 
 McMahan is right in pointing out that there is certain kind of egoistically oriented 
concern with a future person who is similar to you in many aspects and will carry on 
with your goals and social responsibilities in future. However, one should also notice 
that there is a fundamental and unbridgeable difference between (1) an egoistic 
concern, a concern about one’s experience from a first-person perspective and (2) an 
egoistically oriented concern, a concern that does not involve the fear of future pain 
or anticipation of future joy. An egoistic concern is a concern about the future 
experience of oneself from a first-person perspective. Although our persistence is not 
a necessary condition for having an egoistically oriented concern, only our existence 
and persistence guarantees that we can have an egoistic concern that includes the fear 
of pain from a first-person perspective.  
My definition of egoistic concern is that necessarily, one can have a egoistic 
concern with a future entity E if and only if one exists and persists as E. In other words, 
since I define egoistic concern such that identity is both necessary and sufficient for 
being capable of having an egoistic concern, necessarily, identity with X aligns well 
with being capable of having an egoistic concern with X. 
One point worth noting is that it is not necessary for an individual to be 
egoistically concerned with a future individual – the target can also be the present 
individual. For instance, I can be egoistically concerned with my present self because 
I detect something abnormal happening that disturbs my mood. I am concerned with 
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this present self, and I hope it could get rid of the discomfort. Moreover, when one 
exists or persists as an entity and will have what this entity experiences from a first-
person perspective, one can be egoistically concerned with this entity – one can be 
concerned about the entity’s experience from a first-person perspective.  
In summary, I propose that there are two kinds of concerns, the egoistic concern, 
and the egoistically oriented concern. Necessarily, my concern about X can be egoistic 
if and only if I exist and persist as X. This completes my argument for premise one of 
the Essentiality Argument. 
 
4.1.5   Premise Two 
Premise two is the claim that necessarily, if my subject of experience is numerically 
identical with E at t, then my concern with an entity E at time t can be egoistic. In what 
follows, I argue for this by first illustrating that I can be egoistically concerned with 
the post-person as a minimal subject of experience at the late stage of Alzheimer's 
disease, given that the subject of experience persists. Then I generalize this to all cases 
in which my subject of experience is present. 
I generally agree with McMahan’s proposal that we persist as the post-persons in 
the late stage of Alzheimer’s disease. However, premise two is different from saying 
that we persist as the post-persons – it is about whether we can have an egoistic concern 
with the post-persons. I believe so. To recall, I define an egoistic concern as one about 
one’s future experience from a first-person perspective. Let us imagine, from a first-
person perspective, whether we can be egoistically concerned with the post-person in 
the late-stage of the Alzheimer’s disease, given that the subject of experience persists. 
Imagine that I am thinking of my future, and I perceive of the possibility of myself 
having the Alzheimer’s disease. Given that the subject of experience persists 
throughout the disease, I can imagine my current subject of experience persist through 
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time and forgetting things day by day until one morning the subject wakes up forgetting 
my own name. My subject of experience during the late-stage of the disease has lonely, 
isolated experiences because my personality will be completely changed due to the 
disease. At that stage, my subject of experience can only enjoy very limited activities 
such as eating, walking, and sleeping. The subject does not remember any relatives it 
has. Still, when I am now thinking about all these, I wonder how long my subject will 
survive in this stage, and whether it would still enjoy life after entering the late-stage 
of the disease. I can foresee that my relatives and friends would no longer enjoy 
communicating with the future individual since it would become a burden to them. 
The subject would not be able to enjoy the physical and intellectual activities that it 
once enjoys. As a result, my subject of experience at the late-stage would probably feel 
useless, worthless, and depressed. Upon thinking about what my subject of experience 
would encounter, I come to the conclusion that being a post-person is not worth living. 
There would be more sufferings than joy for my subject of experience at that stage. 
Realizing this, I plan to write in my will that I wish to have euthanasia after reaching 
the late-stage of the disease. I am willing to pay for the euthanasia to avoid my future 
sufferings. 
Given that my subject of experience persists, I can foresee my suffering from the 
deprivation of my psychological complexity. I also foresee my subject as having 
negative experiences. Given that the subject of experience persists, it is reasonable to 
replace “my subject of experience” with “myself” or “I” in the above context. If my 
subject of experience will suffer, then I will suffer. If it is so, given that an egoistic 
concern is one about one’s future experience from a first-person perspective, I can be 
egoistically concerned with the future individual as a post-person in the late stage of 
the Alzheimer’s disease. 
This is how I come up with the claim that I can be egoistically concerned with 
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my post-person as a minimal subject of experience at the late stage of the Alzheimer's 
disease, given that the subject of experience persists. Otherwise, all the above 
descriptions would not be rational thoughts for me, and there is no reason for me to 
pay to have euthanasia to end the suffering. Moreover, if we consider other cases in 
which there is my subject of experience at time t, given that an egoistic concern is one 
about one’s future experience from a first-person perspective, necessarily, I can also 
care about what my subject of experience is going to experience at time t. I anticipate 
enjoyments and plan to avoid sufferings for my subject of experience at time t. If that 
would be my subject that suffers, then necessarily, I can be concerned with this future 
entity from a first-person perspective. The general claim that necessarily, I can be 
egoistically concerned with an entity E at time t, given that my subject of experience 
is numerically identical with E at t thus come along. 
The subject of experience of the post-person in the late-stage of the Alzheimer’s 
disease is a thin subject because it does not have personality, memories, self-
consciousness, and many other complexities that a normal person has. How thin can a 
minimal experience be? To recall, for Strawson, the subject of experience can exist 
without any memories, psychological traits and dispositions. We are subjects of 
experience with an essential property of being conscious, and subjects of experience 
are things that have experience, but they may not have memories, psychological traits, 
dispositions, and even the ability of self-identification. 
 
4.1.6   Premise Three 
Premise three of the argument is the claim that necessarily, if my subject of experience 
is not E at t, then my concern with an entity E at time t cannot be egoistic. I will first 
take my human body as an example. I hereby show that we can only have an 
egoistically oriented concern, but not an egoistic concern, with our human bodies, if 
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we are not numerically identical with the human bodies. Then I generalize this to all 
cases in which my subject of experience is absent. I define in the introduction of this 
thesis the term “human body” as the physical body of the primate species Homo 
Sapiens that persists after the human animal dies. Our human bodies have an intimate 
relation to ourselves, but yet, we are not numerically identical with our human bodies. 
I also take it that human bodies don’t think – what thinks is the subject of experience 
that has intimate causal relation with the human body. 
Let us consider a situation in which my subject of experience is to be transferred 
into a pig’s body via the transformation of my brain at time t, which is supposed to be 
responsible for the instantiation of my subject of experience. Suppose, also, that my 
human body would still survive for a year after time t without the brain, given that the 
body is supported by some advanced technologies. In this situation, I will still have a 
certain concern about this human body after my subject of experience is transferred to 
a pig’s body. This human body was once the physical container of my subject of 
experience which accompanied me for many years. My concern about my human body 
after time t should be classified as an egoistically oriented concern because I will not 
care about how this human body experiences and perceives the world from a first-
person perspective. Given that my subject of experience does not own this human body 
anymore, the experience I have will be independent of the conditions of this human 
body, and there is no experience from a first-person perspective in this human body 
for me to concern with. 
Even if it happens to be that there is some conscious experience occurring in the 
human body with an empty skull after the operation, and if I am sure that my subject 
of experience has already been transferred to a pig’s body, it would be another subject 
of experience that perceives the external world via my former human body – it would 
not be my subject anymore. By my definition, an egoistic concern is a concern that 
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involves concern about one’s future experience from a first-person perspective. As a 
result, I simply cannot have an egoistic concern about my human body given that my 
subject of experience does not perceive the external world via this human body at that 
time. I can only have an egoistic concern with my subject of experience which 
accidentally has an intimate causal relation with this particular human body at this 
moment. Strictly speaking, I can only be egoistically concerned with the experiences 
of my subject from a first-person perspective via this human body, but I can not be 
egoistically concerned with the human body per se. 
To generalize the above claim, one just needs to think about any entity E which 
is not identical to one’s subject of experience. At that moment, necessarily, the subject, 
call it H, cannot be egoistically concerned with E. Necessarily, the individual H no 
longer cares about what E experiences from a first-person perspective, given that E’s 
experience is not possessed by H (assuming that H is not identical to E). Therefore, 
necessarily, I cannot be egoistically concerned with an entity E at time t, given that my 
subject of experience is not E at t. This completes the reasons for supporting premise 
three. 
In summary, I give reasons for all the premises one to three. Following premises 
two and three, we can come to the conclusion that I can be egoistically concerned with 
an entity E if and only if my subject of experience is numerically identical with E. 
Together with premises 1, I further conclude that necessarily, when I exist, I am a 
subject of experience. That is to say; I am essentially subjects of experience. Also, 
necessarily, I persist as a subject of experience. 
 
4.2   We Persist as Subjects 
I now provide another argument for the claim that we persist as subjects. A more formal 
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expression for the claim that (1) we persist as subjects is that (1′) necessarily, for any 
entity x, if x is among us, x persists as a future entity y if and only if y is the same 
subject as x. For simplicity, I will treat the two above expressions (1) and (1′) as 
equivalent in the whole thesis. I argue for it via a thought experiment. 
Suppose Albert undergoes a brain operation during which the brain cells of his 
cerebrum are replaced by silicon one-by-one. Suppose that the cerebrum is responsible 
for one’s consciousness, memories and psychological traits. Unlike many other 
operations, this very operation lasts a year. Albert enters the operation room for 15 
minutes every day, during which a small number of his brain cells from his cerebrum 
are replaced by silicon chips that maintain the same function as the original brain cells. 
Albert’s memory and psychological traits are perfectly continuous throughout this 
process. 
Suppose Billy undertakes another brain operation that takes only a day. During 
the few hours of operation, Billy’s original cerebrum is totally removed at once, 
preserved in a tank with nutrients, such that it ceases to function when being in the 
tank but does not deteriorate. After that, a full-blown silicon cerebrum with Billy’s 
memory and psychological traits are implanted into Billy’s empty skull. Let us further 
suppose that Billy’s brain is put in a vat with nutrients. It keeps functioning, and the 
individual with this brain is able to communicate with others via some advanced 
technology. This brain-individual is also fully psychologically continuous with Billy, 
and he claims that he is Billy. 
Both the resultant entities retain all the mental capacities the former entities have 
after the operations. There is no difference in terms of psychological continuity 
between the two operations. However, we intuitively think that there is a significant 
difference regarding our persistence between the two cases. We believe that it is more 
secure to undergo the operation in a gradual way. More specifically, many of us think 
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that the same individual wakes up every time after the gradual operation, but we are 
reluctant to admit that the individual who wakes up after the second operation is still 
the original one given that the whole cerebrum is replaced all of a sudden. The intuition 
becomes even stronger after we are told that Billy’s brain keeps functioning in a vat, 
and the brain-individual is also psychologically continuous with Billy. In this case, 
many of us would think that the Billy persists as the brain in the vat instead of 
persisting as the individual with a new brain and Billy’s original body. 
Our intuition is that there should be some physical continuity, such as the gradual 
replacement of brain cells, to guarantee our persistence. What does continuous 
replacement of brain cells guarantee us? There is already psychological continuity 
between the resultant entities and the original person in both cases with gradual and 
sudden replacement of brain. It is not psychological continuity that we are concerned 
with when dealing with the persistence of individuals. What does the continuous 
replacement of brain cells support? 
We should find an account such that something, call it “x,” is maintained if the 
brain is gradually replaced, whereas x is not preserved in a sudden replacement of the 
brain. Furthermore, this account should admit that x is what determines our persistence. 
The possible candidates of x I can think of are (1) the continuity of spatiotemporal 
location of the whole human body, (2) the right causal chain for psychological 
continuity; and (3) the sameness of subject of experience supported by the continuity 
of the brain. I discuss each of them and propose that the first two proposals cannot 
fully explain our intuition. I go on to argue that the sameness of subject of experience 
can be regarded as the best candidate that underlies our intuition. 
Let us consider the first candidate. It is prima facie reasonable to suppose that the 
continuity of the spatiotemporal location of the human body is what determines our 
persistence. One might think that the brain is an important part of human body, and 
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since the continuity of spatiotemporal location of human body determines our 
persistence over time, the spatiotemporal continuity of the brain is also necessary. The 
gradual replacement of the brain thus guarantees our persistence, but a sudden 
replacement of the whole brain does not. For one thing, one can individuate a human 
animal by its unique spatiotemporal location because every human animal is a physical 
being that occupies a particular location. Furthermore, a common thought is that a set 
of mental properties acquires particularity because the thoughts are owned by a subject 
embedded in a physical body with a unique spatiotemporal location. If each of us has 
a unique spatiotemporal location, it seems quite reasonable to conclude that the 
continuity of the spatiotemporal location of the human body also determines our 
persistence over time. 
Unfortunately, there are some drawbacks to this proposal. There are many bodily 
parts that we think are not crucial regarding our persistence. For example, we can 
receive a pair of donated lungs and heart and donate a kidney and a great proportion 
of liver but still continue to persist. Furthermore, it seems that the continuity of the 
brain, and only the brain, is crucial for our persistence. If the brain is removed from a 
human body and is transplanted to another body, our persistence goes with the brain, 
and spatiotemporal continuity of the human body goes with the body. It seems that the 
spatiotemporal continuity of the human body is not a necessary condition for our 
persistence. 
The second possibility is to say that the right causal chain for psychological 
continuity determines our persistence. The gradual replacement of brain ensures the 
right causal chain for psychological continuity, but the sudden replacement of brain 
does not. There is also the idea of memory trace, which is related to the idea of the 
right causal chain. Philosophers who accept the causal model for memory (and 
psychological continuity in general) would most probably also believe in the existence 
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of memory trace, which is the structural analogue that stores or traces a person’s 
experience, psychological disposition, and memory. For the sake of simplicity, I will 
only concentrate on the causal model of memory but not that of other psychological 
traits. I believe that my following discussion of the causal model of memory could also 
be applied to the causal model of psychological traits in general. 
Many philosophers assumed that for a memory state to have a causal chain, there 
should at least be some memory trace. For instance, Sven Bernecker (2001) believes 
that the idea of memory causation must rely on the idea of memory traces. If there is 
memory, then there must be memory traces. The relation between memory and the 
corresponding memory trace is like music and the groove in a gramophone record. 
Science nowadays does not provide a definitive answer to what a memory trace is and 
how it works, but philosophers have given various proposals. For instance, Bertrand 
Russell (1995) believes that it is plausible that future neuroscience provides us with a 
one-to-one correlation between memory states and neuron states. On the other hand, 
there are David Rumelhart and Donald Norman (1981) who propose that memory is 
information stored everywhere in the brain but not in a particular part of the brain. 
Similarly, Sven Bernecker (2001) believes that memory traces could plausibly be 
structural modifications at synapses, where synapses are structures that permit neurons 
to pass electrical or chemical signals to other neurons. For him, there are three elements 
that constitute a right causal process of memory: encoding, storage, and retrieval. 
Encoding is a process during which experiences creates memory traces. During storage, 
the information is transferred from trace to trace. When the person retrieves the 
information, there is the memory state brought out by the trace.  
It is intuitive for us to regard memory trace as neuronic. Nevertheless, there are 
defenders of the view that memory trace for memory may not be neuronic. For instance, 
C. B. Martin and Max Deutscher (1966) believes that for a person to remember an 
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event, the person should have experienced the event and that her experience of it must 
have been operative in producing successive states in her that is operative in producing 
the memory representation. However, they assert that continuity of brain or parts of 
the brain should not be strictly necessary for the right causal chain for memory. They 
propose that it is problematic to say that there must be a neuronic memory trace which 
serves as the operation condition for a right causal chain of memory. Their reason is 
that this criterion neglects some intuitive cases of memory. For instance, we can 
conceive of other beings that can remember, and they remember through not their 
bodies, brains, neurons, but some external devices.  
In the example they give, each of the Martians carry a metal box with them 
throughout their lives. The boxes are external devices given to them at birth. The 
Martians remember things only in virtue of having the metal boxes – their metal boxes 
serve as memory storage devices such that they experience themselves remembering 
things in the same way just as we experience ourselves remember things. In this 
example, C. B. Martin and Max Deutscher hold that it is intuitive that they have 
memory with the right causal chain, but it is not the case that their memory trace is 
neuronic. 
Let us return to my thought experiments of gradual and sudden brain transplant. 
First of all, both brain transplant operations have causal chains that originate from the 
person’s direct experience. Therefore, the person’s original experience is operative in 
producing through successive causal chain the memory the person now has. Second, 
we can propose that the replaced silicon cells participate in serving as part of the 
memory trace that stores and traces a person’s experience and memory. We can surely 
think of situations where the individual’s psychological information is copied and 
mapped into the newly produced silicon brain or silicon cells by advanced technology 
to ensure a continuous causal chain in both cases of gradual and sudden replacement. 
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The psychological information carried by this new silicon brain or the new silicon cells 
is the effect, and the psychological information carried by the original brain is the cause. 
Both cases involve non-neuronic structural analogue of the memory trace. The 
difference between a sudden replacement and a gradual replacement seems not to be 
about the difference in kind between the causal chain. 
Suppose after the entire operation is done, Albert and Billy are asked whether 
they remember an event that happened to them before their operations. Their memories 
would rely on some non-neuronic (silicon-based) memory trace. If we take Martin’s, 
Deutscher’s, and Malcolm’s stance and presuppose that the memory trace for memory 
may not be neuronic, it follows that both Albert and Billy can be regarded as having 
the right causal chain for memory. There is no reason to say that sudden replacement 
of the brain does not constitute the right causal chain, whereas gradual replacement of 
the brain guarantees the right causal chain for memory. 
If one wants to make a difference between the two cases, further explanation is 
needed to provide a reason for the claim that the sudden information mapping process 
should not be regarded as the right causal chain for psychological continuity, but the 
gradual information mapping process constitutes the right causal chain. Furthermore, 
if one thinks that our persistence is determined by memory with the right causal chain, 
then one may also think that the right causal chain that supports psychological 
continuity is what matters. However, I have already argued that psychological 
continuity of any kind is not necessary nor sufficient for determining our persistence.  
A better candidate should be continuity of brain. Continuity of brain is maintained 
if the brain is gradually replaced, whereas continuity of the brain is not preserved in a 
sudden replacement of the brain. Furthermore, this account should admit that 
continuity of brain is what determines our persistence. There are two alternatives: (1) 
the continuity of brain per se determines our persistence; and (2) continuity of the brain 
 150 
 
supports the sameness of subject of experience, and we persist as subjects. These two 
alternatives have the same explanatory power – they are both successful in explaining 
our intuition of the thought experiment. I argue that we should prefer (2). I first discuss 
the alternative (1) and show that this alternative has pitfalls. I then argue that (2) is 
better. 
The first drawback of alternative (1) is that continuity of the brain seems to 
determine our persistence if there is no branching; but if there is one, then this criterion 
again fails. In cases such as brain splitting, for example, both resultant entities have 
part of the original brain, and both the left-hemisphere and the right hemisphere have 
a certain degree of physical continuity with the original brain. If both parts are regarded 
as having some physical continuity with the original brain, then this criterion fails to 
give a unique answer to our persistence. Even if continuity of the brain may be one 
necessary condition for the sameness of person over time; it is definitely not sufficient 
to determine our persistence. 
Furthermore, it is hard to define what it means by the continuity of brain. Consider 
a case in which a patient with a brain disease has an operation with half of the cerebrum 
removed in one go. In this situation, it is uncertain whether there is a sufficient degree 
of continuity of the brain to support our persistence. If continuity of brain is regarded 
as the criterion of our persistence, then our persistence may come in a matter of degree, 
and this may render our persistence indeterminate in some cases. We may need to allow 
expressions such as “I partially exist” and “my current existence will be indeterminate 
after time t.” I believe most of us are unwilling to assert such weird statements. 
Continuity of the brain is not a precise criterion for determining our persistence and 
thus is undesirable. 
I suggest that (2) is a better alternative. Our intuition that a certain degree of brain 
continuity is needed for our persistence may come from another deeper intuition that 
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the sameness of subject is supported by the continuity of brain, and we persist if and 
only if our subjects of experience persist. I define a subject of experience as a mental 
entity, a thing that has conscious experience and mental properties. We think we persist 
as the same subject of experience, and we are reluctant to accept a sudden replacement 
of the whole brain because we have the intuition that after replacing the whole brain 
in one go, even if the resultant entity is fully psychologically continuous with me, the 
being that wakes up afterward would be another subject and it won’t be me anymore. 
We tend to believe that gradual replacement of brain guarantees the sameness of 
subject since the continuity of brain components is the only candidate in a scientific or 
natural sense that supports sameness of subject of experience. There is a common 
belief that the sameness of subject is supported by the continuity of brain components 
before we die. 
Recall the very alternative we have just considered, namely, that our persistence 
is determined by the continuity of brain. I have argued that since there is not a clear 
definition of what it means by the continuity of brain, the claim is undesirable because 
it requires that our existence is indeterminate. In contrast, the claim that we persist as 
subjects is safe from having such a pitfall. Given that you are a subject of experience 
whose essential property is being conscious, if we assume that it is not a matter of 
degree whether there is conscious experience or not, then it is not a matter of degree 
whether you exist or not. If the existence of subject of experience is determinate, the 
Conscious Subject View would have to say that your existence should be determinate 
too - either you persist, or you do not.34 
This proposal has no obligation to provide a clear definition of what it means by 
                                                     
34 I presuppose that consciousness is determinate. Whether consciousness is determinate is a heated 
debate nowadays. Neuroscientists such as Claire Sergent and Stanislas Dehaene (2004) argue that Is 
consciousness is not a gradual phenomenon. They give evidence for an all-or-none bifurcation 
between consciousness and unconsciousness during the attentional blink of subjects. 
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the continuity of brain. So long as my subject is preserved, no matter how many of my 
brain cells continue to live, I persist. On the other hand, we can simply acknowledge 
that there is continuity of brain only if the sameness of the subject is maintained. The 
strategy is to step back to examine what the underlying beliefs we have about our 
persistence when searching for a clear definition of what it means by the continuity of 
brain. 
It is not to say that necessarily, we persist only when there is continuity of brain. 
I believe that it is metaphysically possible that we persist without the continuity of the 
brain. Alternative (2) is the best choice for us to explain our intuition that we persist 
only when there is the gradual replacement of the brain is to understand our persistence 
via the persistence of subjects of experience. After we realize that we persist if and 
only if our subjects persist, it follows that when we are asked whether we persist in a 
situation where our subjects persist but not our brains, our answer would still be 
positive. 
By abductive reasoning, I now propose that the best candidate for supporting our 
intuition about the thought experiment is that I persist as a subject of experience. My 
argument is as follows: 
 
Argument of Persistence 
1. We have the intuition that we persist only when there is the gradual replacement of 
the brain. 
2. The best candidate to explain this intuition is that we persist as subjects of 
experience. 
____________ 
C. We persist as subjects of experience. 
 
These are my two arguments (the Argument of Persistence and the Essentiality 
Argument) for my Conscious Subject View, according to which (1) we are essentially 
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subjects of experience, and that (2) we persist as subjects of experience. 
 
4.3   Embedded Experience 
Many philosophers believe that conscious experience is always an experience of being 
embodied. I call this idea “the Theory of Embodied Experience.” The Theory of 
Embodied Experience describes the structure of the phenomenal realm. It is different 
from the metaphysical claim, according to which the self cannot exist without having 
a possessed body. I call this metaphysical claim “the Theory of the Embodied Self.” It 
is possible that the Theory of Embodied Experience is true, whereas the Theory of the 
Embodied Self is false, and vice versa. I am not going to deal with the Theory of the 
Embodied Self in this chapter. 
I believe that the Theory of Embodied Experience is incorrect. I propose that 
conscious experiences are not necessarily experiences of being embodied. There can 
be a subject of experience without having the sense of being embodied. In what follows, 
I introduce the Theory of Embodied Experience and argue against it. 
There are two representative views about Embodied Experience in the literature 
- the traditional view and the nativist view. The traditional view is one in which the 
sense of being embodied is learned and developed through experience. It basically 
stems from Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962) whose philosophy is heavily influenced by 
research in developmental psychology. Merleau-Ponty believes that the sense of being 
embodied is acquired through experience. There are similar ideas in the works of 
William James (1890), Jean Piaget (1954), and Paul Guillaume (1943). These 
philosophers believe that children’s development of the sense of being embodied is a 
gradual process which can only be formed after the repeated perceptual experience of 
one’s own body. Before the process is completed and the corresponding psychological 
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mechanism fully developed, there is conscious experience without the sense of being 
embodied. The process is similar to our acquisition of many habits through practice 
and repeated experience. We learn how to control our bodies through repeated 
practices of movements. Newborns’s consciousness should then be disorganized, 
primitive, and not structured or shaped by the embodiment. They have no sense of 
being embodied. 
On the other hand, philosophers such as Aron Gurwitsch (1964) and Maxine 
Sheets-Johnstone (1998) hold that there is always an awareness of one’s body 
whenever one has movements and cognitive activities. Recently, Shaun Gallagher 
(2005) proposes that there is always a marginal awareness about one’s own body in 
any experience, and this awareness constitutes a structural feature of phenomenal 
consciousness. For him, all kinds of conscious mental states, such as perception, 
memory, imagination belief, judgment, etc., are shaped by the sense of being embodied. 
We always have conscious experience as being embodied. Although the degree of 
awareness may vary among individuals, such as that some people are more aware of 
their bodies and some are only peripherally aware of their bodies, there should at least 
be some awareness of the body in any conscious experience. 
Shaun Gallagher (2005) proposes that the sense of being embodied is innate. He 
studies research findings in psychology and neuroscience and maintains that there is 
evidence from developmental psychology that shows that body schema is innate. A 
body schema, for him, is a system of sensory-motor processes that constantly regulate 
posture and movement and a collection of sensory-motor interactions that individually 
define a specific movement or posture. He describes it as “a system of sensory-motor 
capacities that functions without awareness or the necessity of perceptual monitoring.” 
(Gallagher 2005, p. 24) Even if I am conscious of some aspects of my posture and 
movement, my body schema unconsciously functions and supports my movements 
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and body balance. He defines innateness as this: X is innate if and only if X “exists 
prior to birth.” (Gallagher 2005, p. 72) and holds that if body schema is innate, then 
the sense of being embodied is also innate. Since body schema is innate, therefore, the 
sense of being embodied is innate. 
Gallagher also proposes that there is a primary sense of is proprioceptive 
awareness (PA), a self-referential and pre-reflective awareness of one’s body, that 
occurs from birth. This conscious awareness is governed by and produced out of the 
unconscious proprioceptive information, which he calls physiological information (PI), 
which informs the bodily motor system about one’s postures and movements. 
Gallagher believes that the two aspects of proprioception, PA and PI, is fully 
developed at birth, and is sufficient for the sense of being embodied. 
Gallagher interprets the experimental result of developmental psychologists such 
as Andrew Meltzoff and M. Keith Moore (1983, 1994) and concludes that some motor 
behaviors were present in neonates. These psychologists studied the imitation 
behaviors of neonates and argued that their body schema is already fully developed 
during birth. In the test, a mouth-opening gesture is shown to forty neonates from one 
hour old to several days old. The image was presented to the infants over a period of 
4 minutes with alternations in 20-second intervals between the mouth-opening gesture 
and the passive facial appearance. The same experimental process is repeated with a 
tongue protrusion gesture. The result shows that the most infants, including the 
youngest one which is only forty minutes old, imitate the gestures of both mouth 
opening and tongue protrusion. Psychologists concluded that neonates of less than one 
hour old could imitate facial gestures. 
Gallagher believes that these research findings show that body schemas already 
exist at birth to allow for the imitation at infancy, and consciousness from birth is 
already structured by the embodiment. He interprets the results as one in which the 
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infants’s stimuli, namely, the gestures they observe, are transformed into PA of their 
own body parts, and PI equips her to move the parts such that PA matches their stimuli. 
A neonate is thus able to imitate others and to correct movements. Moreover, this 
interpretation implies that the infants can recognize the difference between their own 
gestures and the others’s gesture, which presupposes a sense of dichotomy between 
self and non-self. In addition, there is PA at birth. Given that PA is a form of self-
awareness, there is already some primitive sense of being embodied at birth. Gallagher, 
therefore, concludes that there is a primary sense of oneself being embodied with the 
experience of body postures and motor control at birth. He goes on to declare that 
whenever one experiences, one always also experiences oneself as embodied.  
In contrast, the traditional view proposed by Piaget et al. would imply that it is 
impossible for an infant to imitate the gestures appearing on others’s face because this 
behavior requires a fully developed body schema. These theorists thus fail to explain 
why such imitations are impossible before an infant reaches 8-12 months of age. The 
traditional view is, therefore, inconsistent with the recent discoveries in contemporary 
psychology. 
 
4.3.1   My Objections to Gallagher’s Theory 
I believe that there is a problem with Gallagher’s theory. He falsely believes that his 
theory draws the conclusion that it is impossible for the body schema and the sense of 
being embodied to be absent in one’s conscious experience. His argument fails to 
demonstrate that this conclusion is true. First, Gallagher defines that X is innate if and 
only if X exists prior to birth. According to this definition, innateness does not imply 
necessity. Even if Gallagher’s analysis on the research in developmental psychology 
is true that the psychological mechanism that produces the experience of being 
embodied is innate, there is still no reason for us to believe in the metaphysical claim 
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that necessarily, there is an experience of being embodied in one’s conscious 
experience. In other words, it can well be that there is conscious experience without 
the experience of being embodied even if the body schema is innate. Whether body 
schema is innate is not a metaphysical question of the prevalence of the embodied 
experience and is not relevant to whether the experience of being embodied is an 
essential component for conscious experience. 
I argued in chapter two that an individual could have a robust first-person 
perspective without having a rudimentary first-person perspective. Now I propose that 
an individual can have conscious experience without having the experience of being 
embodied by similar reasons. To begin, one can conceive of oneself being put in a 
sensory deprivation tank, a scenario discussed by G. E. M. Anscombe (1975). During 
that period, one lacks the experience of having a body because one lacks the five senses 
when being put in the tank, whereas the experience of being embodied at a certain time 
t1 necessarily entails that at least one of the five senses, such as touch, is present at t1. 
However, during the period in the tank, one may still think about oneself. For instance, 
one may ask oneself, “what happens to me? It seems that I have lost my body. That is 
terrible!” The individual in the tank has conscious thoughts, but she does not have the 
experience of being embodied. 
There are other discussions by philosophers of mind about this. For instance, 
Barry Dainton (2016) proposes that if there is a conscious computer, it can be 
conscious without having the experience of being embodied. More specifically, if one 
does not design the computer program such that it is able to detect it’s (the machine’s) 
surroundings, even if it is designed to have experience and thoughts, it can never have 
the experience of being “embodied” with physical parts. This, of course, is a far-
fetched scenario, but the case is to show that the conception of subject of experience 
does not logically entail the idea of experiencing oneself as embodied. There are no 
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obvious reasons for us to believe that body schema and the experience of being 
embodied is essential for the existence of a subject of experience. 
 
4.4   Two Uses of “I” 
According to many philosophers, such as Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953), Galen 
Strawson (2011), and Derek Parfit (2012), there are two uses of the term “I.” The 
Wittgensteinian approach is that there is use of “I” as an object and use of “I” as a 
subject. For Strawson, the term “I” is used with the intention to refer to either a human 
being considered as a whole or the subject of experience. For instance, when I claim 
that “I am six feet tall,” the “I” here probably refers to the whole human being. In 
contrast, when I am thinking about my possibility of surviving death, the phrase “my 
possibility” as used here refers to the possibility of the subject of experience. Similarly, 
Parfit thinks that there are the Inner-I and the Outer-I which refers to the thinking 
person and the human animal respectively. He believes that the Inner-I thinks non-
derivatively and the Outer-I thinks derivatively in virtue of having the Inner-I that 
thinks. 
I am along with Strawson’s and Parfit’s proposal of the two uses of “I.” I argue 
that one can regard one use of “I” as proper use and the other uses of “I” as improper 
uses. In what follows, I first briefly introduce Strawson’s idea of the two uses of “I.” I 
will then further argue for my theory about the proper and the improper uses of “I.” 
Galen Strawson (2011) holds that sometimes the term “I” is naturally used to refer 
to the subject of experience and to the human being as a whole in different contexts. 
For example, when I claim that “I am hungry now,” the “I” here probably refers to the 
whole human being. On the other hand, if I am thinking about my possibility of going 
to heaven, my possibility here refers to the possibility of the subject of experience. As 
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stated, he regards the subject of experience as part of the human being as a whole. 
Strawson argues for the two uses of “I” by several means. First, he claims that it 
is appropriate for us to assert statements such as “I am completely detached from my 
body” in cases like near death experience. Even if the presence of these experiences 
does not logically imply that it is possible for there to be a subject of experience 
without a possessed body, the intended referent of “I” in these descriptions is not the 
whole human being but the subject of experience. Second, Strawson points out that 
some psychological research reveals that most of us realize that we are focused on 
inner events without any direct awareness of outside events. When the subjects in the 
psychological experiment are randomly alerted by an activating beeper they carry 
during their daily lives, they report having thoughts without being aware of what is 
happening out there. (Baars 1996; Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel 2007) Strawson 
interprets these experiments as showing that our ordinary experience is rich and 
complex. It does not only reflect what is happening in the external world. In contrast, 
our experience is full of abstract thoughts, plans, and reflections. 
 
4.3.3   My Two Uses of “I” 
I am along with Strawson’s line of thought – I believe that that there is indeed more 
than one use of “I.” Moreover, I believe that some uses of “I” do not reveal the essential 
properties of ourselves. I discuss how people use the term “I” in our daily lives and 
further examine whether the different uses of “I” have metaphysical implications that 
are incoherent with each other. I propose that some uses of “I” are not useful in 
revealing the metaphysics of selves. Nevertheless, there are still hints on what we are 
in some appropriate uses of the term “I.”  
I introduce the idea of the proper uses of “I” and the improper uses of “I.” A 
proper use of “I” is a use of “I” that is consistent with the essential properties or the 
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persistence conditions of the self, whereas is an improper use of “I” is a use of “I” that 
is inconsistent with the essential properties or the persistence conditions of the self, 
but yet it is a common and effective usage in ordinary language. In my opinion, when 
we use “I” to refer to the subject of experience, there is a proper use of “I.” On the 
other hand, if we use “I” to refer to the human body or the corpse after we die, then 
these usages of the term “I” are improper uses of “I.” 
When we assert sentences such as “bury me under this tree after I pass away,” the 
“I” dos not refer to the subject of experience but to the human body. Sentences like 
“please bury me under this tree after I pass away” indicate that we persist as a corpse 
but this is a wrong metaphysical implication because we do not persist as corpses. 
Moreover, if there can be a subject without the experience of being embodied, as I 
have argued in the preceding section, then the subject would be using “I” to refer to 
the subject of experience per se, as this individual may not know whether she has a 
physical body or not. 
If we fix “I” to be referring to the subject of experience, the above usage of “I” 
referring to the corpse should be incorrect. Still, people may use the word “I” in some 
occasions, such as saying that “I will be buried under this tree,” which is not a 
proposition but a statement tantamount to “the sun is rising,” which should not be 
regarded as a true proposition – the sun does not rise, it is the rotation of the earth 
which produces the effect.  
When we use “I” to refer to the human body, it is an improper use of the term “I.” 
It is a conventional way of expression which does not correctly reflect the essential 
properties or the persistence conditions of ourselves.  
I proposed previously that there are two kinds of self-oriented concerns: the 
egoistic concern and the egoistically oriented concern. Now I further propose that 
necessarily, we can have an egoistic concern about a thing that is the referent of “I” if 
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and only if the use of “I” in this case is proper use. On the other hand, necessarily, we 
cannot have an egoistic concern about a thing that is the referent of “I” if and only if 
the use of “I” in this case is improper use. For instance, the use of “I” that refers to 
one’s corpse is an improper use because one has only egoistically oriented concern but 
not egoistic concern about one’s corpse. We can have an egoistically oriented concern 
about our corpses – for instance, many people have the desire that their bodies be 
buried in their favorite places. However, we never care about how the corpse feels, 
experiences, and perceives the external world from a first-person perspective. 
Moreover, if one was told that one’s subject of experience would be realized by 
something else apart from this human body P after time t, then my egoistic concern 
after t will only be about the subject but not P. What is left is at most an egoistically 
oriented concern about P that has accompanied the individual for such a long time. We 
cannot have an egoistic concern with the corpse. 
What about the human animal? If I use “I” to refer to my human animal, and we 
adopt a physical theory of human animal, is it a proper use of “I”? My answer is no. 
When I say, “I am five feet tall” or “I weight 45kg,” the “I” in this sentence refers to 
the human animal, and the human animal is a physical entity, not identical to the 
subject of experience, which is a mental entity. These examples are, therefore, 
improper uses of “I.” On the other hand, if we adopt a hybrid theory of human animal, 
according to which the human animal is the sum of a mental substance and a physical 
substance, then the sentence “I am five feet tall” should also be incorrect. I am the 
mental part of the human animal. I am not five feet tall, being a purely mental 
substance. It should be that the physical part of the human animal that bears intimate 
causal relation to me is five feet tall. 
There is one point worth nothing though. Although proper use of “I” entails the 
presence of a subject of experience who has the ability to make self-reference; the term 
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“I” refers to the subject of experience who may not have the ability to refer to itself. 
To take an example, I may use “I” to refer to the post-person in the final stage who 
does not have the ability to self-refer. Still, I believe that I persist at the final stage of 
the post-person, given that the post-person is conscious and is able to experience pain 
and joy. Proper uses of “I” entail the presence of a conscious being with the ability to 
self-refer, but the referent of “I” is a subject of experience who may not have the ability 
to self-refer. 
In summary, I have argued that although we have expressions in daily life that 
uses “I” to refer to the human body, these uses of the word “I” are improper uses of 
“I.” When there is a proper use of “I,” “I” refers to the subject of experience.  
 
4.5   Advantages of My View 
There are several theoretical advantages of the Conscious Subject View. First, a 
Conscious Subject View also explains why we have the intuition that a person has an 
egoistic concern with the post-person as a minimal subject in the late stage of 
Alzheimer’s disease even if the post-person is not psychologically continuous with her 
at all. The underlying reason for this intuition is fairly straightforward - we believe that 
we persist so long as there is the same subject of experience, and this does not entail 
psychological continuity. My view also explains why we have the intuition that we 
persist only when there is a gradual replacement of brain cells. The intuition is 
grounded in the fact that we think that we are subjects of experience, and we also have 
the intuition that in the actual world, before we die, our subjects persist only when it 
is supported by the continuity of brain. 
Another advantage of the Conscious Subject View is that it can provide a 
satisfactory solution to the case of brain-splitting, whereas the Embedded Brain View 
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cannot do so. If I am essentially a brain, then I can be split because a brain can be split. 
In other words, the Embedded Brain View fails to indicate how we could determine 
the identity relations between the resultant entities, call them Lefty and Righty, and the 
original one (call him Brainy) when the brain splits into two. The Embedded Person 
View faces similar problems; as Lefty or Righty both have equally good physical and 
psychological continuity, all relevant physical and psychological facts fall short of 
providing helpful information for determining identity relations. As such, 
contemporary philosophers such as Robert Nozick (1991) and Derek Parfit (1984) 
stopped here and withdrew from taking identity seriously. According to Robert 
Nozick’s closest continuer theory and Derek Parfit’s famous claim “identity is not 
what matters,” personal identity is just a convention but not anything ontologically 
significant. According to their theories, there is not an identity relation between Brainy, 
Lefty, and Righty. This answer is not satisfactory in the sense that it does not explain 
why the identity relation is eliminated when the brain is split. Moreover, if one 
endorses the Only-x-and-y principle defended by Harold W. Noonan (1985), according 
to which whether identity holds between two entities only depend on facts and 
relations about the two entities in question, then the fact that the creation of an extra 
entity, say, Righty, throughout the splitting process should not affect the identity 
condition between Brainy and Lefty. It would be unacceptable that the existence of 
Righty after the operation “cancels” the identity relation between Brainy and Lefty. 
My Conscious Subject View is a view that takes our persistence as a metaphysical 
but not conventional claim. It also takes the first-person perspective seriously by 
emphasizing our egoistic concern and our intuitions regarding our persistence 
conditions from a first-person perspective. If we take the first-person perspective 
seriously, the case of brain-splitting indicates that there is something over and above 
the observable physical and psychological facts that determine our persistence. In the 
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next chapter, I will argue that subjects of experience are mental entities that have 
haecceities. Haecceity provides an explanation to our intuition in the case of brain-
splitting and reduplication from a first-person perspective, whereas both the Embedded 
Person View and the Embedded Brain View fail to do so. There is a lot to do to work 
out the argument, and I will elaborate more on these ideas in the next chapter.  
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5   Haecceitism 
5.1   General Haecceitism 
Haecceity is a term introduced by John Duns Scotus (1266–1308) that refers to a non-
qualitative property responsible for uniqueness and identity. Haecceity explains how a 
substance is distinct from the other substances. I formulate it as an object O has 
haecceity H if and only if H is what makes O a different object from other objects even 
if they are qualitatively identical with O. Based on this definition, necessarily, for all 
x and y, x equals y if x has haecceity p and y also has haecceity p. That means if I have 
my haecceity, then no one else has my haecceity. Also, if an object O is the kind of 
thing that has haecceity, then whenever O exists, its haecceity, call it H, is also 
instantiated. 
Haecceity is also called “thisness” or “individual essences.” Typically, 
philosophers who believe in haecceities think that the necessary and sufficient 
condition for instantiating haecceity is for the relevant individual to exist. For instance, 
if Socrates exists, then necessarily, there is one and only one entity that instantiates 
Socrates’s haecceity. In contrast, if Socrates does not exist, there is no such entity that 
instantiates Socrates’s haecceity. David Lewis (1986), though does not say that he 
believes in the existence of haecceities, describes haecceities as “properties that are in 
no way qualitatively delineated, and some of these are haecceities of this- and other-
worldly individuals. A unit set of an individual is one especially stringent haecceity. 
Also, for any individual and any counterpart relation, there is the set of that individual 
together with all its counterparts, and this is a less strict sort of haecceity.”  (Lewis 
1986, p. 225) It is generally agreed that haecceities are not multiply instantiable. There 
can only be one existing object that instantiates Plato’s haecceity. Based on this, some 
philosophers, such as Richard Swinburne (2012), are reluctant to regard haecceity as 
a property. However, some thinkers such as Sam Cowling (2016) are happy with the 
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idea that haecceity is a property that is not multiply instantiable. My definition of 
haecceity is compatible with the idea that haecceity is a property so long as we 
understand haecceity as in principle not multi-instantiable.  
Apart from haecceity, there are also qualitative properties and non-qualitative 
properties. These concepts play a crucial role in my discussion. There is no clear 
definition of what a non-qualitative property is, but the distinction between qualitative 
and non-qualitative properties are usually illustrated by paradigmatic examples. Some 
examples of non-qualitative properties are those that share haecceities’ dependence 
upon specific individuals, such as “standing five feet in front of Plato,” “being the 
sister of Socrates,” and “being a friend of Wittgenstein.” The differences in 
haecceitistic distribution also lead to differences in non-qualitative properties. For 
example, if Plato exists and his haecceity is instantiated, there are also non-qualitative 
properties such as “standing in front of Plato.” Haecceities are not multiply instantiable, 
but many non-qualitative properties are multiply instantiable. “Standing in front of 
Plato” is one easy example. Non-qualitative properties are also called “identity 
properties” or “impure properties.” 
Apart from non-qualitative properties, there are also qualitative properties. 
Typical examples of qualitative properties are color, shape, mass, and volume, such as 
those of “having a certain mass,” “being red,” and “being located five feet away from 
a tree.” 
There is an interesting relation between the theories of haecceities and 
essentialism. There are several versions of essentialism. The strongest version of 
essentialism is called “hyperessentialism,” a view that every individual necessarily has 
all the properties it actually has, such that the entity must be what it now is. Another 
strong version of essentialism called “origin essentialism” claims that any individual, 
such as Jenny Hung, necessarily has her actual biological origins – Joseph Hung and 
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Cindy Cho, in any possible world in which Jenny Hung exists. A weaker version of 
essentialism requires that all entities instantiate certain non-discriminable properties 
such as “being identical to itself” and “being such that 1+1 = 2.” Hyperessentialism 
and some strong forms of essentialism may rule out the possibility of individuals 
swapping qualitative roles. If it is impossible for you to have different properties, it 
follows that you cannot “occupy” the qualitative role of Plato or that of your friends. 
Similarly, origin essentialism precludes the idea that there can be haecceitistic 
differences without qualitative differences. For instance, you cannot swap qualitative 
roles with Wittgenstein because you necessarily have a different biological origin with 
him. 
Haecceitism may endorse weak versions of essentialism. If I am essentially a 
human being, then there can be one version of haecceitism that allows swapping of 
qualitative roles between two human beings but not swapping of qualitative roles 
between a human being and a cat. The weakest form of essentialism, if it is still 
considered as essentialism, (note that some philosophers do not regard it as a version 
of essentialism) is extreme haecceitism, according to which the only essential 
properties of an individual are its haecceity and general properties such as “being 
identical to itself.” Extreme haecceitism allows that the world could have been 
qualitatively the same while Plato could have been a poached egg - Plato and the 
poached egg swap their qualitative roles. This view is most permissive in terms of the 
de re modality of any individual. It is also dubbed “anti-essentialism” because of its 
ruling out the distinctive essences of various kinds of things. 
There are different versions of haecceitism. Some might only accept that two 
twins swap qualitative roles while denying that you could swap your qualitative role 
with your friend. Other versions of haecceitism allow swapping qualitative roles 
between two human beings but reject the idea that we can swap our qualitative roles 
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with inanimate objects or abstract entities such as numbers. 
 
5.2   Haecceitism of Souls 
In what follows, I examine the argument for haecceities of souls by a representative 
contemporary philosopher, Richard Swinburne (2012). For Swinburne, we are 
essentially souls, and souls have haecceities. He proposes the simple view of our 
persistence, a view saying that our persistence over time is ultimately not analyzable. 
In this view, you may not remember anything experienced by your soul in the past. 
Your present soul may have distinct bodies and brains with that of your soul in the 
past. This theory allows for a person to persist under radical changes of mental life and 
bodily constitution. 
Swinburne proposes a thought experiment to argue for the simple view of our 
persistence. Suppose I have a brain disease that affects the functioning of the right 
hemisphere, and that part of my brain is cloned and is replaced by a clone without the 
disease. The clone contains all my memories and character traits. Suppose also that the 
disease spreads to the left hemisphere, and this part is later replaced by another clone 
of it. My psychology is kept continuous throughout these operations. In this situation, 
Swinburne is not sure whether the resulting person would still be me. It seems that it 
is both possible that I continued to exist or ceased to exist. He concludes that if both 
cases are indeed possible, then our survival should not require physical or 
psychological continuities. 
 
Informative Designator 
Richard Swinburne (2012) introduces the idea of “informative designators” to discuss 
the relation between logically possible sentences and metaphysically possible 
sentences. 
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He adopts Saul Kripke’s (1980) definition that a rigid designator is a word which 
“in every possible world, designates the same object.” (Kripke 1980, p. 48) He reads 
object here as “things” in general, including substance, property, time, or event. He 
further suggests that there are two types of rigid designators: informative rigid 
designators and uninformative rigid designators. This is Swinburne’s definition of 
informative designator: necessarily, for any term t, t is an informative rigid designator 
if and only if (1) a competent language user fully knows the characteristics of the 
property, substance, time, or event, and that (2) the term always picks out the same 
property, substance, time, or event. Some examples of properties being informative 
designators are such as “having the length of 1m,” “being round,” etc. Examples of 
substances being informative designators are “H2O” and “electron.” Swinburne writes: 
 
This means understanding by the ‘canonical description’ of an event a description in 
terms of the substances, properties, and times involved in it by words such that a 
competent language user would thereby know fully which property, which substance, 
and which time the event involved. These will be words which always pick out the same 
property and so on, and tell us fully which property that is; such words I shall call 
‘informative [rigid] designators.’ (Swinburne 2017, p. 12) 
 
On the other hand, there are also uninformative rigid designators that refer to 
substances such that the speaker does not know the nature of that entity. He takes 
Hilary Putnam’s (1975) example to explicate this idea. As the term “water” was used 
in the eighteenth century as a designator of the colorless and watery stuff without 
knowing its chemical essence, the people only picked out something watery and 
colorless in virtue of its superficial (and even contingent) properties of water. It follows 
that these people are unable to know or declare whether the stuff they pick out was 
water or not. 
For Swinburne, if there is a logically possible sentence in which all the substances 
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and properties involved are designated by informative designators, then this sentence 
is metaphysically possible. For instance, a qualitative description of “I” in the sentence, 
such as “I continue to exist without any continuity of my brain, physical body, 
memories, or psychological traits.” is logically possible, and all the substances and 
properties described in this sentence are designated by informative designators. 
Therefore, the sentence is also metaphysically possible. Swinburne writes: 
 
If all the substances, properties, and so on, in a logically possible sentence, are designated 
by informative designators, then that sentence will also be metaphysically possible. 
(Swinburne 2013, p. 54) 
?
According to Swinburne, the term “I” is an informative designator because I know 
how to use this term, and it is not subject to illusion. More specifically, I cannot be 
mistaken about its application when I am applying the term “I” to refer to the subject 
of present experience. He writes: 
 
What sort of designators are ‘I’ or ‘Richard Swinburne’ as used by me? These seem to 
be informative designators. If I know how to use these words, then—when favourably 
positioned, with faculties in working order, and not subject to illusion—I can’t be 
mistaken about when to apply them; and when I am considering applying these words to 
a person in virtue of that person being the subject of a present experience, no mistake at 
all is possible. (Swinburne 2013, p. 158) 
My knowledge of how to use ‘I,’ like my knowledge of how to use ‘green’ and 
‘square,’ means that I know the nature of what I am talking about when I use the word. 
(Ibid.) 
 
Our knowledge of the use of “I” is like that of “H20.” One cannot be mistaken about 
the application of such a term. Swinburne states that the use of these terms is not 
subject to an illusion - the use of the term “I” is always immune to error through 
misidentification. Since the sentence “I continue to exist without any continuity of my 
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brain, physical body, memories, or psychological traits.” is logically possible, and all 
the substances and properties described in this sentence are designated by informative 
designators. Therefore, the sentence is also metaphysically possible. We are, therefore, 
things that can continue to exist without any continuity of our brains, physical bodies, 
memories, or psychological traits. 
What, then, are we? Swinburne thinks that we are souls. He maintains that there 
is an urge for us to propose the existence of souls. He defines a soul as follows: 
necessarily, for any entity x, x is a soul if and only if x is a mental entity capable of 
being conscious. For him, necessarily, we exist if and only if our souls exist. In other 
words, we are essentially souls. Also, I persist only when my soul persists. Our having 
physical bodies are contingent properties of our existence.  
He provides a thought experiment to argue for the claims that (1) we are souls, 
and (2) souls have haecceities. Suppose that there is a possible world W2 which is 
qualitatively the same as our world W1. There is the same number of persons, each 
having the exactly similar mental states as those in W1. Still, Swinburne thinks that the 
two worlds can be very different in terms of your own existence. The person in W2 
who looks exactly the same as you who thinks the same thoughts and has the same 
actions as you is not you. A full description of a world regarding its physical, 
psychological, and qualitative aspects does not provide any information about your 
existence. Since there is no difference in terms of the qualitative, physical and 
psychological properties of the two worlds, there should be something else that makes 
the difference. Swinburne thinks that it is the existence of your soul makes the 
difference. Your soul is there in world W1, whereas your soul does not exist in world 
W2. The presence of, say, your soul, does not contribute to a qualitative difference 
because there is not any qualitative, psychological, or physical difference between the 
situations in which (1) your soul has mental state M1 and (2) somebody else’s soul has 
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M1. For Swinburne, the difference between situations (1) and (2) is non-qualitative, 
thus is haecceitistic. Therefore, (1) each person has a unique soul for her existence and 
persistence, and (2) necessarily, for any entity x, x is a soul only if x has haecceity. 
 
5.2.1   My Objections to Swinburne’s Haecceitism of Souls 
In what follows, I argue that Swinburne’s argument that “I” am a soul that has 
haecceity is problematic. To recall, his argument is briefly that: 
 
1. Sentence A: “I continue to exist without any continuity of my brain, physical body, 
memories, or psychological traits.” is logically possible. 
2. Necessarily, if all the substances and properties in a logically possible sentence are 
designated by informative designators, then that sentence will also be 
metaphysically possible. 
3. All the substances and properties in sentence A are designated by informative 
designators. 
__________ 
C.  Sentence A is metaphysically possible. It is metaphysically possible that I continue 
to exist without any continuity of my brain, physical body, memories, or 
psychological traits. 
 
In my opinion, premise three of the above argument is dubious. My basic stance is that 
if “I” refers to the subject of experience, then “I” is an informative designator; however, 
if it refers the soul, a mental thing that is capable of being conscious but is not 
essentially conscious, then “I” is not an informative designator. We should, therefore, 
be very careful about how we use the term “soul” and how we understand the 
conception of I.  
According to Swinburne, a soul is a thing that has a capacity to be conscious. He 
writes: 
 
[T]he only essential properties necessary for a person to exist are the essential 
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properties of any soul, which – I suggest – are simply the one property of having 
(in some sense) a capacity to be conscious. (Swinburne 2012, p. 122) 
 
Swinburne states that an informative designator is a concept such that we can fully 
understand the essence of the properties of the entity we are referring to. A thing that 
is capable of being conscious is not necessarily a thing that is essentially conscious. It 
may sometimes be unconscious. Such a thing is only potentially conscious; it is not a 
requirement from Swinburne’s very definition of a soul that it is essentially conscious. 
If “I” refers to a thing that is merely capable of being conscious, now I may ask, what 
is the nature of the thing that is sometimes not conscious, but yet it sometimes 
instantiates my consciousness? Modern science tells us that it is the brain. However, 
for Swinburne, it should not be the brain because our brains are physical, and 
Swinburne has already put forward an argument against the view that souls are 
physical. Instead, he thinks that the soul is an immaterial substance. What is the nature 
of such an immaterial substance that is potentially but not essentially conscious?  
Some people would think that the essential property of a soul is the property of 
the capacity to be conscious. Since we know the essential property of a soul, we know 
the nature or essence of a soul. However, I doubt whether the essence (or essential 
property) of a substance can be dispositional. In what follows, I briefly introduce the 
idea of dispositions and provide my reasons for the claim that if the term “I” refers to 
the soul, it should not be an informative designator because we do not know what kind 
of entity we are referring to when we use the word. 
First, the capacity to be conscious is a disposition property. A disposition, briefly 
speaking, is a tendency, or a capacity, of having an actual status in certain conditions. 
For instance, we say that glass has the disposition to shatter when struck, or that a 
person has the disposition to get angry. When we assert these, it does not mean that the 
glass has already shattered, or that the person is now angry. A dispositional property is 
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one that is usually expressed in words such as “ability,” “potency,” “capability,” 
“tendency,” “potentiality,” “proclivity,” “capacity,” and so forth. Locke once uses the 
term “power” to describe such a property, whereas Aristotle adopts the conception 
“dunamis” to elaborate a similar conception. Rudolf Carnap (1928), for instance, 
introduces the idea of material conditionals to describe a dispositional expression. 
According to him, an object x has a dispositional property of “being soluble” if it 
fulfills the material conditional that “if x is put into water, it dissolves.” 
Contemporary discussions on functions in philosophy of science, in particular, 
biomedical science, have discussed the idea of dispositions. Philosophers such as 
Robert Arp and Barry Smith (2008) discuss the classification of entities widely used 
in biomedical research. They contribute to the revision of an ontological system called 
the Basic Formal Ontology (BFO), a framework for organizing and integrating 
biomedical information. BFO is now used by frontier research organizations such as 
National Cancer Institute in the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and 
the Science Commons – a renowned platform for sharing of scientific information.  
According to BFO, there are two basic entities: continuants and occurrents. The 
former denotes entities that persist through time, whereas the latter refers to events in 
which continuants participate. There are two types of continuants: the independent and 
dependent continuants. Independent continuants are bearers or carriers of dependent 
continuants such as qualities. The existence of dependent continuants, on the other 
hand, depends on the existence of some other independent continuant to serve as its 
bearer. An example of the former is the property of being soft, and the latter is the brain 
which serves as the bearer of the property. A disposition is classified as a continuant. 
They are realizable entities – a realizable entity is a dependent continuant which can 
be instantiated in associated processes in which the bearer participates. Some 
realizable entities, such as the function of a uterus to store and nourish the fetus, may 
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only be manifested once in the lifetime. Other realizable entities, such as the function 
of the lung to breath and intake oxygen, is realized in every single moment when the 
organism is alive. A disposition is an internally-grounded realizable entity that 
supervenes on the physical make-up of the independent continuant. If the disposition 
ceases to exist, it must be that its bearer’s physical make-up has changed. In the 
situation that there is a non-functioning lung, the function of breathing does not exist 
because some physical make-up of the lung has changed, such as its having a serious 
infection. 
I take it that the disposition, “the capacity of being conscious,” is a dependent 
continuant that depends on the existence of some other independent continuant to serve 
as its bearer. As there should be something, such as the brain, that serves as the bearer 
of the property “being soft,” similarly, there should also be a bearer of the property of 
“capable of being conscious.”  
Unfortunately, we are not informed what the bearer of this property is, and what 
its nature is. We have no idea about what the kind of thing that is capable of being 
consciousness is. There could in principle be more than one kind of thing that 
instantiates the capacity of being conscious. When one uses the term “I” to refer to the 
soul, one actually does not know what kind of thing one is referring to. Take “being 
fragile” as an example. There are many kinds of entity that possess that dispositional 
property of being fragile - it is plausible that their being fragile are grounded in 
different physical structures or lower-level physical properties in virtue of which an 
entity is fragile. Glass is fragile because of the molecular structure of glass, and a piece 
of biscuit is also fragile because it is crispy with air filled in between crumbs of it. One 
has a molecular explanation of fragileness, and the other has macrophysical reasons 
for being fragile. Similarly, there can be two or more substance in virtue of which the 
dispositional property of capable of being conscious is instantiated. We do not know 
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what kind of thing it is even if we know that it is a thing that has the capacity to be 
conscious. In this case, if the term “I” refers to the soul, it should not be an informative 
designator because we do not know what kind of entity we are referring to when we 
use the word. 
For “I” to be an informative designator, one would need a feature of the referent 
of “I” such that we can easily refer to such that kind of entity with that very feature. I 
believe that this feature is the phenomenal character of our consciousness. Such a 
feature explains why when we use “I” to refer to a conscious subject, we are always 
successful in doing so. More specifically, we are always capable of referring to the 
mental thing that owns the current experience via being aware of our conscious 
experience from a first-person perspective.  
However, if the only property that characterizes the soul is dispositional (such as 
the capacity of being conscious), then the existence of one’s soul would be independent 
of any feature in virtue of which one is capable of detecting from a first-person or a 
third-person perspective. In particular, when my soul is not conscious, nobody 
(including myself) can tell whether my soul exists or not. This renders the existence of 
the soul in principle unverifiable from both first-person and third-person perspectives, 
and thus it violates Swinburne’s idea that the soul is an informative designator. 
Some philosophers of the soul view, such as Descartes, believe that the soul is 
essentially conscious. One might be tempted to believe that necessarily, if an entity A 
is capable of being conscious, A is essentially conscious. However, prima facie, the 
former does not logically entail the latter. More arguments are needed for such a view 
to hold, and the burden will not be on my side. 
On the other hand, if “I” refers to a subject of experience, and if we adopt a 
Strawsonian definition of subjects of experience, then necessarily, “I” the subject of 
experience exists if and only if there is conscious experience. That said, the essential 
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property, or the essence, of a subject of experience is to be conscious. The property of 
being conscious is not dispositional, and there is a clear feature with having this 
property that allows us to tell whether the entity exists or not from a first-person 
perspective. We can, therefore, say that we know the essence (or essential properties) 
of a subject of experience. If we know the essential properties of “I,” we can also say 
that we know the essence of the entity “I” that we are referring to, and thus “I” can be 
an informative designator. 
My conclusion is that if we were to admit that the concept “I” is an informative 
designator, “I” simply cannot be a soul that is merely capable of being conscious and 
not essentially conscious. In contrast, it must be a mental thing that is essentially 
conscious. A conscious subject of experience is the owner of conscious experiences, 
and we have experiences directly in virtue of being a subject. Following my definition 
that subjects of experiences are essentially conscious and not just potentially conscious, 
a subject is an informative designator. When we propose that “I” refer to a subject of 
experience, we can confidently claim that we know the essence of the reference of “I.” 
I thus recommend revising Swinburne’s proposal of the haecceitism of the potentially 
conscious souls to the haecceitism of essentially conscious subjects of experience. 
 
5.3   Haecceitism of First-person Perspectives 
There is still another contemporary analytic philosopher who proposes that we have 
haecceities. As mentioned in chapter three, Lynne Rudder Baker (2000, 2007, 2013) 
proposes Constitutionalism of persons, a view saying that you are not numerically 
identical with an animal but are constituted by an animal. In addition, Baker proposes 
a view according to which a person has haecceitistic implications because of the 
haecceitistic implications of a first-person perspective. 
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Haecceity, according to Baker, is “a state of affairs of someone exemplifying the 
dispositional property expressed by “a first-person perspective.” (Baker 2013, p. 180) 
For instance, my haecceity is my exemplifying my first-person perspective essentially, 
and your haecceity is your exemplifying your first-person perspective essentially.35 
Following this, if there is a person A at time t1 who has x’s first-person perspective, 
and there is a person B at time t2 who also has x’s first-person perspective, then it must 
be the case that A=B. For her, having x’s haecceity, or, x’s first-person perspective, is 
the necessary and sufficient condition for the diachronic identity of person x. Baker 
stresses the particularity of a spatiotemporal location, and the origin of her perceptual 
field, from which the subject perceives the environment. She also proposes that 
persons have haecceities in virtue of having a first-person perspective. Although she 
uses a different definition of haecceity that Swinburne uses, both Baker’s and 
Swinburne’s definition avoids multiple instantiations of a single haecceity at the same 
time by two different entities. Second, both admit that haecceity is a non-qualitative 
fact that determines the uniqueness, identity, existence, and persistence of an entity 
that has haecceity. 
In my opinion, Baker’s view is flawed in the sense that a subject does not 
necessarily have a unique first-person perspective. In what follows, I aim to argue that 
if it is possible for (1) one single spatiotemporal location (or viewpoint) to be possessed 
by two or more perceivers at the same time, and for (2) one perceiver to have two or 
more spatiotemporal locations (or viewpoints) at the same time, it follows that the 
haecceities of a first-person perspective are questionable. 
                                                     
35 Baker writes: “Let F be the dispositional property expressed by “a first-person perspective. …the 
notion of an haecceity as a property to take an haecceity to be the state of affairs of someone’s 
exemplifying a property. So, my haecceity is my-exemplifying-F-essentially. Your haecceity is your-
exemplifying-F-essentially. Necessarily, person x and person y have the same haecceity if and only if x 
= y. So, necessarily, I have my haecceity and no one else does.” (Baker 2013, pp. 179 - 180) 
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Baker proposes that a first-person perspective carries haecceities, such that the 
sameness of a person is determined by the sameness of the first-person perspective. 
There are two stages of the first-person perspectives: the rudimentary and the robust 
one. The robust FPP is an ability to use first-person pronouns and to think of oneself 
as oneself. However, our ability to conceive of oneself as oneself as the subject of 
thoughts develops gradually, and the strength of our abilities may differ throughout 
our lives. It does not make any sense for us to say that our persistence is determined 
by the sameness of one of our abilities. Moreover, abilities are multiply instantiable, 
and it should not be the case that the robust first-person perspective determines the 
sameness of a person over time. If my ability to think of myself as myself has declined 
recently, it does not make sense to say that I do not persist in this case. 
Assuming that Baker’s theory is true, it should be the rudimentary first-person 
perspective that has haecceitistic implications. What exactly does it mean by saying 
that a rudimentary first-person perspective has haecceity and determines one’s 
uniqueness and persistence conditions? Let us reveal some features of a rudimentary 
FPP proposed by Baker: 
 
1. To have a perspective is to be disposed to perceive the world from a particular 
spatiotemporal location. 
 
2. [I]t is simply the default location of the conscious subject, the origin of her 
perceptual field, the location from which the subject perceives the environment 
that she interacts with. (Baker 2013, pp. 40-41, my Italics)  
 
For Baker, what makes a rudimentary first-person perspective unique is the unique 
spatiotemporal location of the perspective from which one perceives. Let us assume 
that this is what renders a first-person perspective haecceitistic. Since we all have the 
ability to perceive the world from a certain spatiotemporal perspective, what makes a 
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first-person perspective unique should not be the ability to perceive, but the 
spatiotemporal location from which one perceives. Arguably, there are two types of 
spatiotemporal locations when we perceive: (1) the spatiotemporal viewpoint from 
which one perceives the world, and (2) the spatiotemporal location of the physical 
entity (should be the brain in our case) responsible for producing the perception. An 
example will clarify. Suppose a person goes into an experience machine in Hong Kong 
such that she has experiences of herself at a beach in Hawaii. She does not have any 
bodily sensations or perceptions of being in that machine in Hong Kong. Her 
spatiotemporal viewpoint should be a certain spatiotemporal perspective on the beach 
in Hawaii, whereas the spatiotemporal location of the physical entity responsible for 
producing the perception is located inside the experience machine in Hong Kong. 
What about defining the spatiotemporal location of the physical entity responsible 
for the perception to be the element in the first-person perspective that has haecceity? 
Unfortunately, this proposal would render Baker’s theory inconsistent. If the 
spatiotemporal location of any physical entity that realizes higher-order properties 
determines the uniqueness and individuation of that entity, then many physical entities, 
conscious or unconscious, would have haecceities. This is not what Baker wants to see 
– she wants to argue that persons are special in the sense that they carry haecceitistic 
implications by virtue of having a unique first-person perspective. 
The other choice for Baker is to claim that the spatiotemporal viewpoint from 
which we perceive the external world is haecceitistic. My proposal is that the 
spatiotemporal viewpoint from which we perceive the world is still not an indicator of 
our uniqueness. As a spatiotemporal property is descriptive, in principle, it can be 
doubly instantiated by two distinct beings of the same kind simultaneously. It is 
possible that different subjects may experience the same spatiotemporal viewpoint. For 
instance, there can be more than two persons going into the experience machine, and 
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their spatiotemporal viewpoints are all the same: a certain spatiotemporal perspective 
on the beach in Hawaii. In this case, each person’s spatiotemporal viewpoint is not 
unique anymore. If there can be two or more individuals sharing the same first-person 
perspective, then the first-person perspective does not correspond to the uniqueness 
and identity of individuals. As a result, the first-person perspective should not be 
haecceitistic. 
Second, it is not hard for us to seek advice from the rapidly growing 
biotechnology and artificial intelligence that one day we can sense and control a 
physical part that is spatiotemporally separated from our physical body, which can “see” 
and “sense” things in a way as direct as using our limbs. For instance, we already have 
decent enough technologies that allow amputated patients to control over and have 
various sensations about an artificial limb or leg. It is not difficult to imagine that this 
artificial limb is sometimes not in direct physical connection with the main human 
body. The consequence of accepting the possibility for some of our effective bodily 
parts to be in separated places at the same time is that there can be many spatiotemporal 
viewpoints from which I perceive the world. Perhaps one day we all have artificial 
eyes in addition to our natural eyes. These artificial eyes can be separated from our 
human bodies and can “see” things from a different perspective. If it is so, the 
spatiotemporal viewpoint from which one perceives the world would not be one but 
many, and it would then fail to determine our uniqueness. The idea that a conscious 
subject necessarily having one single spatiotemporal viewpoint is thus problematic. If 
I can have two or more spatiotemporal perspectives from which I perceive the world, 
there can be two different locations eligible for being “my first-person perspective” at 
the same time. 
As my first-person perspective can be multiply instantiable at two different places 
at the same time, the first-person perspective does not carry haecceity. Haecceity is 
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defined such that it determines the uniqueness, existence, and identity of an object, and 
thus is in principle not multiply instantiable. Consider a situation in which (1) 
necessarily, I exist if and only if A exists, and (2) necessarily, I exist if and only if B 
exists. However, given that A?B and they do not necessarily coexist, then either (1) 
is false or (2) is false. Similarly, if I have two spatiotemporal perspectives from which 
I perceive the world and they do not necessarily coexist, then my first-person 
perspective(s) are not what determine(s) my uniqueness. First-person perspectives 
should not carry haecceity. 
 
5.4   Haecceitism of Subjects 
I will now argue that subjects of experience have haecceities. Before I lay out my 
arguments, let me first introduce some terminologies and definitions. 
I differentiate in this discussion two important concepts: (1) subjects and (2) 
human beings. As stated in the preceding chapter, I define a subject as a conscious 
thing that essentially has experience, and a human being (or human animal) a physical 
organism. My notion of “subject” is different from Baker’s conception of person in 
the sense that my idea of subject is very thin - so long as there is a conscious stream 
of experience, a subject exists. Under this picture, many other animals such as worms 
and spiders also have subjects of experience, even though they are not persons. I will 
extensively use the concept subject instead of person. I propose, instead, that it is the 
subject (but not the first-person perspective) which carries haecceitistic implications. 
I define haecceitism as the claim that the world could differ (change) non-
qualitatively without differing (changing) qualitatively. I adopt a common 
understanding of the conception of non-qualitative properties via exemplars such as 
“standing in front of Plato,” and I understand qualitative properties via paradigm cases 
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such as “having a certain mass,” “being red,” and “being located five feet away from 
a tree.” I define haecceity as follows. An object O has haecceity H if and only if H is 
what makes O a different object from other objects that are qualitatively the same with 
O. There are two claims regarding haecceitism: Haecceitism of the Conscious and 
Haecceitism of the Unconscious. Haecceitism of the Conscious is the claim according 
to which for any world W with at least one conscious being, W could differ non-
qualitatively without differing qualitatively. Haecceitism of the Unconscious is the 
view that for any world W with only unconscious beings, W could differ non-
qualitatively without differing qualitatively. 
I propose that (1) Subjects have haecceities, and (2) Haecceitism of the conscious 
is true. My arguments are modified from Robert Merrihew Adams (1979). Here is the 
first step of my argument. Suppose a great physicist suddenly announces a terrible but 
significant discovery - we are living in a universe with two symmetrical space-time 
regions - call this world the “symmetrical universe.” There are two sides in this world, 
each having exactly the same states of affairs with the other side at all times. In addition, 
each person has a mirror-person with the same mental properties at all times during 
one’s lifetime, and the environment she encounters is exactly the same as that of the 
other side. In this thought experiment, I define a person as a mental entity, a subject of 
experience that has certain psychological complexity such as memories, psychological 
traits, and personality. 36  More specifically, my mirror person has the same 
psychological properties with me from the beginning of the world to time t1. Suppose 
physicists tell us that the symmetry will be broken, and things in the two sides will 
behave differently after t1 due to charge differences. More specifically, physics predicts 
that the individual on the side with more positive charges after t1, call it “side A,” feels 
                                                     
36 I do not assume substance dualism here in this thought experiment. However, if one is a substance 
dualist, one can assume that each person is intimately causally related to one and only one human 
being in this thought experiment. 
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itchy and laughs during t1-t2, whereas the individual on the side with more negative 
charges after t1, call it “side B,” has intense pain and cries during t1–t2. I aim to show 
that there can be two scenarios: 
 
Two scenarios in the Symmetrical Universe: 
I. I am at side A.  
II. I am at side B.37 
 
I propose that there are three ways to argue for the haecceities of subjects of experience. 
They are: (1) the Chalmersian approach, (2) the Swinburnean approach, and (3) the 
Nida-Rümelinean approach. These approaches are not proposed by these philosophers 
although their names are mentioned here. David Chalmers does not propose 
haecceitism of anything; Richard Swinburne (2013) adopts a different argument for 
the haecceities of souls, and Martine Nida-Rümelin (2016) does not mention 
haecceitism in her theory. I adopt some of their ideas in the three approaches of my 
arguments of haecceitism of subjects. 
The Chalmersian approach is to say that the two propositions, namely, “I am at 
side A” and “I am at side B,” are all ideally positively conceivable and are thus 
metaphysically possible. Since there should be something non-qualitative that 
determines which I am. If “I” refers to the subject of experience, then haecceitism of 
subjects thus come along. The Swinburnean approach is to argue that the two 
propositions involve the term “I,” which is an informative designator. These sentences 
are logically possible sentences in which all the substances and properties involved are 
designated by informative designators. It follows that these propositions are 
metaphysically possible. Since there should be something non-qualitative that 
                                                     
37 Again, I do not assume substance dualism here. However, if substance dualism is true, one can 
understand the sentence “I am at side A” to mean that I am intimately causally related to the human 
being at side A. 
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determines which I am, subjects of experience have haecceities. The third (Nida-
Rümelinean) approach is to argue that there is a factual difference between the four 
situations. Given that there are no differences in qualitative (psychological, physical, 
or spatiotemporal) properties between the two individuals in that world, and yet these 
propositions correspond to different facts, it follows that the answer to the question 
“who am I?” is a non-qualitative further fact over and above all the observable, 
qualitative properties and state of affairs in the world. Haecceities of subjects of 
experience thus comes along. 
I think all these approaches are effective. I am more inclined to the first two, and 
I have some doubt about some implications of Nida-Rümelin’s idea. In what follows, 
I will delineate the arguments of the three approaches one by one and further comment 
on them. 
 
5.4.1   The Chalmersian Approach 
Let us start with the Chalmersian approach. There are three steps to argue for the 
haecceitism of subjects. In the first step, I argue for the metaphysical possibility of 
some propositions in the thought experiment. In the second step, I argue that there is 
something non-qualitative that determines my existence. In the third step, I argue that 
subjects have haecceities. 
I now delineate how the situations in a thought experiment are ideally positively 
conceivable. Recall that the two individuals in that symmetrical universe I have just 
mentioned have all the same psychological properties before t1. The person in one side 
of the two symmetrical sides of that world feels itchy and laughs right after t1 (call this 
person A), whereas the mirror person in another side of the world suffers from intense 
pain and cries starting from time t1 (call this person B). Suppose you are told that you 
are living in a symmetrical universe, and there is a mirror person who has the same 
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qualitative psychological properties with you from the beginning of the universe to 
t1.38 Now you are thinking about the question of which side of the universe I am in. 
The question of whether you are A or B is a real question, a fact that greatly affects 
you. Either you will suffer from great pain after t1, or you will not. It certainly matters 
whether you are going to suffer or not, and you are egoistically concerned with whether 
you will be A or B. Your being B is greatly different from your being A because you 
will suffer in the former situation but not the latter. The things that happen after t1 can 
be clearly imagined, and we have a clear and a positive understanding of the feature 
of the two propositions above. We can also successfully imagine the details clearly and 
distinctly – you can even imagine that you are waiting for t1 to come, and you anticipate 
seeing whether you will feel pain or itchy. We can say a lot further about the details of 
those statements and can even write a short story about your being in the symmetrical 
universe. We can perceptually imagine what would happen to us in a way that verifies 
that it is true, and the imaginative scenario does not reveal a contradiction.39 These 
situations are ideally positively conceivable and belong to the type of conceivability 
that has the strongest evidence for metaphysical possibility according to Chalmers’s 
classification.40 If ideally, positively conceivable propositions are those such that any 
                                                     
38 I presuppose some kind of internalism about mental states. Internalism is the view that the content 
of our mental states is determined by our intrinsic properties. Briefly speaking, I presuppose that the 
phenomenal quality and the representational content of the mental states of the mirror persons are 
the same. The mental states of the mirror persons are the qualitatively identical in virtue of the 
sameness of representational content and phenomenal content of the mental states. For instance, the 
mirror persons think that “A cat is on the mat.” The “mirror” mental states had by the mirror persons 
have qualitatively the same phenomenal content, the same phenomenal quality of “what it’s likeness.” 
Furthermore, their representational contents can be expressed by the same proposition. Hence, I 
would say that the mirror-mental states are qualitatively identical (they may not be numerically 
identical). 
39 According to Chalmers, some imaginations are perceptual (call them perceptual imaginations). In 
these perceptual imaginations, the subject has a perceptual image of the scenario she imagines. For 
instance, a subject conceives of a pig playing the guitar by imagining the visual image of a it. For more 
classifications of imagination and conceivability, see the introduction of this thesis.  
40 For more descriptions of different types of conceivable situations, refer to the introduction of this 
thesis. 
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ideal reasoners can perceptually imagine it and can verify the truth of it without any 
contradiction involved, the two propositions (I and II) in my thought experiment are 
ideally positively conceivable, and thus are metaphysically possible. Here is the first 
step of my series of arguments: 
 
Step 1: The Chalmersian Argument for Metaphysical Possibility 
1. We can ideally positively conceive of I- II. 
2. All ideally positively conceivable propositions are metaphysically possible. 
___________ 
C.  I-II are metaphysically possible.41 
 
This argument is followed by the argument for non-qualitativity. The argument is 
briefly as follows. The two propositions are metaphysically possible, namely, that it is 
metaphysically possible for me to be A or B. Nevertheless, there is no qualitative 
difference between my being A and my being B. There should be something non-
qualitative that determines whether I am A or B. In other words, the difference between 
I and II is grounded in something non-qualitative. Here is the second step: 
 
Step 2: An Argument for Non-qualitativity 
1. Propositions I-II are metaphysically possible. 
2. There is something that grounds the difference between two metaphysically possible 
propositions, whether qualitative or non-qualitative. 
3. There is not any qualitative difference between I-II. 
____________ 
C.  The difference between I and II is grounded in something non-qualitative. 
 
                                                     
41 I am grateful to Prof. Dan Marshall in pointing out that the necessity of identity is a possible threat 
to the conclusion of the Chalmersian Argument for Metaphysical Possibility. The necessity of identity 
is a claim that if two objects, a and b, are numerically identical with each other, then it is necessary 
that a is numerically identical to b. It is thus not metaphysically possible that I am A given that I am B, 
and vice versa. However, there are contemporary philosophers, such as Wolfgang Schwarz 
(forthcoming), who rejects the controversial claim of the necessity of identity. I would take it that it is 
metaphysically possible that I am A, and it is also metaphysically possible that I am B. Both scenarios 
are metaphysically possible because both are ideally positively conceivable. 
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I have already argued for premise 1 in the first step. I now argue for premise two. From 
the above discussions, we can see that the two situations in which we can ideally 
positively conceive are very different. For instance, situation (I) is for me to feel itchy 
and to laugh, which is quite a pleasurable experience, whereas situation (II) is for me 
to feel great pain and to cry, which is obviously undesirable for me. These situations 
correspond to different facts with which I am egoistically concerned; I have a strong 
preference for one but not the other. The two propositions direct two distinct facts. I 
assume in premise two that the differences between metaphysically possible 
descriptions should be grounded in at least some way, whether qualitative or non-
qualitative. 42  I assume premise three in my thought experiment that there is no 
qualitative difference between propositions I and II. Therefore, there should be 
something non-qualitative that makes I-II different; namely, there should be something 
non-qualitative that determines whether I am A or B.43 
Here comes the final step of my series of arguments for the haecceitism of 
subjects: 
 
Step 3: An Argument for the Haecceitism of Subjects 
1. There is something non-qualitative that grounds the difference between I (I am A) 
and II (I am B). 
2. There is something non-qualitative that makes “I” the subject of experience a 
different object from other objects even if they are qualitatively identical with it. 
                                                     
42  Philosophers such as Theodore Sider (2018) propose that there are fundamental and non-
fundamental facts. Fundamental facts are ungrounded. I regard the fact that I am individual A but not 
B in the thought experiment as a non-fundamental fact grounded in the fact that individual A has my 
haecceity H, but individual B does not. 
43 Some philosophers may think that the causal-historical-relational properties of the individuals in I 
and II are different, and this is sufficient to ground the distinctness of I and II. My reply is that the 
causal-historical-relational properties of the mirror persons in the two sides of the symmetrical 
universe are set to be qualitatively the same in this thought experiment. Second, some may want to 
claim that the relational properties of the mirror persons are different, such as the A instantiates “being 
two miles from B” and B instantiates “being two miles from A,” etc. The distinctness of these properties 
grounds the distinctness of I and II. My reply is that these properties can at most be the ground to the 
distinctness of the two mirror persons but not the distinctness of the facts that “I am A” and “I am B.” 
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3. Necessarily, an object O has haecceity H if and only if H is what makes O a different 
object from other objects even if they are qualitatively identical with it. (My 
definition of haecceity) 
____________ 
C.  “I” the subject of experience has haecceity. 
 
The first premise is what I have just argued for in the second step. For the second 
premise, both (I am A) and (I am B) are identity statements. There is only one thing in 
each sentence, namely, the entity that is that referent of “I.” The term “I” in this thought 
experiment refers to the subject of experience in these two descriptions because “I” 
refers to an entity with conscious experience such as pain and itchiness from the first-
person perspective in these descriptions. The ideal positive conceivability of the above 
scenarios stems from the fact that the concept “I” refers to the subject of experience in 
the above situations. The third premise is my definition of haecceity.  
This is how I come up with the conclusion that “I” the subject of experience has 
haecceity. There is one thing worth mentioning though. The diachronic identity 
conditions of subjects of experience in any possible world should be the same even 
when it is not yet t1. Even if you are one of the subjects in that symmetrical universe, 
and it is not yet t1, the metaphysical fact of identity regarding “who you are” is still 
there. The difference in psychology between the two individuals during t1-t2 does not 
change the metaphysical facts regarding the identity of the subjects. The test is just a 
means for us to understand more about the conditions of our existence. You may still 
wonder which one you are. Your question is a real metaphysical question, just that you 
are not able to know the answer before t1. 
 
5.4.2   The Swinburnean Approach 
Now, let us go on to discuss my second approach: the Swinburnean approach to the 
haecceitism of subjects. In the previous section, I have argued that “I” is an informative 
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designator when “I” refers to the subject of experience, which is different from 
Swinburne’s claim that “I” is an informative designator that refers to the soul. We 
know the essential properties of a subject of experience. “I” is an informative 
designator referring to a subject of experience, the essential property of which is to be 
conscious. If we take Swinburne’s idea that any logically possible sentence in which 
all the substances and properties involved are designated by informative designators, 
and that “I” is an informative designator when referring to the subject of experience in 
this thought experiment, then it follows that the posited situations I and II in the above 
thought experiment are metaphysically possible. Here is step one of my Swinburnean 
argument: 
 
Step 1: The Swinburnean Argument for Metaphysical Possibility 
1. Propositions I- II are logically possible. 
2. Necessarily, if there is a logically possible proposition in which all the substances 
and properties involved are designated by informative designators, then this 
proposition is metaphysically possible. 
3. “I” is an informative designator when referring to the subject of experience. 
4. All the substances and properties involved are designated by informative 
designators in both I, “I am A,” and II, “I am B.” 
___________ 
C.  Propositions I-II are metaphysically possible. 
 
After that, the second and third steps are exactly the same as that of the Chalmersian 
approach. We can plug in step 2: An Argument for Non-qualitativity, and step 3: An 
Argument for the Haecceitism of Subjects. Based on the assumption that propositions 
I-II are metaphysically possible, one can eventually come to the conclusion that 
subjects of experience have haecceities. 
 
5.4.3   The Nida-Rümelinean Approach 
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There is a third method to argue for the claim that subjects have haecceities. Nida-
Rümelin’s theory of propositional content captures the differences in meaning. For her, 
propositions 1 and 2 have different factual contents if and only if there is a feature 
which would render 1 true and 2 false. Also, there is a factual difference between 
propositions 1 and 2 if and only if they have different factual content. She claims: 
 
There is a factual difference between two alleged possibilities in the relevant sense if and 
only if there is a difference in factual content between the sentences expressing them. 
(Nida-Rümelin 2013, p. 709) 
 
And also, 
 
The sentences “C1 and C2” and “C1 and C3” have different factual content if and only if 
there is an objective feature which, if satisfied in a given situation in addition to what 
renders C1 true, would make that situation one ‘where’ “C1 and C2” is true and “C1 and 
C3” is false (and vice versa). (Ibid.) 
 
For Nida-Rümelin, the factual content of a sentence refers to the fact described by a 
sentence. There is a difference between the factual contents of two sentences if and 
only if there is a factual difference between sentences. Step 1 of the Nida-Rümelinean 
Argument is as follows: 
 
Step 1: The Nida-Rümelinean Argument for the Haecceitism of Subjects 
1. There is a factual difference between propositions I (I am A) and II (I am B) when I 
use “I” to refer to the subject of experience. 
2. There is not any qualitative difference between I-II. 
3. There should be something non-qualitative that makes I-II different. 
____________ 
C.  There should be something non-qualitative that “I” the subject of experience 
possesses, that makes I-II different. 
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After that, one can directly take step 3, the argument for haecceitism of subjects. The 
Nida-Rümelinean approach merges steps 1 and 2 of the Chalmersian approach.  
 
5.4.4   A Comparison of Different Approaches 
I believe that all three arguments are sound. Both the Chalmersian and the 
Swinburnean approach have the same implication – the two scenarios are 
metaphysically possible. On the other hand, the Nida-Rümelinean approach does not 
mention whether the sentences with the difference in factual context correspond to 
different possible worlds. Although we may not need to talk about metaphysical 
possibility in the argument for the haecceitism of subjects, it is crucial for us to know 
whether the two situations “I am A” and “I am B” are metaphysically possible. 
Nida-Rümelin is reluctant to accept that conceivable situations, in any case, imply 
metaphysical possibility. I disagree with her proposal. In what follows, I briefly 
introduce her notion of “non-descriptive individual nature.” I argue that the two 
situations, I and II, should be metaphysically possible. 
Nida-Rümelin thinks that conscious beings are special in the sense that they have 
non-descriptive individual nature. Unconscious entities such as chairs, trees, and books, 
on the other hand, do not have non-descriptive individual nature. More specifically, an 
entity possesses a non-descriptive individual nature if and only if “the constitutional 
basis for its existence is non-descriptive.” (Nida-Rümelin, 2012, p. 160) One may use 
a rigid designator to refer to that individual in any counterfactual situation and may 
say that the description “D has property P” or simply that “D exists” and these 
statements trivially endorses the view that D exists. However, there is no way to 
describe in a non-trivial manner what guarantees the existence of a thing. For her, “the 
constitutional basis of a thing’s existence is non-descriptive if and only if there is in 
principle no way to say in a noncircular manner what constitutes the existence of that 
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particular thing.” (Ibid.) If the individual has a non-descriptive individual nature, one 
can only have a trivial statement, such as that of including its existence, for the 
condition of the existence of an entity. One may also say that an entity X has a non-
descriptive individual nature if and only if “the constitutional basis of its existence can 
only be described using a rigid designator which refers to X.” (Ibid., p. 161) It indicates 
that the non-descriptive individual nature is a non-qualitative property that is uniquely 
possessed by an entity. 
Nida-Rümelin goes on to argue that conscious beings are very different from non-
conscious entities in the sense that we have a positive conception of an additional 
feature apart from the qualitative facts regarding the conditions of our existence from 
a first-person perspective, but it is in principle impossible that we perceive of an 
additional feature apart from the qualitative facts regarding the existence of an 
unconscious entity from a first-person perspective. On the other hand, it makes perfect 
sense to say that there is a perfect counterpart to you and yet she is not you. More 
specifically, we understand very well what it means by saying that “the perfect 
counterpart is you” (call this option 1) and “your perfect counterpart is not you.” (call 
this option 2) The first sentence describes a case in which you “wake up” discovering 
that you have the counterpart’s body and her experiences, and you live her life. The 
second sentence describes the situation in which you do not wake up, and do not 
experience anything – you simply cease to exist. To conceive of the difference, one 
has to think in a first-personal way from one’s own perspective. There is a genuine 
factual difference between the two options. Nida-Rümelin thinks that we have a clear 
and positive understanding of the difference between the two. Given that all the 
descriptions about the psychological and physical facts in situations I and II are the 
same, these qualitative facts fail to guarantee your existence. Every condition that 
guarantees your existence requires a rigid reference to you. It follows that you have a 
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non-descriptive individual nature. 
Nida-Rümelin believes that to have a clear and positive understanding of the 
difference between the two options does not imply that there is a feature that 
constitutes the difference between their metaphysical possibilities. More specifically, 
even if one of the options is metaphysically impossible, there is still a clear positive 
understanding for us regarding the two situations, and there would still be a factual 
difference between the two options. For Nida-Rümelin, even if the second option, 
namely, you do not exist, is metaphysically impossible, there is still a clear positive 
understanding for us regarding the two situations. There would still be a factual 
difference between them. 
I believe that there is a problem with Nida-Rümelin’s theory. I argue that if option 
2 in the above scenario is impossible, then the non-descriptive nature should not co-
exist with a conscious object. However, Nida-Rümelin wants to claim that there exists 
my non-descriptive nature F,” such that necessarily, I exist if and only if F exists. She 
would then have to admit that option 2 is metaphysically possible. 
Recall the two situations that she thinks we can conceive of. Suppose there is a 
perfect counterpart of you with your psychological traits and memories. Nida-Rümelin 
thinks that we understand clearly what it means by saying that there is a perfect 
counterpart of you and yet she is not you. Let us assume that this option is 
metaphysically impossible, as Nida-Rümelin suggests. That said, it is metaphysically 
impossible that a person has the same qualitative properties as me and yet she is not 
me. If it is true, then it follows that necessarily, my existence is sufficiently determined 
by my set of qualitative properties and nothing else. In other words, necessarily, if my 
set of qualitative properties exists, then I exist. Now, let us suppose that there is a non-
descriptive nature F that I uniquely have. Given that the psychological and physical 
facts sufficiently determine my existence, the proposal that “there exists a non-
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descriptive nature F, such that necessarily, I exist if and only if F exists” would be 
incorrect. The structure of my argument is as follows: 
 
1. It is metaphysically impossible for the perfect counterpart of me not to be me. 
(Nida-Rümelin’s assumption A) 
2. Necessarily, I exist if my set of qualitative properties exist. (1) 
3. There exists something non-qualitative, call it “my-non-descriptive nature F,” such 
that necessarily, I exist if and only if F exists. (Nida-Rümelin’s assumption B) 
4. If necessarily, I exist if my set of qualitative properties exist, then possibly, I exist 
even if there does not exist a non-qualitative non-descriptive nature F. 
5. I exist even if my-non-descriptive nature F does not exist. Contradiction. 
_____________ 
C. Either A or B is incorrect. Either it is not the case that (A) it is metaphysically 
impossible for the perfect counterpart of me not to be me, or it is not the case that 
(B) there is something non-qualitative, call it “my-non-descriptive nature F,” such 
that necessarily, I exist if and only if F exists. 
 
Nida-Rümelin is not willing to accept the conclusion that it is not the case that there is 
something non-qualitative, call it “my-non-descriptive nature F,” such that necessarily, 
I exist if and only if F exists. The claim that conscious beings have non-descriptive 
nature is her basic claim. She would then need to admit that premise (1) is false. It is 
not the case that it is metaphysically impossible for the perfect counterpart of you not 
to be you.44 
In summary, I believe that all the three approaches of arguing for haecceitism of 
subjects of experience are sound and cogent. I prefer the first two approaches, namely, 
the Chalmersian and the Swinburnean approach. The reason is that I disagree with 
Nida-Rümelin about her claim that the two scenarios discussed above are 
metaphysically impossible. 
                                                     
44 One possible objection to my argument is to say that the non-qualitative further fact supervenes on 
a particular set of qualitative facts. However, Nida-Rümelin’s proposal of non-descriptive individual 
nature would then be redundant. It is tantamount to saying that the non-descriptive individual nature 
is in fact describable in terms of a particular set of qualitative facts. 
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5.4.5   On Our Persistence Conditions 
I have argued in the previous chapter that we are essentially subjects of experience. 
Necessarily, when we exist, we are subjects. I have also argued that subjects of 
experience have haecceities, such that the persistence of any subject S is determined 
by the sameness of its haecceity, call it H, of that subject. The presence of H is the 
necessary and sufficient condition of the existence of S. Since haecceity is non-
qualitative, we can in principle know and tell nothing about our persistence conditions. 
Our persistence should then be an unanalyzable fact. My view of our persistence can 
also be regarded as a modified simple view which is not directly simple but ultimately 
simple, according to which there are two steps toward simplicity: step one is the claim 
that our persistence conditions are just the diachronic identity conditions of subjects 
of experience. Step two is to show that subjects have haecceities, and its persistence 
conditions are not analyzable any further. I still regard my view as a version of the 
simple view because our persistence is, ultimately speaking, not analyzable. 
 
5.4.6   Some Implications 
In what follows, I talk about some implications of the haecceitism of subjects. Recall 
the thought experiment proposed by Sydney Shoemaker (1984) and Derek Parfit 
(1984), in which an individual Brainy’s brain is split into two and put into two newly 
made bodies, Lefty and Righty. As Lefty or Righty both have equally good physical 
and psychological continuity with Brainy, all relevant physical and psychological facts 
fall short of providing useful information for determining the identity relations 
between the two resulting entities and the original person. As such, many 
contemporary philosophers stopped here and withdrew from taking the diachronic 
identity of persons seriously. For instance, Robert Nozick’s (1981) closest continuer 
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theory and Derek Parfit’s (1984) idea that “identity is not what matters” assert 
similarly that personal identity is just a convention. After all, we are capable of 
knowing all the observable facts regarding the splitting process. At face value, personal 
identity is just one among many kinds of identities of things - if we treat the identity 
condition of physical objects in a conventional way, then we should also treat the 
identity condition of persons in the same way. 
If we accept haecceitism of subjects, it cannot be the case that both Lefty and 
Righty get Brainy’s subject afterward. Either one of the resultant subjects is the same 
as Brainy’s subject, or none of them is Brainy’s subject. The haecceity of one’s subject 
of experience is a unique further fact for each of us, which is not describable in terms 
of qualitative properties. 
If one endorses the haecceitism of subjects of experience and believe that there is 
a non-qualitative further fact about our existence disclosed by the first-person 
perspective, one would also admit that observations from a third-person perspective 
are limited – it does not provide us with information of our own existence. Only when 
one examines one’s life from a first-person perspective can one understand one’s 
existence. 
The first-person perspective reveals a further fact of regarding my existence as a 
subject of experience, which observations from a third-person perspective is not 
capable of verifying. Since the further fact revealed by the first-person perspective 
regarding my existence is not to be revealed by all the qualitative properties, such as 
physical and psychological properties of the individual in question, the further fact 
regarding my existence is a non-qualitative fact. 
 
5.5   Objections and Replies 
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5.5.1   Objection 1: Haecceitism and Common Sense 
Haecceity is non-qualitative. It would imply that my haecceity exists independently of 
all physical/qualitative facts. It is tantamount to saying that “being Jenny” existed and 
could have existed before Jenny was born and the qualitative facts of Jenny’s body had 
existed. This is totally absurd. Are Haecceitists of subjects of experience committed to 
such claims? 
 
5.5.2   My Reply 
My reply is no – the haecceities of subjects of experience do not exist when there is 
no conscious experience. It is incorrect to say that my haecceity exists independently 
of all physical/qualitative facts. In fact, my haecceity exists only when there is my 
conscious subject of experience exists. Even if my haecceity is a further fact over and 
above the mental properties I have, its existence depends on the existence of my 
conscious experience. 
Although the existence of my haecceity is a further fact over and above the 
qualitative facts of the world, it does not mean that my haecceity exists permanently, 
or it can exist with having any qualitative property. To recall, the essential qualitative 
property of a subject is “being conscious.” A subject cannot exist without the 
qualitative property of being conscious. 
 
5.5.3   Objection 2: Haecceitism and Moral Responsibility 
Personal ontology sometimes has implications for moral responsibility, agency, etc. 
The claims that I am a subject, and I persist if and only if my haecceity persists is a 
non-starter because there can be a subject of experience that persists without 
psychological continuity. It is entirely unconvincing to say that such I persist without 
psychological continuity because it does not match our intuition about the strong 
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correlation between our persistence and our moral responsibilities. Also, if I am merely 
a subject, and a subject may not have any psychological complexities such as 
personality, memories, and psychological traits, then I may not have moral or social 
responsibilities. This is weird. 
 
5.5.4   My Reply 
I would choose to bite the bullet here. I hope that my theory could be persuasive for 
those in search of a metaphysical theory of our existence and persistence. It is not to 
say that moral responsibility is insignificant, but it is arguable that the metaphysical 
inquiries of personal ontology are in principle separable from the ethical inquiries of 
our moral or social responsibility. For instance, Immanuel Kant famously asserts that 
we cannot in principle know the metaphysical truth regarding the nature and the 
persistence conditions of the immanent self as a substance. There is a limit to our pure 
reasoning that we cannot surpass. However, this fact does not hinder the development 
of a workable theory regarding moral responsibility via our practical reasoning. 
Haecceitism of subjects is a theory that has similar implications to that of Kant 
regarding the relation between the metaphysical and the ethical. There is no guarantee 
that there is psychological continuity when a subject of experience persists and vice 
versa. Nevertheless, any theory that claims that moral responsibility is grounded in 
psychological continuity is in principle compatible with haecceitism of subjects. 
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Summary 
I did three things in chapter one. First, I argued that weak Animalism is not what we 
want, as it is not a fundamental theory that answers the question of “what we are.” 
Second, I argued that a traditional Cartesian substance dualist would reject either 
premise one or premise two of The Thinking Animal Argument. Third, I objected to 
Snowdon’s proposal, I pointed out that his argument only applies to Classical 
Animalism but not weak Animalism. Furthermore, I argued that he only focuses on the 
representational unity of consciousness, which is one kind of unity among the many 
kinds of unity of consciousness. I suggested that we may adopt a Phenomenal Unity 
Theory of Consciousness, a theory modified by Tim Bayne, according to which a 
subject of experience always has mental states that are phenomenally unified. 
In chapter two, I argued against Baker’s constitutionalism or person. I pointed out 
that since one can have a robust first-person perspective without having a rudimentary 
first-person perspective, and vice versa, the two are not different stages of the same 
property but are totally different properties. Furthermore, I argued that my essential 
property is not a robust first-person perspective. I also proposed that a rudimentary 
first-person perspective is not essential for our existence. I thus concluded that neither 
the rudimentary nor the robust first-person perspective is essential for our existence. 
I have four objections to Sydney Shoemaker’s theory of personhood. I proposed 
that I can exist as two distinct persons at different times, even when there is no 
psychological connectedness between them. Second, I argued that the waterfall 
illusion is an example showing that the representational contents of the mental states 
of a normal person are not necessarily unified. Third, Shoemaker explicitly claims that 
mental states are functional states. This proposal is problematic in the sense that the 
phenomenal aspects of our lives are totally neglected. Finally, I argued that we are not 
persons that are functions because we are not dispositions that are multiply instantiable. 
 201 
 
In chapter three, I point out that Jeff McMahan’s (2002) Embedded Mind View 
is flawed. His claim that broad psychological continuity is necessary for the 
persistence of the individual is redundant. Given that a sufficient amount of the same 
brain already determines the same mind, there is no need to propose broad 
psychological continuity as the criterion of the sameness of mind. I then argued that 
Galen Strawson’s (2011) claim that subjects are identical to its experiences it 
problematic. I provided some counterexamples, such as the action and reaction forces 
and a cause and its effect, to argue that things that necessarily co-exist may not be 
identical. I also revealed the disadvantages of a process metaphysics. His Conscious 
Subject View would be inconsistent if he endorses the view that subjects are processes, 
and processes are categorically basic entities that do not have essential properties. 
When one identifies a subject with a process, we lose the information of modal 
properties such as the essential properties of an object. However, given that there is an 
answer to the question, ‘will I* experience tomorrow?’ it follows that me* the subject 
of experience is a concrete object that has persistence conditions. 
In chapter four, I defended my own Conscious Subject View, according to which 
we exist and persist as subjects of experience, whose essential property is to be 
conscious. I provide two arguments for this claim. The Essentiality Argument is 
basically as follows. I first define egoistic concern such that necessarily, my concern 
about X can be egoistic if and only if I exist and persist as X. Furthermore, I argue that 
necessarily, I can be egoistically concerned with an entity E if and only if E is 
numerically identical with my subject of experience. I, therefore, conclude that we are 
essentially subjects of experience. My second argument, which I call the Argument of 
Persistence, is briefly that we have the intuition that we persist only when there is the 
gradual replacement of the brain. The best candidate to explain this intuition is that we 
persist as subjects of experience. 
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I also argued that there is a fundamental and unbridgeable difference between (1) 
an egoistic concern that involves concern about one’s future experience from a first-
person perspective and (2) an egoistically oriented concern that does not involve the 
fear of future pain or anticipation of future joy. I also propose that there are two uses 
of “I”: the improper and the proper uses of “I.” The proper use of “I” is when “I” refers 
to the subject of experience, and the improper use of “I” is when “I” refers to the human 
animal or the human body. 
In chapter five, I argued that Swinburne’s claim that if “I” refers to the soul, then 
“I” is an informative designator is dubious since we have no idea about what the 
essence of the soul that is capable of being conscious is. If we were to admit that “I” 
is an informative designator, “I” simply cannot be a mental thing which is merely 
capable of being conscious but not essentially conscious. Instead, it must be a mental 
thing that is essentially conscious. I thus recommended modifying haecceitism of souls 
to become haecceitism of subjects of experience. I also argued that Baker’s view is 
flawed because a subject does not necessarily have a unique spatiotemporal viewpoint. 
If it is possible for one to have two or more spatiotemporal locations from which one 
perceives at the same time, the haecceitistic implications of a first-person perspective 
would be questionable.  
Finally, I provided my own series of arguments for the haecceitism of subjects of 
experience. Suppose a physicist suddenly announces a discovery that our actual world 
is a symmetrical universe. We can ideally positively conceive of these: (1) I am in side 
A of this symmetrical universe, (2) I am in side B. Given that there are no differences 
in the qualitative properties between the two individuals, and yet these are genuine 
metaphysical possibilities corresponding to different facts, the answer to “who am I?” 
is a non-qualitative further fact over and above all qualitative properties. There is thus 
haecceities of subjects of experience.  
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